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OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING AND CERTIFICATION:
REMEDIES FOR DENIAL
DOUGLAS

A.

WALLACE*

INTRODUCTION

In the past three to four decades, occupational licensing has become
one of the most pervasive forms of state regulation of the economy.
At one time, with a few exceptions, only the "learned professions" of
law and medicine were subject to state licensing;' today it is not unusual
for a state to license as many as 60 separate occupations. The Council
of State Governments reported in 1952 that at least one state had
licensed more than 80 different "professions" ranging from abstractors
to egg graders, to yacht and ship brokers, and salesmen. State licensing
in its modern form, therefore, does not encompass only such occupa* B.A., Princeton University; J.D., Yale Law School. Member, Florida bar.
1. The licensing of lawyers and doctors in this country began in the latter part of the
eighteenth century and the first years of the nineteenth. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTs, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LEGISLATION IN THE STATES 15-16 (1952); R. SHRYROCK,
MEDICAL LICENSING IN AMERICA 1950-1965 at 3-27 (1967). This trend toward centralized

control over admission to the legal and medical professions was soon reversed under the
pressure of an expanding frontier and the ideals of Jeffersonian democracy. By the
1830's many of the old statutes were repealed or amended, and legal restrictions on the
practice of law and medicine were reduced to a minimum. COUNCIL OF STATE GoVRNmEwrs, supra at 18-19; J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: TiE LAW MAKERS 277
(1950); R. PoUND, TiE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 223-49 (1953);
R. SHRYRocK, supra at 27-42. The qualification of lawyers and doctors to practice
through a centralized licensing system began again in earnest in the 1870's. COUNCIL OF
STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra at 19; J. HURST, supra at 277-78; R. SHRYROCE, supra at 43-61.
After the Civil War, other occupational groups organized professional societies and
associations, and they too demanded licensing regulation. Their efforts began to bear
fruit in the closing years of the nineteenth century; the period from 1906-35 represented
a peak in the enactment of new licensing legislation. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
supra at 20-24; C. GILB, HIDDEN HIERARCHIES: THE PROFESSIONS AND GOVERNMENT 28-46
(1966). For an account of parallel developments in England see A. CARR-SAunERs &
P. WILSON, THE PROFESSIONS (1933); W. READER, PROFESSIONAL MEN: THE RISE OF THE
PROFESSIONAL CLASSES IN NINETEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND (1966).
2. See Hanft & Hamrick, Haphazard Regimentation under Licensing Statutes, 17
N.C.L. REv. 1 (1938).
3. CotNcI. OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 1, at 7-8. For discussion of licensing
legislation in specific states see Hirschberg & Gilchrist, Licensing in Iowa, 33 IowA L.
REv. 344 (1948); Note, Licensing of Professions and Occupations in Nebraska, 29 NEB.
L. REV. 146 (1949); Comment, Occupational Licensing in Illinois, 46 ILL. L. REV. 328
(1951). For federal licensing see Koons, Growth of Federal Licensing, 24 GEO. L.J. 293
(1936).
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ions as pharmacy, accountancy, and dentistry, which are understand-

ably subject to some form of control designed to protect the public
from the incompetent and unscrupulous. On the contrary, state legis-4
latures have found it in the public interest to license watchmakers,
house painters, 5 photographers,- and members of many other ordinary

trades. 7
Rarely does such legislation result from the demands of an electorate
outraged by ill treatment received at the hands of incompetents and
charlatans. Instead, the occupational group itself usually initiates new
licensing legislation." Moreover, such proposals generally move smoothly
from the legislature to the governor and finally into the statute books.
The only threat during the legislative process is the possibility of opposition from another professional group which feels the bill threatens
its interests.9 Although the existing maze of state occupational licensure
4. See, e.g., State ex rel. Whetsel v. Wood, 207 Okla. 193, 248 P.2d 612 (1952).
5. See, e.g., State v. Peck, 237 Wis. 596, 297 N.W. 572 (1941).
6. See, e.g., Sullivan v. DeCerb, 156 Fla. 496, 23 So. 2d 571 (1945).
7. It should be noted that the licensing of the diverse occupations has not been imposed simply as a device for collecting revenue. These licensing statutes often have
complex provisions concerning educational qualifications, competitive examinations, apprenticeship requirements, and similar conditions comparable to those in statutes governing the admission to practice of lawyers and doctors. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 407 I11.
565, 95 NZE.2d 888 (1951) (invalidating statute requiring prospective plumbers to serve
a five-year apprenticeship under a master plumber); Schneider v. Duer, 170 Md. 326,
184 A. 914 (1936) (invalidating statute requiring student barbers to master curriculum
including the following subjects: "scientific fundamentals for barbering, hygiene, bacteriology, histology of the hair, skin, nails, muscles and nerves, structure of the head,
face and neck, elementary chemistry relating to sterilization and antiseptics, disease of
the skin, hair, glands and nails, haircutting, shaving and arranging, dressing, coloring,
bleaching and tinting of the hair."); Roller v. Allen, 245 N.C. 516, 96 S.E.2d 851 (1957)
(invalidating a statute requiring applicants for licenses as tile contractors to pass a
written examination concerning tile installation); Moore v. Sutton, 185 Va. 481, 39
S.E.2d 348 (1946) (invalidating statute requiring applicants for a photographer's license
to submit to an examination on their technical qualifications).
8. See, e.g., W. GELLORN,

INDMDUAL FREDOM AND GovERNMENTAl RESTRAINTS 109-11

(1956); J. LIEERmAN, THE TYRANNY OF EXPERTS 14-36 (1970); Akers, Professional Asso-

ciation and Legal Regulation of Practice, 2 LAW & Soc'y REV. 463 (1968). Akers' conclusions are based on "exploratory research" of the Kentucky legislature. See also CouNcm OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 1, at 57.

9. In New York, for example, organized medicine mobilized its resources to defeat a
plan for the licensure of psychologists. Although the New York legislature passed the
bill, Governor Dewey vetoed it, citing the "vigorous and impressive objections" of the
state medical society and American Psychiatric Association. Comment, The American
Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics in Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L.J.
931, 968-69 (1954). The New York psychologists finally realized their goal of becoming
licensed in 1956. See SESSION LAws OF N.Y. ch. 737 (McKinney 1956). *
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has aroused the ire of many legal commentators, 0 the general public
normally is not likely to be sufficiently interested to participate in the

process. Thus, the legislative process constitutes only a minor barrier
to the enactment of new licensing legislation.
Although professional associations contend that additional legislative
controls are necessary in order to protect the public,"" critics of new
licensing schemes suggest that there are other, more telling, reasons
which motivate occupational groups to seek new regulation. 12 Since
members of the profession typically control the licensing authority,
legislation often results in a grant of self-regulatory power to the pro10. A representative sampling would include the following: M.
Am

137-60 (1962); W. GELLORN,
105-51 (1956); D. LEES, ECONOMIC

FREEDOM

RESTRAINTS

INDIVIDUAL

FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM

FREEDOM AND

GOVERNMENTAL

CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROFESSIONS

(1966);

Barron, Business and Professional Licensing-California, a Representative Example, 18
STAN. L. REv. 640 (1966); Doyle, The Fence-Me-In Laws, 205 HAPERS 89 (1952);
Graves, Professional and Occupational Restrictions, 13 TEMP. L.Q. 334 (1939); Hanft
& Hamrick, supra note 2; Reich, The New Property,73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Silverman,
Bennett & Lechliter, Control by Licensing over Entry into the Market, 8 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 234 (1941).
11. In testimony before the Illinois State Legislature in 1959, Nels J. Johnson, Chairman of the Illinois State Tree Expert Examining Board, observed that "the intent of
the tree expert law was primarily to protect the public against tree quacks, shysters and
inexperienced persons." Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J. LAw & EcoN. 93 (1961).
Similar testimony was given to the California Assembly by a representative of the
barber's union in support of comprehensive examinations for out-of-state barbers wanting to practice in California:
We have to consider too, California is the fastest growing state ... and
everybody wants to come here.
Question: Isn't it right to bring barbers... (also]?
Answer: Such an influence of them as coming in and they will tear down
the conditions.
Question: What do you mean?
Answer: Get more barbers here than they can use.
Question: Is the State worried about that or . . . about the health and
safety?
Answer: It would affect health and safety.
Question: How can it? . . .
Answer: If it tears down the conditions it would very definitely affect
the health and safety.
Barron, supra note 10, at 653.
12. Few critics would deny that on occasion licensure may benefit the public. Compare W. G.LHoRN, supra note 10, at 144-47, with M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 149-60.
Gellhorn concedes that licensing may "in fact afford protection against suffering at the
hands of the blatantly inept or patently corrupt," but argues that it should be "reserved
for special cases." Friedman, on the other hand, carries his critique of occupational
icensure to its logical conclusion with the argument that even the licensing of physicians
cannot be justified.

1972]

OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING

fession itself. 13 This allows the profession to govern admission to pratice and to discipline erring members.14 Consequently, licensing is a
very effective tool for dealing with the price cutter or other practitioner
whose conduct is deemed unfair or unethical.' 5 In a few occupations,
licensing may even provide the basis for a state-administered system of
price-fixing. 6 Finally, licensing gives the profession the ability to restrict
cbmpetition by raising standards of admission.' 7
Commercial advantage, however, is not the only motive behind the
demand for occupational licensing. For a variety of reasons, a rapidly
increasing number of occupational groups aspire to the professional
status and prestige traditionally enjoyed by the lawyer, physician, and

university professor.' 8 Teachers, social workers, librarians, insurance
salesmen, and many other "white collar" workers now claim that they
are entitled to be recognized as "professionals." 19 In order to achieve

professional status-or, as the favored expression has it, become "professionalized" 20-many of these groups have consciously reorganized
13. See, e.g., W. GaiLuoax, supra note 10, at 115-18; C. GiLs, supra note 1, at 34-46;
J. LxzERarrX, supra note 8, at 14-15.
14. See T. CalLow, Tnm SoCIoLOGY OF WORK 102 (1954).
15. Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law,
53 Nw. U.L. REv. 226, 249 (1958).
16. See, e.g., State Dry Cleaners' Bd. v. Compton, 201 Okla. 284, 205 P.2d 286 (1949).
In this case the Supreme Court of Oklahoma sustained the validity of a law delegating
to a State Board of Dry Cleaners the power to approve minimum price schedules supported by 75 percent of the state's licensed dry cleaners. See generally Plot, Occupational Self-Regulation: A Case Study of the Oklahoma Dry Cleaners, 8 J.LAw & EcoN.
195 (1965). For a decision holding a similar scheme unconstitutional see State Bd. of Dry
Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, Inc., 40 Cal. 2d 436, 254 P.2d 29 (1953) (4-3 decision).
17. See W. GEuLoL, supra note 10, at 117-18; J.LiEnBaRAN, supra note 8, at 28-30;
Barron, supra note 10.
18. Peter L. Berger suggests that the widespread yearning for professional status can
be explained as a natural response to the meaninglessness of work in modern society and
its concomitant depersonalizing effect. P. BERGwE,THE HUMAN SmsAn OF WoRx 214-17
(1964). Cf. A. ErZIONi, THE SEMI-PROESIONS AND TnaIR ORaANIZATION at vi-vil (1969).
Theodore Caplow, on the other hand, argues that control of the recruiting process and
occupational monopoly are the goals of the struggle to achieve professional status. See
T. CAPLOW, supra note 14. See also H. WmENSxY & C. LEBEAuX, INDU STAL SocIm=
AND SocIAL WELPARlE 286-87 (1958).
19. See, e.g., Wittlin, The Teacher, in Tim PROFESSONS IN APamcA 91 (K. Lynn
ed. 1965); Goods, The Librarian:From Occupation to Profession?, 31 LIBRaR Q. 306
(1961); Greenwood, Attributes of a Profession, 2 SoCIAr WORK,July, 1957, at 44; Taylor
& Pellegrin, Professionalization:Its Functions and Dysfunctions for the Life Insurance
Occupation, 38 SOCIAL FoREs 110 (1959). See generally Wilensky, The Professionalization of Everyone?, 70 Am. J.SocIOLoGY 137 (1964).
20. "Professionalization" is defined as "the dynamic process whereby many occupations can be observed to change certain crucial characteristics in the direction of ,a
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the internal structure of their occupational organization along the lines
of the legal and medical professions. 2' Licensing the occupation is one
of the most important steps in the "professionalization" process because

it represents the judgment of the state that the occupational group is
entitled to exercise the same kind of self-regulatory power traditionally

22
reserved to the learned professions of law and medicine.
Criticism of occupational licensure has focused on its anti-compedprofession, even though some of these may not move very far in this direction."
H. Vo L.Lm & D. MILLS, PROFESSIONALIZAMTON at vii-vini (1966).
21. Much of the literature in this field assumes that once the characteristics of professions are isolated and analyzed, an occupation may develop a program for adopting
these characteristics in a number of "steps" culminating in the achievement of professional status. See, e.g., Proposal to Professionalize Registered Representatives, 198
Tim COM. & FIN. CmoNIcLE, Dec. 5, 1963, at 3, 24-25. For a criticism of this view see
Taylor & Pellegrin, supra note 19, at 114.
Theodore Caplow's analysis of the "steps" involved in the process of professionalization is as follows:
The first step is the establishment of a professional association, with definite membership criteria designed to keep out the unqualified.
The second step is the change of name, which serves the multiple function
of reducing identification with the previous occupational status, asserting a
technological monopoly, and providing a title which can be monopolized,
the former one being usually in the public domain.
The third step is the development and promulgation of a code of ethics
which asserts the social utility of the occupation, sets up public welfare
rationale, and develops rules which serve as further criteria to eliminate
the unqualified and unscrupulous (see Chapter 5). The adoption of a code
of ethics, despite certain hypocrisies, imposes a real and permanent limitation on internal competition.
The fourth step is a prolonged political agitation, whose object is to
obtain the support of the public power for the maintenance of the new
occupational barriers. In practice this usually proceeds by stages from the
limitation of a specialized title to those who have passed an examination
(registered engineer, certified public accountant) to the final stage at which
the mere doing of the acts reserved to the profession is a crime.
Concurrently with this activity, which may extend over a very long
period of time, goes the development of training facilities directly or indirectly controlled by the professional society, particularly with respect to
admission and to final qualification; the establishment through legal action
of certain privileges of confidence and inviolability, the elaboration of the
rules of decorum found in the code, and the establishment-after conflictof working relations with related professional groups.
T. CAPLow, supra note 14, at 139-40. For a similar discussion see Barber, Some Problems in the Sociology of the Professions, in THE PROFESSIONS IN AMERICA 15, 22-24 (K.
Lynn ed. 1965). See generally A. CARE-SAUNDERS, PROFESSIONS: THEIR ORGANIZATON AND
PLACE IN SocIETY 3-31 (1928).
22. See, e.g., Kidneigh, Social Work as a Profession, 14 SocIAL. WORE YEARS300K 563,
571-72 (1960).
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tive aspects.2 3 It is argued that decreased competition through restricted
access to the occupation and the delegation of policy-making authority
to private organizations may amount to a re-birth of a medieval guild
system which is sharply at odds with American traditions. 2 Abuse of
the licensing power also provides the occasion for what Walter Gellhorn has aptly described as "the intrusion of irrelevancies," principally
the establishment of irrelevant qualifications for obtaining or continuing
to hold a license.2 A good example is the typical provision that conviction for any felony or misdemeanor justifies suspension or revocation
of an occupational license. Another is the common requirement that
lawyers must be United States citizens. 26 The addition of such occupationally unrelated definitions of eligibility to licensing statutes arbitrarily limits the individual's ability to pursue his chosen vocation.
Despite this criticism, occupational licensing has not been widely
reformed. Not only have the state legislatures been unwilling to halt
the extensions of licensing to new occupations,27 but courts have become
much less sympathetic to constitutional challenges to licensing legisladon. Fifty years ago the Supreme Court would have invalidated much
of the present licensing regulations on substantive due process grounds.28
23. See authorities cited in note 10 supra. It is often suggested that occupational licensing insulates the beneficiaries of licensing legislation from the market system and thus enables them to reap monopoly profits. See, e.g., J. LIEBEnmBN, supra note 8, at 141. It
should be noted, however, that in the present state of the art, economic analysis is able
to provide only the most tentative support for this proposition. The classic study is
M. FRIEDMAN & S. KuzNETs, INCOME FROM INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE (1945).
See also D. LEEs, supra note 10, at 15-17. Kessel, Price Discriminationin Medicine, 1 J.
LAW & ECON. 20 (1958); Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J. LAw & EcoN. 93 (1961).
24. See W. GELLHORN, supra note 10, at 111-14; C. Gum, supra note 1, at 227-32; D.
Lms, supra note 10, at 7; Grant, The Guild Returns to America, 4 J. PoL. 303, 458 (1942);
Reich, supra note 10, at 768-71.
25. W. GELLHORN, supra note 10, at 125.
26. Id. at 125-40.
27. On a nation-wide basis, the latest entrants into licensing's charmed circle are social
workers and psychologists. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 9040 et seq. (West Supp.
1971) (licensing of clinical social workers); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 5301 et seq. (SmithHurd 1968) (registration of social workers); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14 B-1 et seq. (Supp.
1971-72) (licensing of psychologists).
28. The Court's freewheeling attitude toward review of state economic regulation
prior to 1937 may be observed in the cases of Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 US. 402
(1926); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905). Its views on the individual's right to earn a living were expressed well in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), a case which did not involve occupational
licensing. In Allgeyer Mr. Justice Peckham stated:
The liberty mentioned in [the fourteenth amendment] means not only the
right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person
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Today the Supreme Court is less willing to pass judgment on the reasonableness of state economic regulation. 29 Indeed, the presumption of
validity which the Court has applied to state economic regulation has
been extended to the actions of state licensing authorities.3 0 As the
Supreme Court has retreated from this particular constitutional battleground, however, many state courts have succeeded to its place in the
trenches."' Frequently these state courts have invalidated licensing legislation on the basis of state constitutional provisions guaranteeing due
process of law.32 The legislation has been condemned as an arbitrary
as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the
citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his facilities; to be free to use
them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for
that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and
essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above
mentioned...
Id. at 589. See also Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 513 (1924), where Mr.
Justice Butler said that a state cannot, "under the guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily interfere with private business or prohibit lawful occupations or impose unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions upon them."
29. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co,
348 U.S. 483 (1955); Day Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Olsen
v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
The demise of the substantive due process doctrine is discussed in Hetherington, supra
note 15, at 226; McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exbwnation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. Rav. 34; Rodes, Due Process and Social Legisla-tion in the Supreme Court: a Post Mortem, 33 NoTRE DAME LAw. 5 (1957); Stern, The
Problems of Yesteryear-Commerce and Due Process, 4 VAJD. L. REv. 446 (1951).
30. See, e.g, Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954). In the Barsky case the
Court upheld the suspension of a doctor's license by the New York Department of
Education. The applicable New York law made conviction of any crime a violation of
the state's "professional medical standards"; Dr. Barsky had been convicted of failing to
produce certain papers subpoenaed by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. In dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas said: "The fact that a doctor needs a good knowledge of biology is no excuse for suspending his license because he has little or no
knowledge of constitutional law." Id. at 473-74. But see Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 333 (1867). In this post-Civil War case, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional
as a bill of attainder and ex post facto law a federal statute which would have barred all
persons who had participated in the "Rebellion" from appearing as attorneys in the
courts of the United States.
31. See Hetherington, supra note 15; Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due
,Processin the States, 34 MINN. L. Rxv. 91 (1950).
32. These state court decisions often include frank discussion of the anti-competitive
aspects of occupational licensing. A particularly good example is Roller v. Allen, 245
'N.C. 516, 96 S.E.2d 851 (1957) (invalidating statute licensing tile layers). See also Sullivan
v. DeCerb, 156 Fla. 496, 23 So. 2d 571 (1945) (photographers); Golden v. Bartholomew,
140 Neb. 65, 299 N.W. 356 (1941) (invalidating regulation requiring every licensed
funeral director to stock a prescribed number and variety of caskets); State ex rel.
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-and capricious restriction on individual freedom to pursue lawful occupations. Nevertheless, these decisions have done little to halt the expansion of occupational licensing; most licensing legislation is, certain to
3
survive the attack.

Closely resembling the licensing process is the form of occupational
regulation known as private certification. The fundamental distinction
between licensing and certification is that the former is established by
legislative enactment and the latter is established by private occupational
groups. a4 Otherwise, the functions of these two institutions are similar.

Through the certifying agency, the professional association is able to
prescribe educational and ethical qualifications for candidates for certification, administer competitive examinations, and award some hallmark of qualification to the successful. Additionally, the agency always
retains jurisdiction to revoke its certificate or diploma for incompetence,
"unprofessional conduct," or other shortcomings. The determinations
of the certifying board naturally lack the force of law, but often tend
to the same economic and social results as state licensing. The only
practical limit on the potential power of the certifying board is its ability
to win public acceptance of certification as a mark of quality. 5
Whetsel v. Wood, 207 Okla. 193, 248 P.2d 612 (1952) (watchmakers); State v. Peck,
237 Wis. 596, 297 N.W. 572 (1941) (house painters).
33. As the examples in the preceding note suggest, the state courts have been most
receptive to attacks on the licensing of manual trades which are relatively easy to learn;
litigation in other areas has borne little fruit.
34. Brief references to the certification device may be found in Anderson & Ertell,
Extra-institutionalForces Affecting Professional Education, in EDUCATION FOR THE PRoFEassioNs 235, 239 (N. Henry ed. 1962); C. GILB, supra note 1, at 61, 182. For a more
extended discussion see J. BRADLEY, THE ROLE OF TRADE ASSOCIATIONS AND PROFESSIONAL
BusiNEss SocIETIEs IN AMERICA 112-35 (1965). Analyses of the medical profession's use
of the certifying board in the implementation of specialization are also available. See
E. RAYACK, PROFESSIONAL POWER AND AMERICAN MEDICINE: TsE ECONOMICS OF T'M
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (1967); R. STEVENs, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST (1971) [hereinafter cited as R. STEVENS].
The term "certification" as used in this paper must be distinguished from state certification, a less restrictive form of licensing in which the state certifies the competence
of persons meeting its standards but does not prohibit other persons from engaging in the
activity at issue. Uncertified persons are simply prohibited from misrepresenting their
credentials by posing as certified practitioners. Walter Gellhorn cites as an example of
this form of state licensing the "registered nurse." "[Tihe designation of a nurse as a
'registered nurse' gives her a titular distinction that at once identifies her as a person
schooled in her calling. In many states anyone may nurse the infirm for pay, but if a
trained nurse is wanted, the certification of those who are registered serves to indicate
'the individuals of supposedly greater worth." W. GELLHoRN, supra note 10, at 147.
35. See A. Carr-Saunders & P. Wilson, supra note 1, at 358-59.
The possibility that the determinations of a private certifying agency may acquire the
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Several reasons have been advanced for allowing a professional association to employ the private certification device as an alternative or
an addition to state licensing. Some of these reasons may be described
briefly as follows:
(1) Definitional Problems: Frequently a professional group may
experience difficulty in drafting an acceptable definition of the
work it considers its exclusive prerogative for use in a statutory
licensing scheme. The American Psychological Association, for
example, has promoted the licensing of psychologists for many
years but has suffered many setbacks in its bid for licensure because
of the problems of defining the practice of psychology. 86 A broad
definition of psychology includes work performed by psychiatrists, social workers, marriage counselors, and clergymen, to name
only a few; any legislation which purports to give psychologists
exclusive jurisdiction over this vast domain is certain to arouse the
determined opposition of these groups. A narrow definition, on
the other hand, is of little use to the professional psychologist in
preventing the charlatan from encroaching on his territory. The
private certification device provides a partial solution to this impasse because it enables the association to designate for the benefit
of the public and potential employers those psychologists it considers professionally qualified.37 Corinne Gilb has observed that
private arrangements such as certification may also provide necessary flexibility lacking in statutory definitions "when the work
situation is in flux, and alterations in the divisions of labor may be
required." 38
force of law through incorporation by reference in a licensing statute should not be
overlooked. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111-1/2, § 626-101(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972)
(in order to qualify as a clinical laboratory director, a physician must be certified by
the American Board of Pathology in clinical pathology, or present evidence of acceptable
training and experience equivalent to such certification).
36. See Armstrong, On Defining Psychology as a Profession, 2 AM. PSYCHOLOGIsr 446
(1947); Note, Regulation of PsychologicalCounseling and Psychotherapy, 51 COLUM. L.

REv. 474 (1951).
37. The American Board of Professional Psychology was created in 1947 to carry out
these objectives. For information on the Board's current activities see its annual report
for 1968, New Directionsand Approaches,24 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 151 (1969).
Recently, the American Psychological Association has become convinced that the
difficulties in defining the practice of psychology, together with other problems, have
been resolved satisfactorily. The Association now seeks licensing of psychologists on a
nation-wide basis. See APA Committee on Legislation, A Model for State Legislation
Affecting the Practice of Psychology 1967, 22 AM. PsYcHouLGIST 1095 (1967).
38. C. GrmB, supra note 1, at 182.
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(2) National Scope: Unlike licensing legislation, private certification is not limited by state boundaries. This is important to an
association which desires to establish a regulatory system having
uniform regional or national basis.39 The medical profession, for
example, has achieved uniform national standards for the recognition of physicians as specialists through the use of the private
certification device.

(3) Licensing Substitute: An occupational group which lacks
the political power to secure state licensing occasionally turns to
private certification as an alternative means of achieving its goals.
A good example is the case of the social workers. When their first
concerted efforts at winning state licensure failed, the social workers developed their own programs for the recognition of "professionals" in the social welfare field by means of private certification.
(4) Intra-professional Goals: Private certification can be utilized to serve a number of intra-professional goals. Certification
programs often play an integral role in the drive for "professionalization." Certification has also been used with great success by
the medical profession as a means of implementing specialization,
and by a number of professions as a device for controlling a group
of dependent or allied technical workers. In a case of intra-professional rivalry, one faction may certify its own members and
thereby attempt to differentiate them from members of another
faction deemed unethical or less qualified.
(5) Immunity: Since the certification process operates in the
context of private membership associations, the likelihood of judicial review of the activities of certifying boards is often remote.
Traditionally, Anglo-American courts have been hesitant to interfere in the internal affairs of private associations; 40 the possibility
39. Although federal regulation may seem to be a logical solution to this problem,
constitutional and historical reasons will often render federal intervention inappropriate.
For example, centralized control over higher education is common in most foreign
countries, but in this country tradition favors state and local control. Moreover, it is at
least arguable that the power to regulate education is vested not in the federal government but in the states by virtue of the tenth amendment to the Constitution. See

Comment, The Legal Status of the Educational Accrediting Agency: Problems in
judicial Supervision and Governmental Regulation, 52 CoRNELL L. Rsv. 104, 121, 125-26
(1966).
40. See, e.g., Cassel v. Inglis, [19161 2 Ch. 211; Weinberger v. Inglis, [1911] A.C. 606,
aff'g [1918] 1 Ch. 517 (decisions refusing to set aside expulsions of two brokers of
German birth from the London Stock Exchange as a result of anti-German sentiment
during World War I). See generally Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not
for Profit, 43 HARv. L. Rnv. 993 (1930).
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of compelling a professional association to admit to membership
an applicant the association wishes to exclude has been unthinkable until quite recently.4' Furthermore, unless a court is willing
to hold that a certifying board is exercising quasi-governmental
power in the performance of its functions, the due process of law
argument relied upon in attacks on state licensing legislation is inapplicable without a showing of "state action." 42
In view of these uncertainties, the purpose of this article is to survey
the operation of the certification process in order to develop a frame
of reference for an examination of the following questions: (1) What
functions does the certification device serve? What is its economic and
social impact on the individual? (2) What remedies under existing law
are available to obtain judicial review of the actions of certifying boards?
(3) Is additional regulation of the certification device warranted? If so,
is it feasible?
WHEN LICENSING FAILS:

THE SOCIAL WORKERS

The case of the social workers presents a notable example of a professional group which turned to private certification after repeated
failures to achieve its goals through the passage of licensing legislation.
The social workers had several reasons for seeking legislative controls
over the social welfare field. A basic motive was a desire to enhance
the prestige of the entire profession. At least since 1915, when Abraham
Flexner concluded that social work was not a profession,43 social workers
have been deeply concerned about their status as professionals. Despite
a flood of literature designed to demonstrate the "professional" character of social work,44 the general public does not accord social workers
a status commensurate with their education and income." The diffi41. Compare Harris v. Thomas, 217 S.W. 1068 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920), with Falcone v.
Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 NJ. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961).
42. A case in which a court did hold that a private certifying agency was exercising

delegated governmental power is Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States
Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd on
other grounds,432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 US. 965 (1970).
43. See Flexner, Is Social Work a Profession?, NATIONAL CONFRENCE OF CHARTIES
A
CoRRECTIoNs: PRocEaDiNos 576 (1915).
44. See, e.g., Greenwood, Attributes of a Profession, 2 SOCIAL WORK, July 1957, at 44.
45. See, e.g, Rettig & Pasamanick, Status, Work Satisfaction and Variables of Work

Satisfaction of Psychiatric Social Workers, 44 MENTAL HYGIENE 48 (1960). The authors
conclude from an empirical study that despite the higher education and greater income
of the psychiatric social worker, nurses are accorded a higher status by the general
public and other professionals.
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culties experienced by the social workers in achieving the desired recognition have been compounded by problems such as the popular conception of social work as a "female profession," 46 the ill-defined responsibilities and areas of competence of the social worker,47 and what
has been described as a "scapegoat effect" resulting from the association
of social work with welfare activities.48 Public understanding and
acceptance of social work is also seen as necessary to obtain adequate
appropriations for the conduct of social services.4 9 Accordingly, the
social workers have sought legislative controls as an indication of community sanction of their profession.
Social workers also have been concerned that such rival professions
as medicine, the ministry, nursing, social psychology, and marriage
counseling might pre-empt areas of social work. This fear is not
unfounded. In 1953, for example, the Attorney General of the State
of Michigan issued an opinion defining the practice of medicine (as
that term was used in the state's Medical Practice Act) in such a manner
as to cast doubt on the legality of casework practice by social workers.
A successor attorney general issued a clarifying opinion holding that
social workers were not in violation of the Act. 0 It was hoped that
legal regulation of the profession authorizing social work practice in a
definite field would eliminate the risk that social work would be divested
51
6f some of its functions by a profession in a neighboring field.
In addition, some elements of the profession have viewed licensing
as a means of distinguishing the "professional social worker" from
workers in the social welfare field who lack professional training. Social
work is unique as a profession in that only 20 percent of its members
have obtained graduate professional training from a school of social
ivork.5 2 Because he competes with his untrained counterpart for many
of the same jobs,"3 the professional social worker "faces a persistent
46. See Meyer, Social Work, 14

INTMNA-IONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAl. SCIENCES 495-

96 (1968).

47. Rettig & Pasamanick, supra note 45, at 53.
48. Id.
49. See Youngdahl, Social Work as a Profession, 10 SOCIAL WoRK YEAR BOOK 497, 504
(1949).
50. Legal Opinion in Micbigan, 1 SOCIAL WoRK, April 1956, at 114.
51. Weinberger & Weinberger, Legal Regulation in Perspective, 7 SoCIA. Woam 67,
75 (1962).

52. Baker, Personnel in Social Work, 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SocIAL Wova 532 (1965).
53. Id. at 534-36.
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problem of trying to establish and maintain an independent identity." "
The history of the profession's attempts to enact licensing legislation
is explained in large part by the desire to solve this "persistent problem."
Despite the efforts of social workers to secure licensing legislation,
only California regulates through licensure. Dissatisfaction with this
result led to the establishment of a separate certifying organization entitled the Academy of Certified Social Workers (ACSW).= The requirements for admission to the Academy include: (1) possession of
a master's degree from an accredited school of social work; (2) two
years of regular membership in the National Association of Social Workers (NASW); and (3) two years of continuous employment under the
supervision of an ACSW member.5" All NASW members are to be
admitted to membership in the Academy upon application.a7 The
ACSW member is issued a certificate and authorized to use the initials
"A.C.S.W." after his name.
The ACSW program has experienced a large measure of success;
80 percent of the eligible members of NASW have been admitted into
the Academy.5 Social workers in private practice utilize the ACSW
54. Meyer, supra note 46, at 496.
5Mt. Kidneigh, Social Work as a Profession, 14 SocIA. WORK YEAR BooK 563, 571
(1960). The Academy was created by members of the National Association of Social
Workers. The NASW is the only national professional association of social workers in
the United States. Its membership is restricted to persons with two years of ful-time
study leading to a master's degree from an accredited school of social work. See French,
Professional Organization, 15 ENCYCLOpEDIA Or SOCIAL WORK 574, 576 (1965); Meyer,
supra note 46, at 503.
56. NASW News, July 1971, at 12, col. 4. The original plans called simply for the
creation of the tide "Certified Social Worker," a designation to be awarded to any
NASW member with two years of employment under the supervision of a certified
worker. The decision to create the Academy, a separate organization, was made on the
advice of legal counsel as necessary to avoid a violation of the antitrust laws. Schwartz,
On Certifying Each Other, 7 SocIAL WoRuc, July 1962, at 21, 23; Schwartz, Re-examining
the Record, 7 SocuAL WoRK, Oct. 1962, at 109, 110; NASW News, May, 1960, at 2.
Counsel to the NASW may also have feared the possibility of litigation under a federal statute giving a civil remedy against "[alny person who shall affix, apply, or annex,
or use in connection with any goods or services . . .any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the
same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce . . .infavor of
any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such
false description or representation." Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a) (1970).
57. French, supra note 55, at 578.
58. Baker, supra note 52, at 533. This high percentage of enrollment results in part
from the effect of the supervision requirement. For example, applicants for ACSW
membership must have two years of employment in one agency under the supervision
of an ACSW member. This has the effect of compelling agency supervisory personnel to
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designation as an indication of special training.59 Indeed, the success of
the program has been such that many employers specify that job applicants must be members of the Academy; "ACSW preferred" is also
commonly encountered. 60 But excepting the criterion of two years
under ACSW supervision, the requirements for membership in the
Academy are almost identical to NASW membership requirements.
Membership in NASW is open to persons with two years of full-time
study leading to a master's degree from an accredited school of social
work.6 ' Possession of the ACSW designation, therefore, signifies little
more than membership in NASW plus satisfaction of the supervision
requirement. Recognition of this fact, together with NASW's failure
to endow its creation with an independent board of directors, has
sparked vigorous internal criticisms of the spurious nature of the ACSW
program.62
Nevertheless, insofar as NASW continues to be successful in gaining
acceptance of the ACSW designation as an indication of special competence, it achieves the goal of differentiating one segment of the profestion from the other through the control of a title-a goal it was unable
to achieve in most state legislatures. 63 Despite similarities in the effects
of the ACSW program and the licensing legislation frequently proposed, the Academy, as a private membership organization, is subject to
a different set of legal rules because of the absence of "state action." "
Therefore, although an individual social worker might wage a successqualify as ACSW members in order to be able to offer ACSW supervision as a means of
attracting new graduates from schools of social work. See Schwartz, supra note 56, at
24-25. Personnel information notices in various issues of the NASW News typically
indicate that ACSW supervision is available to employees.
59. For example, 14 of 20 marriage and family counselors in the yellow pages of the
telephone directory for New Haven and vicinity are listed as AGSW members. Telephone Directory (yellow pages), New Haven and Vicinity, 250 (1971).
60. See section on Personnel Information in various issues of the NASW News.
61. See p. ... supra.
62. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 56; Kraft, The State of the Social Work Profession, in HuMAq SERVICES AND SocIAL WoRK REsPoNsmmrry 343, 364-66 (W. Richan
ed. 1969). Perhaps in response to such criticisms, the requirements for ACSW certification have been modified very recently to provide for a written examination of competence and the elimination of the former requirement that two years work experience must be under the supervision of an ACSW member. NASW News, July, 1971, at
12, col 3 & 4.

63. Only after the Academy was established in 1960 were the social workers able to
obtain passage of licensing legislation in a number of states. See, e.g., IL. ANN. STAT.

ch.

23, § 5301 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1968); N.Y. EuDuc. LAw § 7700 et seq. (McKinney

1971).
64. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
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ful legal challenge to a denial of his own application for a license, he
would experience' great difficulty in obtaining judicial review of the
general reasonableness of a private certification program such as ACSW;
regardless of the fact that it may impinge on employment opportunities
in much the same fashion as state licensure6
If the requisite state action could be found to support judicial or
administrative review of the reasonableness of such certification programs,, the reviewing tribunal ought to consider the public interest in
adequate information about the professional designation. 6 A professional designation or degree which truly evidences advanced training
and special competence can be of great value to the public if it promotes an informed choice of professional services. While that certifying
body desires to"restrict its membership for the reasons suggested above;
the public expects that the professional designation conferred upon
members will be meaningful in terms of providing information as to the
members' professional competence. If the designation enables the consuming public to choose discriminatingly among professionals, then the
restrictive effects of certification should be upheld. The courts should
balance the restrictive effect of certification against the value to the
public of the certified designation. Certification in the medical field,
for example, furnishes the public with valuable information otherwise
unavailable, guaranteeing that a doctor holding himself out as a specialist
has the necessary training and experience in his area of specialization. 7
The ACSW designation, on the other hand, has little or no value as a
means of inforiming the public about a social worker's training and
competence. It-indicates nothing more than the possession of a master's degree in social work plus two years of experience under the
supervision of another ACSW member. Accordingly, the balancing
test suggests that, in view of the negligible informative content of the
social workers' designation, the courts, in anaction challenging ACSW
denial of certification, may look with disfavor upon the restrictive
effect of the designation.
CERTIFICATION' AND SPECIALIZATION IN MEDICINE AND LAW

Private certification may be used to implement specialization in a field
inwhich entry into the profession at the level of general practice i
65. The aggrieved party may seek a remedy in an antitrust action. See pp. 89-108 infra.
66. See generally Note, Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARv.L. REv. 983, 1048 (1963).
67. See GRaENwooD & FREDERICKSON, SPECIALIZATION IN THE MEDICAL AND LEGAL PaoFESSIONS 11-47 (1964) [hereinafter cited as GRaENwooD].'
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already regulated through state licensure. The medical profession has.
achieved great success in the education, testing, and recognition of
specialists through the private certification process." In the absence of
any other viable organizational solution,69 responsibility for the certification of specialists in the medical profession devolved in the 1930's."
into the hands of independent specialty boards composed of recognized.
specialists 0 who established requirements and procedures and determined
the qualifications of physicians who wished to be certified. There are
now 20 of these specialty boards, each having jurisdiction over a separate:
medical specialty; 71 some boards recognize and give certificates in sub-.
specialties, and others grant certificates in special divisions of their.
68.

GREENWOOD,

states.

supra note 67;

STEvENS, supra note

COUNCIL OF STATE GovERNMENTs,

34. Physicians are licensed in all

OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LEGISLATION IN TIM

74-75 (1952).
69. For a discussion of other solutions to the specialization question considered by the
medical profession in the 1920's and 1930's see STEVENS, supra note 34, at 149-71, 198-216.
70. Typically, board members are elected from diplomates nominated by independent
specialty organizations. Candidates for election to the American Board of Orthopaedic
Surgery, for example, are nominated by the American Orthopaedic Association, The
Section on Orthopaedic Surgery of the American Medical Association, and The Ameri!
can Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons. Selection of future board members from the
group of nominees is made by the old board members. 14 AMEmucAN BoAmD OF MEDICAL:
SPECIALTIES, DREcToRY OF MDICAL SPECIALisrs 807 (1970) [hereinafter cited as DRESTATES

TORY].

71. The various specialty boards and the year of their incorporation are as follows:

DIRECrORY

Anesthesiology

1937

Colon and Rectal Surgery
Dermatology
Family Practice

1934
1932
1969

Internal Medicine

1936

Neurological Surgery

1940

Obstetrics and Gynecology
Ophthalmology

1930
1917

Orthopaedic Surgery
Otolaryngology
Pathology
Pediatrics
Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation
Plastic Surgery
Preventive Medicine

1934
1924
1936
1933
1947
1937
1948

Psychiatry and Neurology

1934

Radiology
Surgery
Thoracic Surgery
Urology
supra, note .70, at xvii-xviii.

1934
1937
1948
1935
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specialty. 72 Supervising the operations of the 20 specialty boards is the
American Board of Medical Specialties.73 The primary functions of
the Board are to consider and pass upon applications for the approval
of new specialty boards and to oversee the relatively autonomous
boards.74 The Board recommends certain policies to be followed by
approved specialty boards, but lacks the machinery for strict enforcement of its recommendations.

75

The requirements for certification established by the various specialty
boards differ to such a degree that it is impossible to summarize adequately. 78 In very general terms, however, each board requires the
candidate for certification to have satisfactory professional ability,
moral character, and preliminary training. Additional advanced training
appropriate to the area of specialization is also required. Often the
training requirement may be satisfied in several ways, and completion
of the training program frequently will require several years. Finally,
the candidate must successfully complete a series of examinations. The
candidate who completes this arduous process generally is accorded
"diplomate" status by the certifying board and is entitled to have his
name listed in the Directory of Medical Specialists, an important reference volume which classifies board-certified specialists according
to
77
information.
biographical
appropriate
with
address,
and
specialty
This complicated system for the recognition of specialists has become
a subject of controversy within the medical profession. Critics have
noted 10 shortcomings of medical certification. First, the existence of
numerous sharply defined specialties and subspecialties has resulted in
overlapping jurisdiction among the boards, necessitating arbitration of
the inevitable jurisdictional disputes.7 8 Second, the membership of the
boards is unrepresentative. Third, the members are not accountable
72. The American Board of Internal Medicine, for example, recognizes sub-specialties
in allergy, cardiovascular disease, gastroenterology, and pulmonary disease. DImcroRY,
supra note 70, at 150.
73. "The American Board is composed of two representatives selected by each of its
member organizations." DiREroRY, supranote 70, at xvii.
74. Id. For a discussion of the founding of the Board see STEVENS, supra note 34, at
212-15.

75. See statement of "Policies of Approved Specialty Boards," STEvENs, supra note 34,
at 212-16.

76. For a complete statement of these requirements, see the introductory material inserted by each board in the Dni=croay, supranote 70.
77. Non-certified physician specialists are not listed. DIRECTORY, supra note 70, at vi.
78. See generally Croatman & Barland, What's Gone Wrong zvith Specialism? It
Causes JurisdictionalDisputes, 37 MICAL EcoN, Feb. 15, 1960, at 86.
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for their decisions. 79 Fourth, some requirements for certification are

arbitrary80 Particularly objectionable is the requirement that an applicant for certification obtain references from certified men in his local
community; this may enable a specialist who has already attained
"diplomate" status to "blackball" a local competitor."1 Fifth, the examination system is unnecessary and redundant to the residency programs,
especially since some boards tend to pass almost every candidate while
others fail 40 to 50 percent of their applicants."' Sixth, some boards
deny or revoke the certificate without an explanation or hearing."'
Seventh, the large number of autonomous boards has caused a lack of
unity in educational policy and programs among specialty boards in
contiguous fields and has contributed to the absence of an authoritative policymaking body responsible for supervising the development
of graduate medical education in terms of the actual demands of medical
care. 4 The eighth criticism concerns the utility of certification. It
could be an invaluable source of information concerning the qualifications of a medical specialist. Patient and doctor alike are frequently
ill-prepared to determine the merits of self-proclaimed specialists; board
certification might function as a guarantee that a specialist has advanced
training in his chosen field. However, empirical studies of the quality
of patient care have shown that the quality of care usually given by
79. Board-certified specialists describe the typical board member as older and not
familiar with new modes of practice and assert that the boards are dominated by persons
not in private practice. The boards are also criticized as "self-perpetuating" because of
the system which allows old board members to choose from the names offered by the
nominating societies. Croatman & Barland, Behind the Tangled Web of Specialism: The
Specialty Boards, 37 MEnicAL EcoN, May 23, 1960, at 80, 82-85, 288.
80. Id. at 278. The boards dropped many obviously irrelevant requirements, e.g.,
A.M.A. membership and United States citizenship in the mid-1960's. Nevertheless, five
boards still require citizenship. SvENs, supra note 34, at 321-22.
81. Croatman & Barland, supra note 79, at 278. The American Board of Otolaryngology, for example, requires the application for certification to be signed by two
diplomates of the Board. Dimcrony, supra note 70, at 910.
82. SiavENs, supra note 34, at 323; Croatman & Barland, supra note 79, at 280, 287-88.
83. Croatman & Barland, supra note 79, at 278-79. The procedures of the various
boards concerning the grant of a hearing in connection with the revocation of a certificate differ. Some expressly provide for notice of charges and hearing. See, e.g,
DitnaroRy, supra note 70, at 810 (orthopaedic surgery). Others grant a hearing only in
the exercise of their own discretion. DiacroRy, supra note 70, at 2044 (urology). Still
others specify whether a hearing or other procedural safeguards are required. See, e.g.,
DmaroRy, supra note 70, at 535 (obstetrics and gynecology).
84. See STEvENS, supra note 34, at 321.
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certified specialists is not superior to the care given by non-certified
85
physicians.
Ninth, with the rapid advance of medical technology, the boards
typically have failed to require that member specialists keep abreast
of developments.8 6 Tenth, the specialty certification system tends to
increase the incomes 7 of board-certified doctors by restricting hospital
85. See R. TRUSSE, THE QUANTITY, QUALITY AND Costs OF MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL
CARE SECURED BY A SAMPLE OF TEAMSTER FAMILIEs IN THE NEW YORK AREA 3 (1962).

This study reported that patients under the care of physicians certified by a specialty
board, as well as those under the care of house staff in voluntary or municipal hospitals,
received the highest proportion of optimal care. However, this was true only when
care was given in hospitals affiliated with medical schools. The care given by certified
specialists in hospitals unaffiliated with medical schools or having no approved training
programs was not superior to the care given by physicians without such qualifications.
86. See L. LASAGNA, LIFE, DEATH, AND) THE DOCTOR 70-71 (1968).
An example of the incongruous and potentially dangerous results which follow from
the failure of the boards to insure that its diplomates maintain a high level of competence is the case of Dr. John Joseph Foote. Dr. Foote, a graduate of the Harvard
Medical School, was certified by the American Board of Surgery in 1949. In 1965 his
license to practice medicine in the State of Kansas was revoked by the Kansas State
Board of Healing Arts on grounds of "extreme incompetency.' Although Dr. Foote
challenged the action of the Kansas Board in the courts, the Board's decision was sustained by the Supreme Court of Kansas. Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts v. Foote, 200
Kan. 447, 436 P.2d 828 (1968). Nevertheless, Dr. Foote's certificate has not been
revoked and he is listed in the most recent edition of the Directory of Medical Specialists (1970-71) as a Diplomate of the American Board of Surgery. DIRECTORY, supra note
70, at 1819. See also letter from J. W. Humphreys, Jr, M.D, Secretary of the American
-Board of Surgery, Inc. to DouglasA. Wallace, Nov. 18, 1971.
. Both the American Board of Internal Medicine and the American Board of Family
-Practice have announced recently that they will require periodic recertification of
their diplomates. The certificate of the Board of Family Practice, for example, will be
valid only for six years. STEvEms, supra note 34, at 345.
The Oregon Medical Association has taken action to meet this problem by requiring
fulfillment of continuing educational requirements tailored to individual specialties as a
condition of continued membership in the Association. In January, 1972, eleven physicians were suspended from the Association for failure to meet the requirements. These
suspensions were the first in the United States made by a state medical association on
'educational grounds. New York Times, Jan. 9, 1972, at 63, col. 6.
87. See GREENwooD, supra note 67, at 28-29; RAYACK, supra note 34, at 212-19; STEVENS,
supra note 34, at 251-57, 265-66, 305-10.
Certified physicians enjoy many other professional advantages, such as higher salaries
at Veterans Administration hospitals than their non-certified colleagues and preferential
promotion into higher grades in the armed services. GaENwooD, supra note 67, at 28;
"STEvENs, supra note 34, at 278, 285. The courts recognize the economic importance of
board certification to the specialist. See, e.g., Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Ortho'dontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d 495, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969); Kronen v. Pacific Coast
Soc'y of Orthodontists, 237 Cal. App. 2d 289, 46 Cal. Rptr. 808 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 905 (1966). Both cases involve certification programs for orthodontists operated by the American Board of Orthodontists. See Fontanetta v. American
Bd. of Internal Medicine, 303 F. Supp. 427, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
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staff privileges to board-certified men, 8 to the exclusion of general
practitioners and non-certified specialists.8 9
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the certification process generally insures an initial level of competence and potentially may enable
the consuming public to discriminate between a specialist and a nonspecialist. In contrast to medicine, the practice of law in the United
States has from its inception been marked by its nonspecialized character.9 0 However, as the potentialities of certification are being recognized, a trend toward specialization has developed in the legal profession.91 Accordingly, proposals presented in 1954 and 1962 for the
88. See E. RAYAcK, supra note 34, at 220 passim. Rayack cites evidence that the incomes of specialists in the East (where restriction of hospital staff privileges is more
prevalent) exceed the incomes of general practitioners by a greater percentage than
the incomes of specialists in the West (where restriction of hospital staff privileges :is
less prevalent) exceed the incomes of general practitioners. This suggests "that medical
staff restrictionism tends to raise the relative incomes of specialists." Id. at 239. He concedes, however, that "the data required for giving a rigorous answer to this questi6n
are not available." Id.
For information concerning the actual incomes of specialists see GaENWooD, supra
note 67, at 26-27.
89. Dr. Charles E. Letorneau, president of the American College of Legal Medicine,
in response to the question whether he had seen situations where whole groups of staff
doctors, such as G.Ps, had suddenly had their privileges reduced, stated: "Yes, typically
this happens when a horde of surgical specialists moves into an area only to discover
there's not enough surgery to go around. I've seen it affect four or five hospitals in the
same community. Board-certified men try to freeze out the competition completely,
even though local G.Ps had been there for 30 years doing good work." Panel Discussion,
Four Major Hospital Staff Problems, 42 MEmxct EcoN., April 5, 1965, at 73, 90.
For an account of the struggle between board-certified specialists and general practitioners over the adoption of restrictions on staff privileges at a San Francisco hospital
see Kaye, New Curb on Surgical and OB Privileges, 42 MEDMcAL EcoN., May 31, 1965,
at 59. Despite their argument for an individual evaluation of applicants for staff privileges by the hospital itself rather than a blanket restriction, the G.Ps lost the battle.
See G.P.s Lose Fight to Change Staff Bylaws at San Francisco Hospital, 105 MoDaDEa
HospiTAL, July, 1965, at 153.
90. See generally D. BooRsnN, THE AMERIcANs: TmE COLONIAL EXPEIENcE 195-202
(1958); HURsr, supra note 1, at 309-11; GRNwooD, supranote 67, at 49-50.
91. See generally Q. JoHNsroNE & D. HOPsON, JR., LAwYERs AND Tax WoaK: AN

ANALYsis

OF THE LEGAL PRoFEsSIoN IN THE UNITD STATEs AND ENGLAND

131-59 (1967);

GREENwooD, supra note 67, at 50-51.

By far the most common way of locating a specialist is to consult one of the numerous
law lists, such as the Martindale-Hubbell Legal Directory, indicating the "branches of
the profession practiced" by the lawyers listed therein. Ga.MiWooo, supra note 67, at
93-94. The difficulty with this system is that such indications of "branches of the profession practices" often constitute nothing more than "self-proclaimed assertions of
competence" by the attorney involved and thus provide no substantial guidance to the
public or protection to true specialists. Harnsberger, Publicationof Specialties and Legal
Ability Ratings in Law Lists, 49 A.B.A.J. 33, 37-38 (1963).
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certification of lawyers as specialists by committees of the American
Bar Association closely resembled medicine's specialty board system.92
These proposals were defeated primarily because of the uncertainties
in their scope and operation, and the fears of some attorneys that implementation of the proposals would result in a loss of their clients to
specialists. 93
Despite the defeat of the ABA proposals, discussion and development
of certification programs for lawyers have continued within the various
state bar associations. 4 California has initiated a pilot program for certifying specialists in the fields of workmen's compensation, criminal
law, and taxation.95 A practitioner certified under the California plan
will be permitted to list his specialty in the yellow pages of the telephone directory, but not on a business card or letterhead.9" Should
the California program prove successful, certification of legal specialthe United States and take
ists seems destined to spread throughout
97
on increasing importance in the future.
Board certification as a vehicle for implementing specialization in
92. See, e.g., Joiner, Specialization in the Law? The Medical Profession Shows the
Way, 39 A.B.AJ. 539 (1953). For an account of the ABA proposals see GazzNwooD,
supra note 67, at 163-78.
93. See GREENwooD, supra note 67, at 170-72; Q. JOHNSTONE AND D. HoPsoN, supra note
91, at 156.
94. See, e.g., Epps, The Virginia Plan of Specialization, 41 N.Y.STB.J. 294 (1969).
The Virginia State Bar has asked the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to reject the
plan. Specialization and the Bar, 4 TRau, Oct./Nov., 1968, at 4.
The American Bar Association has authorized the creation of such certification programs within the states. See ABA, CODE OF PRoFEssioNA. RESPO NSIBILiTY, ETHICAL CONsmERA~1ozN 2-14, Disc'ImNARY RuxL 2-105.
95. The Gilt-Edged Profession, FoaBs, Sept. 15, 1971, at 30, 38.
96. Id. A Los Angeles tax attorney says of the program: "This doesn't necessarily
identify talent, but it gives the public a better chance to know who's an expert." Id.
It should also be noted that the courts are likely to impose a higher standard of care
in malpractice cases on attorneys who hold themselves out as specialists, just as a doctor
who holds himself out as a specialist is held to a higher standard of care than a general
practitioner. See, e.g., Carbone v. Warburton, 11 NJ. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953) (orthopedic surgeon); Childs v. Comstock, 69 App. Div. 160, 74 N.Y.S. 643 (1902)
(attorneys were experts in practice before customs court). See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECoND) OF TORTS § 299A, Comment d at 74 (1965); Comment, Legal Effects of Attorney Specialization, 30 ALBANY L. REv. 282 (1966).
97. It does not seem possible that certification of lawyers as specialists will acquire
in the foreseeable future the crucial importance that board certification enjoys in the
field of medicine. Lawyers are not likely to accept any plan which would prohibit
lawyers not recognized officially as specialists from practicing in a specialty area. See
GREENwooD, supra note 67, at 159-61. It does not seem likely that the courts-unlike
the hospitals-will adopt rules restricting practice in certain areas to certified specialists.
Cf. GRNuwooD, supra note 67, at 120-29.
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the fields of medicine and law is creating a two-level system for entry
into these professions. The first level, entry into the profession as a
general practitioner, will remain a function of state licensure; the second, initiation into the more prestigious and economically rewarding
strata of professional practice, is gradually falling under the jurisdiction
of specialty boards controlled by private associations. 8 In this evolving
system, the general practitioner seems destined merely to guide the
client to the appropriate specialist or enlist the efforts of several specialists on his client's behalf 9 As this development continues, the growing
power of the boards inevitably will generate mounting pressures for
regulation of both the procedural and substantive aspects of board
action and policy. Pressures for reform are likely to center on the
problem of protecting the rights of the individual practitioner who
applies for specialty certification. Criticisms of the practices of some
of the medical specialty boards which deny or revoke certification
98. This development is obviously much more advanced in medicine than in law.
With respect to law, another qualification must be added to the statements in the
text. If certification of lawyers as specialists becomes the responsibility of the state bar
associations and supreme courts rather than the American Bar Association or individual
specialty organizations such as the American Trial Lawyers' Association and the Commercial Law League of America, the role of the private certifying organization will be
reduced greatly in importance. See GREENwooD, supra note 67, at 151-54. In the light of
the requirements of the new Code of Professional Responsibility, the development of
certification for lawyers within the state bar associations and supreme courts seems assured. See ABA CoDE oF PNoF sSmoNAL REsPoNsmiLiTY, ErmcAL CONSMERATON 2-14,
Dscipr.uAY R=LE 2-105.
99. In the future, the general practitioner may not be permitted to fulfill even the
limited role outlined in the text. Specialty restrictionism in the field of medicine has
resulted in a decline in the number of general practitioners combined with a gradual
assumption of the traditional functions of the general practitioner by the specialists. In
addition, patients short-circuit the model of consultation and referral by their "family
physician!' by choosing to consult a specialist initially rather than allowing the general
practitioner to make a rational choice among competing specialists. RAYAcE, supra note
34, at 236-38. This not only results in a further decline in the position and prestige of
the general practitioner, but also in a wasteful misallocation of resources. Many tasks
which are well within the competence of the general practitioner are being performed
by persons whose advanced training logically dictates that they devote their time to
matters requiring special skills. Id. at 237-38.
The American Board of Family Practice, a specialty board for general practitioners
founded in 1969, may be able to slow the movement toward specialism by raising the
prestige of general practice and making the general practitioner better prepared to
perform his tasks by requiring completion of continuing educational requirements.
Evidence is not yet available to indicate the degree of success the newly founded board
will experience. For a discussion of the newly founded Board of Family Practice see
S-mvENs, supra note 34, at 310-17.
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without explanation or grant of a hearing have been noted previously.1°°
A few of the specialty boards have sought to thwart any judicial review
of their actions by requiring every candidate to agree not to litigate
the decision of the board. 1 ' But once the specialty board certification
process is recognized as a licensing device, it will undoubtedly seem intolerable that candidates for specialty board certification do not enjoy
the benefits of procedural due process now afforded applicants for state
licensing as a matter of right. 0 2 In this event, it can be expected that
judicial reaction will lead to a requirement that all board action affecting
a candidate's certification conform to the safeguards of procedural due
process. Several methods may be adopted to protect an applicant's
rights. First, boards which have established procedural safeguards can
be required to abide by them on the theory that such rules are a part
of the contract between the board and the candidate. 0 3 In return for
100. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
In Fontanetta v. American Bd. of Internal Medicine, 421 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970), the
plaintiff sought an order to compel the Board to disclose the reasons why he had failed
the oral examinations conducted by the Board as part of the certification process. Id.
at 356.
101. The American Board of Otolaryngology, for example, requires each applicant to
agree to the following: "[I]f the Board refuses to grant a certificate, such a refusal may
not and shall not be questioned by me in any court of law or equity, or any other
tribunal." DIRECTORY, supra note 70, at 912.
102. Procedural due process in bar admission proceedings includes the right to a
hearing. Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963). The applicant has a right to be informed of the charges against him. In re Guberman, 90 Ariz.
27, 363 P.2d 617 (1961); In re Burke, 87 Ariz. 336, 351 P.2d 169 (1960); In re Warren,
149 Conn. 266, 178 A.2d 528 (1962); Coleman v. Watts, 81 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1955); In re
Kellar's Petition, 79 Nev. 28, 377 P.2d 927 (1963). The applicant also has the right to
present evidence in his own behalf. In re Lobb, 157 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1963); In re Frank,
293 III. 263, 127 N.E. 640 (1920); In re Monaghan, 122 Vt. 199, 167 A.2d 81 (1961). The
nature and scope of the candidate's right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him is less well-defined. See Wifiner v. Committee on Character and Fitness,
373 U.S. 96 (1963) (due process required confrontation "in a situation such as this");
In re Levine, 97 Ariz. 88, 397 P.2d 205 (1964) (right to confront accusers and adverse
witnesses); In re Dinan, 157 Conn. 67, 244 A.2d 608 (1968); In re Kellar, 401 P.2d 616
(Nev. 1965); In re Icardi, 436 Pa. 364, 260 A.2d 782 (1970); In re Monaghan, 222 A.2d
665 (Vt. 1966). See generally Comment, Procedural Due Process and Character Hearings for Bar Applicants, 15 STAN. L. REv. 500 (1963).
Although there has been less litigation in the medical field, the requirements of due
process are certainly no less stringent there. See, e.g., Corbett v. Kinlein, 191 A.2d 246
(D.C. Ct. App. 1963) (hearing required); Marner v. Board of Registration of Chiropractors, 260 N.E.2d 672 (Mass. 1970); Milligan v. Board of Registration in Pharmacy,
204 N.E.2d 504 (Mass. 1965) (hearing required).
103. It has been noted previously that some of the boards expressly provide for notice
of charges and a hearing in connection with the revocation of a certificate. Supra note
83. These provisions do not appear to contemplate the grant of a hearing to a candidate
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the payment of a fee,1°4 the specialty boards agree to examine the candidate's qualifications and issue him a certificate if he meets the designated
requirements; procedural safeguards promulgated by the boards form a
part of this contract and should be enforced judicially. 0 5 The consti-

tutional limitations of procedural due process might also be imposed
upon the boards on the theory that they exercise essentially governmental functions with the tacit consent of the state and therefore act
in a quasi-governmental capacity. 10 6 Finally, some courts find merit in
the theory that organizations exercising economic control over a trade
or profession are affected with a public interest and have a fiduciary
responsibility with respect to membership applications. 10 7 This fiduciary
initially denied a certificate. In such cases some boards apparently refuse to disclose
the reasons for the denial of a certificate. See note 110 supra.
104. The fees charged by the boards are substantial. A representative sample is as
follows: Dermatology, $25 for registration and $175 for examinations, DECrORY, supra
note 70, at 89; Internal Medicine, $70 for application and $155 for examinations, DIacTORY, supra note 70, at 151; Orthopaedic Surgery, $25 for application, $225 for examinations, DiREcroRy, supra note 70, at 890; Surgery, $225, DIRECTORY, supra note 70, at 1736.
105. A similar result is reached in cases involving procedural limitations
on the
freedom of associations to expel members. The member's entry into an association
results in a contract which requires enforcement of the association's procedural rules.
See, e.g., People ex rel. Meads v. Alpha Lodge No. 1, 13 Misc. 677, 35 N.Y.S. 214 (Sup.
Ct. 1895), aff'd sub nor. People ex rel. Meads v. McDonouaLh, 8 App. Div. 591, 40
N.Y.S. 1147 (1896). See generally Developments in the Law-JudicialControl of Actions
of PrivateAssociations, 76 HARv. L. REv. 983, 1020-36 (1963).
105. See, e.g., Marjorie Webster Jr. College v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and
Secondary Schools, 302 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1969). In the Marjorie Webster case the
district court found that both federal and state governments utilized the defendant, an
educational accrediting agency, as a service agency for determining eligibility for governmental assistance. Id. at 477-78 (Finding of Fact no. 61). The court concluded that
the "defendant in performing its accreditation function is engaged in a quasi-governmental function, subjecting it to the restraints of the Constitution:' Id. at 478 (Conclusion of Law no. 3). Subsequently the decision was reversed. Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, 432 F.2d 650 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970). For a critical discussion of the opinion in the
court of appeals see 84 HARv.L. REv. 1912 (1971).
107. This theory has its origins in the cases requiring labor unions with closed-shop
agreements to admit a non-member or, in the alternative, to refrain from enforcing the
agreement against him. See, e.g., James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329
(1944). It was applied by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in a well-known decision
involving the exclusion of a physician from membership in a county medical society
which necessarily resulted in the loss of his hospital staff privileges, Falcone v. Middlesex
County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961), and approved by the Supreme
Court of California in a decision involving the plaintiff's right to membership in a
dental association where such membership was a prerequisite to certification as a specialist in orthodontics, Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'v of Orthodontists, I Cal. 3d 160, 460
P.2d 495, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969). See generally Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and
the Public Service Enterprise of the New Industrial State, 55 CALir. L. REV. 1247 (1967).
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responsibility gives an applicant for certification or membership a right
to have his application considered in accordance with the fundamentals
of due process.108
CONTROL OF DEPENDENT TECHNICAL WORKERS

The typical pattern of the professional certification process is peergroup regulation consisting of an examination of the qualifications of
candidates for certification by members of the same professional group.
Groups of technical workers, however, often are certified not by their
peers but by the professionals in whose employ or under whose supervision they are apt to work. For these technicians, or "dependent subprofessionals," certification by a closely related professional group becomes the path to recognition and status in the field. The requirements
for the certification of dependent technical workers are similar to those
for professionals.
Certification of technicians occurs in diverse occupational fields. The
American Society of Clinical Pathologists (ASCP), for example, examines and certifies medical laboratory workers known as "medical
technologists." 109 The successful applicant for ASCP registration earns
the privilege of using the initials "M.T. (ASCP)" after his name. Also,
the certification of engineering technicians was inaugurated in 1962
by the National Society of Professional Engineers.Y0 The result was
the formation of the Institute for the Certification of Engineering Technicians, an organization recognizing three distinct grades of engineering technicians." 1 Currently, the American Psychological Association
is considering the establishment of certification programs for technical
workers in psychology at the subdoctoral level,"' and the National
Association of Social Workers is debating the merits of attempting to
of persons employed in social work
measure and define the competence
8
training."
professional
lack
who
108. Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 166, 460 P.2d 495,
499, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623, 627 (1969).
109. Alcuin, Medical Technology, 35 MIme. MEDICINE 331, 333 (1952).

110. Williamson, The Institute for the Certification of Engineering Technicians, 32
AM. ENGINEER, Sept, 1962, at 51. For a sociological analysis of the role of the engineering technician and his relation to the engineer see Evan, On the Margin-The EngiSHAPE oF Wom 83 (P. Berger ed. 1964).
neering Technician,in Tim HuzriA
111. Williamson, supra note 110, at 51.
112. Woods, A History of APA's Concern 'with the Master's Degree, 26 AM. PsyCHOLOGiST 696, 706-07 (1971).

113. Bartlett, Social Work Practice, 15 ENcYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL WoRK 755, 761-62
(1965); French, Professional Organization, 15 ENcYcL PEDiA OF SocIAL WoRK 574, 578
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The reasons generally advanced by professionals in favor of the establishment of certification programs for technical workers focus on the
need to eliminate misuse of the talent of the true professional on routine
job assignments. A certification program, by conferring status and
recognition on technicians, will attract more qualified persons to the
field, thus freeing the professional for more complex and challenging
tasks. 14 A related goal assumes the desirability of distinguishing between the tides and the proper functions of the true professional on the
one hand, and the technical worker on the other."- The certification
device communicates this information to the general public and potential employers. Professional organizations, moreover, often express the
fear that unless an appropriate certification program is instituted, technical workers may lose their identification with the parent profession
and form "specialty societies" with distinct codes of ethics and professional discipline."" It also seems possible that technical workers lack
the organization and resources to establish certification programs on
their own and may prefer to be certified by the professionals under
whom they work." 7

Although certification programs for technical workers typically are
described as "voluntary," 11 the programs would obviously never be
initiated unless it was contemplated that, at the very least, employers
would consider the certification in reviewing the records of job applicants."" In practice, the preference that employers give to certified
(1965). The National Association of Social Workers requires graduation from a school
of social work accredited by the Council of Social Work Education as a condition of
membership. Meyer, supra note 46, at 495, 503.
114. See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 110, at 51-52; Elder et al., The Training of
Technical Workers in Psychology at the Subdoctoral Level, 10 AM. PSYCHOLOGISr 541
(1955) [hereinafter cited as Elder].
115. See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 110, at 53; Elder, supra note 114, at 541-42.
116. See, e.g., McTeer, A Survey of Graduate School Opinion Regarding Professional
Training Below the Doctoral Level, 7 Am. PsYcHoimisr 14, 19 (1952); Elder, supra
note 114, at 544.
117. See GiL, supra note 1, at 61.
118. See, e.g., Williamson, supranote 110, at 51.
119. One of the purposes of an association of professionals or semi-professionals not
subject to direct regulation by the state is to attain recognition of membership in or
certification by the association as an indication of competence comparable to state
licensure. See CARu-SAutwaRs & WsoN, supra note 1, at 358-59. Carr-Saunders and
Wilson explain this phenomenon as follows:
[I]nstitutional monopoly is not a feature of the registered [licensed] professions only. Some degree of monopolistic advantage may be won by a
particular group of practitioners in an unregistered profession. In that case
it accrues, not to the registered, since there is no register, but to the
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technicians suggests that participation in certification programs is not
voluntary. 120 Moreover, certification programs enable the professionals

to exert increased control over technical workers. For example, codes
of ethics governing the professional conduct of the technical worker
and his relations with the parent profession are promulgated by the
certifying agency; violations may result in censure or loss of certifica2
tion. 1
The power exercised by a parent profession over its technical workers may be abused. This is amply illustrated by the case of Higgins v.
American Society of Clinical Pathologists.22 Janet L. Higgins was
certified as a medical technologist by the ASCP Board of Registry in
-1963. She was employed as a medical technologist by a hospital in
Trenton in 1964, but later in the same year accepted a position at Egan
Laboratories, an independent bio-analytic laboratory, where her salary
and working hours were better than they had been at the hospital.'2 3
Her employment at Egan Laboratories violated provisions of the Code
of Ethics and Standards of Conduct promulgated by the ASCP Board
of Registry which, in general, required that a medical technologist work
under a pathologist or other duly qualified and licensed doctor of medi-

cine.2

The director of Egan Laboratories, although not a physician,

members of an association of practitioners; and it does so whenever the
association succeeds in making membership as much a hall-mark of qualification as admission to the register in a state-regulated profession. It is the
aim of every association in the unregulated professions to do this; and indeed not in theunregulated professions only. The Royal Colleges of Physicians and Surgeons, voluntary associations within the framework of the
medical register, have each imposed higher qualifications for admission to
the fellowship grade, designed to give it higher prestige, and to secure to
the 'F.R.C.P.' and the T'.R.C.S.' greater advantages, than those which accrue
to the ordinary registered medical man. But though the prestige which attaches to membership depends upon the qualifications demanded, the
association cannot demand high qualifications until it has acquired prestige.
Hence the building up of an institutional monopoly is a matter of time and
difficulty, though, once attained, it is not easily lost.
Id.
120. An employer may give preference to certified job applicants for a variety of
reasons. For example, the administrator of a hospital, a natural source of employment for
medical laboratory workers, will be cognizant of the fact that representatives of the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals carefully observe whether the workers
in the clinical laboratories have ASCP registry certificates. See Higgins v. American
Soc'y of Clinical Pathologists, 51 N.J. 191, 195-96, 238 A.2d 665, 667 (1968).
121. See, e.g., Alcuin, supra note 109, at 333; Elder, supra note 114, at 542.
122. 51 N.J. 191, 238 A.2d 665 (1968).
128. Id. at 196-97, 238 A.2d at 668.
124. The provisions violated were as follows:
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was licensed to operate the laboratory by the State of New Jersey pursuant to its Bio-Analytical Laboratory and Laboratory Director's Act."n
Nonetheless, the ASCP Board of Registry refused to renew Janet
Higgins' certification in 1965.
Following this refusal, Janet Higgins brought an action against ASCP
to compel it to recertify her as a professionally qualified medical technologist and to reinstate her name in the registry of medical technologists. Disregarding the absence of any tangible economic loss, 12 the
*New Jersey Supreme Court first determined that status as a certified
medical technologist was an interest of sufficient value to warrant
judicial protection if subjected to unjust interference 27 The court
-then held that the provisions of the ASCP rules conflicted with the
public policy of the state and therefore were insufficient to provide a
proper basis for a refusal to renew Janet Higgins' certification. 28 New
Jersey policy, as evidenced in the Bio-Analytical Laboratory and
Laboratory Director's Act, favored the operation of bio-analytic laboratories by qualified nondoctors as well as physicians. The rules of the
ASCP not only conflicted with this policy, but also were intended to
prevent nonphysicians from operating laboratories of clinical pathology
rather than elevating the standards and work performance of the certificate holder. Indeed, the natural tendency of the rules was to prevent
licensed bio-analytic directors who were not physicians from obtaining
the services of certified medical technologists, thus contravening the
state's purpose in granting a director's license and depriving the public
of laboratory service of the highest quality and reliability.
As the New Jersey court was undoubtedly aware, the conduct of
the ASCP in Higgins was an attempt by the pathologists to utilize the
medical technologists as involuntary allies in the pathologists' highly
successful effort to monopolize the commercial medical laboratory
A medical technologist will work at all times under the direction or supervision of a pathologist or other duly qualified and licensed doctor of medicine, such qualifications being determined on the basis of accepted medical
ethics.
A medical technologist will not act as owner, co-owner, advisor or employee, or by means of any subterfuge, participate in an arrangement
whereby an individual not regularly licensed to practice medicine is enabled
to own or operate a laboratory of clinical pathology.
Id. at 196, 238 A.2d at 667-68.
125. N.J. STAT. ANw. § 45:9-42.1 et seq. (1963).
126. 51 N.J. at 197, 238 A.2d at 668.
127. Id. at 198-202, 238 A.2d at 668-71.
128. Id. at 202-04, 238 A.2d at 671-72.
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trade in the United States. 129 The provisions of the Code of Ethics

were designed to serve the pecuniary interests of pathologists rather
than to protect the public or promote high standards of performance
among medical technologists; however, the court did not ground its opinion on this purpose. The New Jersey statute furnished a convenient basis
for the court's holding. In the absence of such a statute, however,
courts may be obliged to examine the character of the relationship between the parent and the dependent group. If an analogous case arises
in the future, courts should recognize that the power inherent in the
certification process allows the parent to advance its interests improperly, to the disadvantage of their dependents. In order to preclude
abuses of this nature, a fiduciary standard should be imposed on professional associations. Furthermore, when the interests of the dependent
are infringed by certification actions of the parent, the burden of proof
showing a legitimate countervailing interest should be borne by the
parent in order to sustain the certification.' 80 Consequently, the potential abuse of power by the professional group would be obviated without
interfering with bona fide certification programs.
REMEDIES

With the exception of antitrust law, there is no statutory regulation
of the certification process. Although the development of a comprehensive code for the regulation of certifying boards seems theoretically
possible, such a step would undoubtedly prove impractical and unwise.
129. In 1966, the Justice Department filed a suit against the College of American

Pathologists charging that the nationwide association of pathologists had conspired in
violation of the Sherman Act to monopolize the $3 billion-a-year medical laboratory
business. The government asserted that as a result of their efforts, members of the

College own virtually all of the 20,000 commercial laboratories in the United States.
In 1969, the court entered a consent decree prohibiting, inter alia, the college and any

persons acting with it from restricting or preventing any person from organizing,
owning, or affiliating with any laboratory. United States v. College of Am. Pathologists,
1969 Trade Cas. 72,825 (N.D. II1.); 414 BNA AirimTusT & TRADE ReG. REP. at A-21
(1969); 261 BNA AinTRusr & TRADE REG. REP. at A-3 (1966).

Although The College of American Pathologists and the American Society of Clinical
Pathologists are separate and distinct organizations, their memberships apparently have
significant overlap. Annual meetings of the two groups are held jointly. DIRE--ORY oF
NATIONAL

TRADE

AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

OF THE UNITED STATES,

28, 49 (1969).

130. Such a requirement may be implicit in the reasoning of the New Jersey court in
Higgns. The court placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the rules in question
were aimed at eliminating laboratories owned or operated by non-physicians and were
related to elevating the standards and work performance of the certified medical technologist. 51 NJ. at 203, 238 A.2d at 671.
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Even though a code of this sort might be designed which would affect
the internal operations and structure of the certifying boards, it would
not be likely to impose any substantive limits on their activities. An
attempt at comprehensive regulation also seems unwise because no
statute could take account of the diverse functions which the certification device serves and the various contexts in which it appears. Thus,
a single statute designed to be applied to all of the various certifying
boards and agencies would constitute a particularly Procrustean form
of regulation. 13 ' Since the possibility of uniform regulation is unlikely,
the remainder of this article will examine various remedies which an
aggrieved professional might pursue. These remedies are concerned
with the law of libel, contract, antitrust, and unjust interference.
131. These conclusions, however, do not rule out the possibility of ad hoc legislation
designed to deal with specific problems. Two examples of the utility of such limited
intervention in the certification process are as follows:
(1) Local real estate boards share many of the characteristics of the certifying board. Because local board membership is generally a condition
of access to the multiple listing system, a broker excluded from a local
board can suffer severe economic distress as a result. Evidence that such
exclusions were frequently made on racial grounds led Congress to declare
it unlawful to deny any person membership in a multiple listing system or
real estate brokers' organization on account of race, color, religion, or
national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 3606 (1970). If the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development is unable to obtain a voluntary compliance with this
statute, the aggrieved party is authorized to enforce his statutory right in
the federal district courts. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1970). Similar statutes'might
be designed to apply to other certifying organizations with a record of
discriminatory practices such as the medical specialty boards. See SlmavNs,
supranote 34, at 248-49.
(2) Critics of the educational accrediting agencies have often objected to
the agencies' policy of refusing to publish or permit inspections of the
evaluations of colleges and secondary schools prepared by the visiting
teams. See, e.g, J. DoEmRa, Tim PARsoNs CoLLEG BuBBtr 203-06 (1970).
Mere accreditation (or the lack of it), it is argued, provided almost no
information concerning the caliber of an educational institution and, as a
result of the policy of confidentiality, the public is denied valuable information concerning the strengths and weaknesses of numerous schools. The
critics conclude that publication of the "visiting team" reports would not
only make this information available but would also have the beneficial
effect of encouraging impartiality by the agencies and spurring the schools
to their best efforts. If a state were persuaded of the validity of this argument, it might provide that disclosure of the reports be required as a condition of the agencies' right to conduct business in the state. Cf. Comment,
The Legal Status of the Educational Accrediting Agency: Problem in
judicial Supervision and Governmental Regulation, 52 CoRaNa.= L. Rnv. 104,
122-25 (1966).
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Libel
Evaluations of the competence and qualifications of professional
persons are sometimes published in a directory or otherwise made available to the public.132 The law of libel may provide a remedy for a
professional aggrieved by the action of an organization concerning his
rating or certification. 133 Disparagement of the reputation of tradesmen

was actionable at common law. 3 4 By analogy, similar protection was
accorded persons engaged in business or the professions.'" Indeed,
imputations of lack of skill or ability to a person engaged in a calling
requiring such skill were deemed so serious as to constitute an exception
to the general rule demanding proof of special damages; recovery for
slander became actionable without proof of special
harm or loss. 86
7
3
Such charges are libelous and actionable per se.
However, for the following reasons, the law of libel is usually an
illusory remedy for the aggrieved professional: First, professional associations in which certification is the criterion for membership do not
attempt to rate members of the profession generally; only applicants
132. See, e.g.,
CIALIsTS;

THE

AMERICAN BOARD OF

MEDICAL

SPECIALTIES, DIRECTORY OF MEDICAL

SPE-

MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY.

133. A professional seeking damages for the publication of material injurious to his
professional reputation has a single action in defamation for redress of the injury
suffered. He may not bring two distinct causes of action, one in his individual capacity
for the damage to his personal reputation and a second action for injury to him in the
conduct of his profession. Guenther v. Ridgway Co., 187 App. Div. 593, 176 N.Y.S. 89
(1919). The circumstance that the libelous matter has reference to a plaintiff's business or reputation is material to the issue of damages but is not the basis of a distinct
cause of action. Id. at 595, 176 N.Y.S. at 91. Thus the professional cannot invoke successfully the rather amorphous body of tort law known variously as "disparagement of
property," "injurious falsehood," "slander of goods," and "trade libel" applicable to
criticisms of the quality of goods held for sale or the character and conduct of a
business. W. PROSsER, LAW OF TORTS 938-50 (3rd ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Paossm].
Usually, a greater burden of proof is imposed on the plaintiff in an action for disparagement. PROssER, supra at 943-45; Comment, The Law of Comnercial Disparagement:
Business Defamation's Impotent Ally, 63 YALE L.J. 65 (1953). Nevertheless a plaintiff
may try to circumvent a short statute of limitations applicable to defamation actions by
describing his cause of action as disparagement or injurious falsehood. See, e.g., N.Y.
Cxv. PRc. LAW § 215 (McKinney 1972) (one year statute of limitations applicable to
actions for libel and slander). See also Quigley v. Hawthorne Lumber Co., 264 F. Supp.
214 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Noel v. Interboro Mut. Indem. Ins. Co., 31 App. Div. 2d 399,
295 N.Y.S.2d 399 (1968).
134. See, e.g., Harman v. Delany, 93 Eng. Rep. 925 (K.B. 1731).
135. PROSSER, supra note 133, at 775.
136. RESTATEiMENT OF TORTS §§ 570(c), 573 (1938); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, Tim
LAW OF ToRTs § 5.12 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMEs].
137. REsTATEMENT OF TORTS § 569, comment e at 168 (1938). See, e.g., Morasse v.
Brochu, 151 Mass. 567, 25 N.E. 74 (1890).
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for membership are evaluated. By applying for membership, the professional has "consented" to the accompanying evaluation and may be
said to have assumed the risk that the result may be defamatory. 3 "
Consent is a complete defense to an action for defamation.'39 Second,
since professional associations do not purport to judge the competence
and qualifications of all potential members, a professional who fiils to
apply for membership will not be permitted to complain that the omission of his name from a list of qualified persons constitutes, by negative
implication, a libelous charge of incompetence. 40 Moreover, the applicant who has been denied a rating or certification does not have a claim
for damages; he will not be branded a failure. His name simply will
138. PROSSER, supra note 133, at 804 n56.
139. RsTA.TEMENT OF ToRTs § 583, comment d at 221 (1938): "One who agrees to
submit his conduct to investigation knowing that its results will be published, consents
to the publication of the honest findings of the investigators.
Such consent may be derived from voluntary membership in an association, the rules
of which provide for such an investigation."
140. Davis v. New England Ry. Publ. Co., 203 Mass. 470, 89 N.E. 565 (1909). In Davis
it was alleged that the defendant's publication intentionally created a public belief that
the list contained the names of all the reputable express companies engaged in business
in Boston and the surrounding area. The Massachusetts court held that the intentional
omission of the name of the plaintiff's express company from the publication did not
constitute a libel upon the plaintiff. However, the court did hold that there was an
injury to property, and that the plaintiff would be entitled to an injunction upon proof
of the facts. Id. at 479, 89 N.E. at 566.
The result in Davis is supported by the reasoning of the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court in Morrison v. NBC, 24 App. Div. 2d 284, 266 N.Y.S. 2d 406
(1965). The Morrison litigation arose out of the plaintiff's participation as a contestant in the popular television quiz show known as 'Twenty-One:' The plaintiff
alleged that he participated in the quiz show honestly and in good faith, receiving no
coaching or assistance, and that when it became common knowledge in 1959 that the
producers had rigged the results by giving the correct answers to some contestants,
the public believed that all contestants were privy to the fraud. Consequently, he became
an object of scorn and contempt, suffered injury in his reputation as a university professor, and lost the chance to obtain fellowships from two foundations. Discussing the
nature of the plaintiff's claim for damages, the Appellate Division stated: "The claim is
-not for defamation . . . because defendants did not publish in any form anything
derogatory to or concerning plaintiff. Instead, they put him in an unduly hazardous
position where his reputation might be injured, not because this was their purpose, but
because they did not care what happened to him in the pursuit of their purpose for
selfish gain. Yet the harm sustained is exactly like that from defamation, albeit induced
neither by slander nor libel." 24 App. Div. 2d at 287-88, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 410. On
appeal, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that
regardless of whether the defendants' conduct was actionable-a question it did not
resolve-the plaintiff's cause of action fell "within the ambit of tortious injury which
sounds in defamation" and therefore was barred by the applicable one-year statute of
limitations. 19 N.Y.2d 453, 227 N.E.2d 572, 280 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1967).
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not appear in the roster of the qualified. 4 ' Finally, professional ratings
typically occur in connection with a report of membership in an association. An individual may claim that his low rating is defamatory.
The professional association may offer the counterargument that freedom of association guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment permits the association to accept members on its own
terms, which, in this case, includes a publication of the individual's
level of professional competence." The effectiveness of the libel action
as a means of obtaining judicial review in this field, therefore, appears
limited to actions against non-membership organizations publishing evaluations or ratings of substantially all of the members of a professional
group.
The second reason that the law of libel may not afford a remedy is
that publications describing the qualifications of professional persons
might be held privileged. Insofar as the decision to rate, accredit, or
certify a member or members of a professional group is made in the
context of proceedings affected with a public interest, a published
report of the proceedings arguably is within the privilege for the publication of reports of public proceedings and meetings. 3 The rationale
of the privilege is the right of the public to be informed of proceedings
in which it has a legitimate interest, but the commentators indicate that
the courts have not shown "a tendency to extend the rule beyond
official governmental proceedings and include certain types of meetings
of general public concern." ' 44 Thus the publication by a member of
the Massachusetts Medical Society, in the Boston Medical and Surgical
Journal,of an accurate account of society proceedings resulting in the
141. See Fontanetta v. American Bd. of Internal Medicine, 303 F. Supp. 427 (E.D.N.Y.
1969), aff'd, 421 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970), an action by a doctor against one of the
medical specialty boards for equitable relief and damages arising out of the board's
refusal to certify the doctor as a specialist in internal medicine. While dismissing the
case for lack of jurisdiction, the district court stated: "The complaint uses the adjective
'defamatory' in describing the defendant's denial of certification, but the word seems
not to be used in the sense of 'defamation of character' . . . nor is the cause of action
basically for a tortious act. There is no allegation that defendant published the fact of
plaintiff's failure to anyone else. Plaintiff is complaining of unfairness or arbitrariness
in the testing procedure, which has caused him economic detriment. Plaintiff's character
is not in issue, but only defendant's procedures." 303 F. Supp. at 431.
142. Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), witb NAACP
v. Alabama, 347 U.S. 449 (1958). See generally Fellman, ConstitutionalRights of Association, 1961 Sup. Cr. REv. 74.
143. Cf. RESrATEMENT op TORTS § 611 (1938).
144. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 136, § 5.24, at 431-32. But see PRossEa, supra note

133, at 817.
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expulsion of the plaintiff from membership for misconduct was held a
privileged communication. The court analogized this situation to the
common law privilege for reports of judicial proceedings. 4 Characterizing the proceedings as "quasi judicial," the court noted that the great
number of associations holding meetings of interest to the public and
publishing their proceedings for general information required a "larger
liberty." 4 Though meetings at which decisions are made to certify
are generally not open to the public, it is at least conceivable that a
modem court might hold publication of the results of such proceedings
privileged because of the public interest in their results. 47
Third, the common law also recognized a privilege for the publication of defamatory matter in order to protect an important interest of
the recipient of the communication. 48 Under this principle, mercantile
agencies furnishing their subscribers with information concerning the
credit of persons engaged in trade were held to have a conditional
privilege against an action for defamation. 49 Despite the potential for
abuse inherent in the activities of these associations, the American courts
supported a qualified privilege for their activities as "a most potent
factor in keeping up public confidence." '6 0 Arguably, the communication of information concerning the competence of a professional to
a person with a legitimate interest in such information should be held
privileged, since reliable information concerning the capabilities of a
surgeon, a tax lawyer, or a securities analyst is valuable to one who is
about to employ such a person. The common law privilege for mercantile agencies, however, was a qualified one; it was lost if the information was given wide dissemination rather than in response to a
request from interested persons.'' Likewise, the publication of ratings
145. Barrows v. Bell, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 301 (1856).
146. Id. at 313.
147. But see RFSrATEAMNT oF ToRrs § 611, comment b at 293-94 (1938).
148. Id. § 595; HARPER & JAMES, supra note 136, § 5.25.
149. See, e.g., Ormsby v. Douglas, 37 N.Y. 477 (1868), and the cases collected in
Smith, Conditional Prhvilege for Mercantile Agencies, (pts. 1 & 2), 14 COLUM. L. REV.
187, 296 (1914). The privilege was not recognized in England. MacIntosh v. Dun,
[1908] A.C. 390 (P.C.) (Aust).
150. Pollasky v. Minchener, 81 Mich. 380, 285, 46 N.W. 5, 6 (1890). Some American
jurisdictions, following the English rule, denied the privilege completely on the grounds
that as profit-making ventures, mercantile agencies should be penalized if they "sell
and traffic falsehood and misrepresentation about the standing and credit of men or
corporations:' Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet Co., 25 Idaho 696, 704, 139 P. 1007,
1010 (1914).

151. Pollasky v. Minchener, 81 Mich. 280, 46 N.W. 5 (1890); Sunderlin v. Bradstreet,
46 N.Y. 188 (1871). Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in King v. Patterson,
49 N.J.L. 417, 9 A. 705 (Ct. Err. &App. 1887).
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or information concerning certification or accreditation in directories

and in other forms calculated to reach the general public should constitute an abuse of the privilege defeating the protection otherwise
afforded.
Members of professional associations also benefit from another con-

ditional privilege for the communication of defamatory matter made in
the furtherance of the common interest of the members of the associ-

ation. 52 Thus a letter from a member of a medical society to the secretary of the society, in the bona fide discharge of the former's duty,

describing another member as unworthy of membership and recommending his expulsion, was held a privileged communication.153 Al-

though this privilege would protect the certifying association in disseminating published evaluations to its members, 54the privilege does not
extend to a public distribution of such materials.'
Fourth, if the criticism of a professional focused on his activities connected with a matter of public concern, the publication of such criti-

cism might be held privileged as "fair comment." "' For example, a
dental association's critique of a dentist's views on fluoridation of public

water supplies as "based on incomplete information" and "totally irresponsible" was held privileged as "fair comment" because of the public
nature of the water fluoridation issue.

56

Even if the theoretical applicability of the libel action is assumed,
further practical difficulties remain. Technical rules of pleading governing the libel action set many traps for the unwary. 57 For example, in

the minority of American jurisdictions which require proof of special
damages if the libel upon which the action is based is not "libelous per
se," "' the plaintiff must plead and prove actual economic loss and
152. REsTATEMENT OF TORTS § 596, comment c at 256 (1938); PROSSER, supra note 133,
at 809.
153. McKnight v. Hasbrouck, 17 R.I. 70, 20 A. 95 (1890); accord, Mick v. American
Dental Ass'n, 49 N.J. Super. 262, 139 A.2d 570 (App. Div. 1958). See also Thompson v.
New South Wales Branch of the British Medical, [1924] A.C. 764, 782 (P.C.) (N.S.W.).
154. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 604 (1938); PROSSER, supra note 133, at 819.
155. REsTA TEmENT or TORTS § 606 (1938); PROSSER, supra note 133, at 812-16.
156. Mick v. American Dental Ass'n, 49 N.J. Super. 262, 139 A.2d 570 (App. Div.
1958).
157. See Kirby v. Martindale, 19 S.D. 394, 103 N.W. 648 (1905). The defendant a
publisher of a legal director, demurred to the plaintiff's complaint alleging a libelous
statement published in the defendant's legal directory, the "substance and effect" of
which was that the plaintiff was a second-rate lawyer. The South Dakota court sustained
the demurrer because of the plaintiff's failure to set out the libel in haec verba and to
explain how the alleged libel would injure him.
158. For an explanation of the origins of the rule and a list of the jurisdictions which
adhere to it, see HaiR & JAMES, supra note 136, S 5.9, at 373-74 n.9.
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further establish the causal connection between the loss and the publication of the defamatory matter. 59 These problems of proof will be
difficult, if not insurmountable. 160 Moreover, the possibility of winning
a substantial money judgment may not restore a tarnished reputation
and certainly will not gain the rating or accreditation sought. For all
these reasons, the defamation action may have little more than a nuisance
or spite value.'"'
Contract
Although professional certification is in many respects analogous to
state licensing or registration, it also resembles traditional educational
programs. Typical characteristics of certification which closely resemble academic functions include the following: (1) a prescribed
course of study;'8 2 (2) the sponsorship of facilities for the conduct of
159. Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Inc. 66 N.D. 578, 268 N.W. 400
(1936). The plaintiff, however, may establish special damages by proof of a general
diminution of business rather than a loss of particular clients or items of business. Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Inc., 68 N.D. 425, 280 N.W. 879 (1938).
160. Consider the plight (and tenacity) of Judge S.E. Ellsworth. From 1907-27 Judge
Ellsworth received the best possible rating in Martindale-HubbellLaw Directory and its
predecessor Martindale's American Law Directory. In 1928 Judge Ellsworth's rating
was lowered for reasons unexplained in the various appellate opinions which marked
the litigation. When Judge Ellsworth attempted to have this slight to his professional
reputation rectified, Martindale responded by refusing to give him any rating at all,
simply placing four dashes or blank spaces after his name. Ellsworth's action for libel
followed, and the history of the litigation may be found in Ellsworth v. MartindaleHubbell Law Directory, Inc., 65 N.D. 297, 258 N.W. 486 (1935); 66 N.D. 578, 268 N.W.
400 (1936); 68 N.D. 425, 280 N.W. 879 (1938); 69 N.D. 610, 289 N.W. 101 (1939).
Martindale ultimately won a directed verdict because of Judge Ellsworth's failure to
introduce evidence that a low rating or no rating would be understood as defamatory
and that the diminution of his business was a result of the publication.
161. Informal modes of redress are likely to be more effective. For an example of the
possibility of such informal adjustments see the following statement in the forward to
the Martindale-HubbellLaw Directory: "While we are continually making rating inyvestigations in accordance with our regular revision procedures, an initial or review
.investigation of any lawyer will be made at his request. Solicited endorsements or
testimonials, however, cannot be given the same consideration as confidential reports
obtained by us." MARTNDAmE-HVBBELL LAW DiRECroy, at vi (1971). For a discussion
of alternatives available to lawyers dissatisfied with their Martindale-Hubbell ratings see
Harnsberger, Publication of Specialties and Legal Ability Ratings in Law Lists, 49
A3A.J. 33, 36 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Harnsberger].
162. For example, the Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts distributes "Institute
Study Guides" to assist candidates for the C.F.A. designation in, preparing for its examinations. Sheppard, The C.FA. Program:Retrospect and Prospect, 23 FIN. ANALzsTs
J., March-April, 1967, at 10, 11.
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scholarly research; 16 3 (3) competitive examinations;' 6 4 (4) the exaction
of fees for admission to the course of study and/or the examinations;"'
and (5) the granting of designations or "degrees." In addition, the
increasing importance of the professional "degree" as a prerequisite for
employment parallels the evolution of the significance of the academic
degree. Furthermore, the various certifying boards tend to emphasize
the educational aspects of their programs rather than the correlation
between professional certification and state licensing."66 Since the
programs of certifying boards and educational institutions are similar,
the remedies available to a student who is wrongfully denied a diploma
may also be available to a professional aggrieved by a board's refusal
to certify.
Matriculation at a college or university establishes a contractual relationship between the student and his school. 67 If the student complies
with the regulations and requirements of the school, he is entitled to
receive a degree; the school which refuses to confer a promised degree
upon a student who has complied fully with its requirements breaches
the contract of enrollment. 6 " Although various remedial theories might
163. An example is the establishment of the Research Center of the Institute of
Chartered Financial Analysts. See Morehouse, Front the President's Desk, 22 FIN.
ANALYSTS J, Jan-Feb, 1966, at 7.
164. See, e.g., copies of the examinations taken by candidates for the C.FA. designation in Sheppard, The 1964 CP.A. Examinations, 20 FIN. ANALysrs J., Sept.-Oct., 1964,
at 12; Sheppard, The 1965 C.F.A. Examinations, 21 FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.-Dec., 1965,
at 4.
165. These fees may be quite substantial. See, for example, the fees required by the
various medical specialty boards of applicants for certification in the DiRECEoRY, supra
note 70.
166. The American Board of Surgery, one of the medical specialty boards, has stated
that it "considers its certificate comparable to an advanced University degree." Letter
from J.W. Humphreys, Jr., M.D., Secretary of The American Board of Surgery, Inc.
to Douglas A. Wallace, November 18, 1971. See also Sheppard, The C.F.A. Progra=m
Retrospect and Prospect, 23 FIN. ANALYSTS' J., March-April, 1967, at 10 (statement of
objectives). This emphasis on educational aspects as opposed to viewing certification
as a substitute for or adjunct to legal regulation undoubtedly is motivated in part by a
desire to forestall antitrust prosecutions. A notable exception to the statement made in
the text is the case of the social workers. The social workers have always seemed to
view self-certification as an interim substitute for legal regulation of their profession.
See, e.g., Baker, supra note 52, at 532, 533.
167. See, e.g., Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (App.
Div.), ret'g 130 Misc. 249, 223 N.Y.S. 796 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1927); People ex rel. Cecil v.
Bellevue Hosp. Medical College, 14 N.YS. 490 (Sup. Jud. Ct.), aff'd rner., 128 N.Y.
621, 28 N.E. 253 (1891); State ex rel. Burg v. Milwaukee Medical College, 128 Wis. 7,
106 N.W. 116 (1906).
168. People ex rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hosp. Medical College, 14 N.Y.S. 490 (Sup. Jud.
Ct.), aff'd mem., 128 N.Y. 621, 28 N.E. 253 (1891).
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be devised for the redress of such a breach of contract, 169 courts generally have designated the writ of mandamus as the proper remedy to
70
compel the conferring of a degree wrongfully refused.1
An independent judicial examination of the action of a college faculty
inassessing the academic preparation of a student and his qualifications
for a degree raises substantial problems concerning academic freedom
and institutional autonomy.17 ' Although courts usually provide the
remedy of mandamus in an appropriate case, the threshold question of
whether a case is appropriate is treated with circumspection. Courts
are cautious in delineating the form and extent of judicial review of a
school's refusal to confer a degree. This is because the faculty exercises
a discretionary function in assessing the qualifications of students and
determining their right to receive degrees, and their decisions are conclusive upon the courts unless they have acted arbitrarily or in bad
faith. 17 Accordingly, the scope of judicial review is limited. However,
169. See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) (review under the statutory provision for civil rights suits,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (1958)); Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924)
(tort); Miami Military Institute v. Leff, 129 Misc. 481, 220 N.Y.S. 799 (Buffalo City Ct.
1926) (contract damages); Barker v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 121, 122
A. 220 (1923) (specific performance); Comment, Private Governent on the CampusJudicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YAIn LJ. 1362, 1367 n.18 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Review of University Expulsions].
170. State ex rel. Valentine v. Independent School Dist, 187 Iowa 555, 174 N.W. 334
(1919); Nelson v. Lincoln Medical College, 81 Neb. 545, 116 N.W. 294 (1908); People
ex rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hosp. Medical College, 14 N.Y.S. 490 (Sup. Jud. Ct.), aff'd
vnem., 128 N.Y. 621, 28 N.E. 253 (1891). See Harker, The Use of Mandamus to Compel
Educational Institutions to Confer Degrees, 20 YALE L.J. 341 (1911); Pennypacker,
Mandamus to Restore Academic Privileges, 12 VA. L. REv. 645 (1926). Pennsylvania,
Michigan, and Wisconsin refuse to grant the writ of mandamus, arguing that the proper
remedy is contract damages or specific performance. Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical
College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909); Kaelin v. University of Pitt., 421 Pa. 220,
218 A.2d 798, cert. denied, 285 U.S. 837 (1966); Barker v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr
College, 278 Pa. 121, 122 A. 220 (1923); State ex rel. Brown v. Milwaukee Medical
College, 128 Wis. 7, 106 N.W. 116 (1906). See also Steinhauer v. Arkins, 18 Colo. App.
49, 69 P. 1075 (1902); State ex rel. Brown v. Gannon, 10 Wash. 2d 440, 117 P.2d 215
(1941). An early New York case also held that mandamus will not be granted to compel
issuance of a diploma. People ex rel. Jones v. New York Homeopathic Medical College
& Hosp, 20 N.YS. 379 (Super. Ct. 1892).
171. See Review of University Expulsions, supra note 169, at 1392-95.
172. See, e.g., Tate v. North Pacific College, 70 Ore. 160, 167, 140 P. 743, 746-47
(1914); accord, People ex rel. Moore v. Lory, 94 Colo. 595, 31 P.2d 1112 (1934). Cf.
Addy v. Western Pa. Medical College, 11 Pa. Dist. 687, 50 P.LJ. 157 (C.P. 1902).
In the Addy case, the board of trustees of the college had refused to approve the
recommendation of the faculty that a diploma be granted to the student plaintiff. The
court stated that: "This was a matter solely for [the board of trustees], unless, perhaps,

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:46

the circumstances in which the courts will hold that educators have
acted "arbitrarily or in bad faith" are uncertain. To ascertain how the
courts have applied this standard, it will be helpful to classify the situations in which the problem under study arises:
Category A: A diploma is withheld on the grounds that the student has failed to meet objective requirements for obtaining a
degree, such as the number of hours in attendance, payment of
proper fees, and compliance with rules of discipline. No question is presented as to the academic attainments of the student
and the faculty's assessment of them.
Category B: A degree is refused even though the student has met
the objective requirements and he has been approved by the
faculty as academically qualified to receive the degree.
Category C: A diploma is withheld on the ground that the faculty
has adjudged the student not qualified academically to receive
a degree. No question of the student's compliance with the
objective requirements for obtaining a degree is presented.
Category A. A limited scope of judicial review poses no major barriers
to relief in cases within Category A. The relatively simple factual
issues presented. differ very little from the kinds of fact-finding courts
perform regularly. In such cases it will be clear whether the student
has fulfilled his part of the contract of enrollment and become entitled
to the promised degree. Because review of a faculty determination of
a student's academic qualifications is unnecessary, the risk of judicial
interference with academic freedom and institutional autonomy is
minimal. Accordingly, the courts have not hesitated to review faculty
decisions denying a student a degree in cases in which the only issue
is an alleged failure by the student to comply with the school's formal
requirements. 1 73 In Finkel v. Brooklyn Law School,174 for example, a
in a case of bad faith, or so manifest a violation of the principles of right and justice as
clearly to indicate their conduct was not only wrongful but perverse."
173. See Cieboter v. O'Connell, 236 So. 2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (doctoral
candidate was not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel a university official to take
specified action in connection with his candidacy for a PhD. in education where student failed to fulfill additional educational requirements deemed necessary by faculty
for completion of doctoral program); Finkel v. Brooklyn Law School, 61 Misc. 2d 198,
305 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1969); Blank v. Board of Higher Educ. 51 Misc. 2d 724,
273 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1966) (college could not assert that attendance at classes
was necessary for credit and was estopped from refusing delivery of a degree to a
student who had, pursuant to permission given by instructors acting as agents of Dean
of Faculty, taken two courses without attending class).
174. 61 Misc. 2d 198, 305 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1969).
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law student instituted a proceeding to compel a law school to issue him
the Juris Doctor degree. A rule promulgated by the New York Board
Df Regents required a candidate for the degree to have completed successfully at least three years of undergraduate work in an accredited
institution. Upon finding that the student plaintiff had not complied
with the rule, the court denied the relief requested. 175
*Category B. The courts have not hesitated to intervene in cases in
Category B. A student who has met the objective requirements and
whose academic qualifications have been approved by the faculty will
have little difficulty in convincing a court that a refusal to grant him
a degree was prompted by arbitrary action or bad faith. Moreover, the
court need not be concerned with usurping academic prerogatives or
deciding an issue for which its fact-finding processes may be ill-suited;
the issue of the student's academic qualifications will have already been
resolved- in his favor and the court may confine its activity to halting
Capricious action by the school.176 A good example of the issues posed
by cases falling within Category B is State ex rel. Nelson v. Lincolh
Medical College.177 In Nelson the court found that the dean of a
medical college had the responsibility of determining which students
had met the scholastic requirements for graduation. The faculty, acting
in accordance with the determination of the dean, was to recommend
qualified students to the college's board 6f directors which, in turn, was
responsible for conferring degrees on qualified students. The court
held that a faculty refusal to recommend a student deemed qualified
by the dean was arbitrary. Accordingly, the trial court's decision awarding a writ of mandamus to compel issuance of a diploma to the student
in question was sustained.
175. Id.
See State ex rel. Valentine v. Independent School District, 187 Iowa 555, 174
N.W. 334 (1919) (high school pupil who qualified for graduation was denied her
diploma because she refused to wear a cap and gown at commencement exercises on the
grounds-that they were nauseating from fumigation and also might carry disease. Thb
court held that she was entitled to mandamus to compel the issuance of her diploma);
Hamlett v. Reid, 165 Ky. 613, 177 S.W. 440 (1915) (a state superintendent of publii
instruction could not refuse arbitrarily to sign the diploma of a student who had cornplied with all the rules and regulations of the institute and completed the prescribed
course of study); State ex rel. Roberts v. Wilson, 221 Mo. App. 9, 297 S.W. 419 (1927)
(a board of education had no power to impose a requirement of tuition payment as';
condition precedent to graduation). See State ex rel. Nelson v. Lincoln Medical College
81 Neb. 533, 116 N.W. 294 (1908).
A 177. 81 Neb. 533, 116 N.W. 294 (1908).
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Category C. Problems of a different order arise when a student claims
that the faculty has misjudged his academic qualifications. Here the
court must decide whether to undertake an independent review of the
merits of the faculty action or to treat the problem through some alternative means. Unfortunately, this question remains unresolved because
student litigants have failed to prove the essential element of arbitrariness or bad faith on the part of the faculty. 17 But in a closely analogous
situation, one court has stated that should a student prove faculty arbitrariness, capriciousness, or bad faith in judging his academic qualifications, the appropriate judicial response is not an independent examination of the student's qualifications, but an order requiring the school to
give the student a fair and impartial hearing.179 The limited scope of
178. See People ex rel. Moore v. Lory, 94 Colo. 595, 31 P.2d 1112 (1934) (a candidate
for a master of arts degree alleged bad faith by the faculty council in refusing to
recommend him for a degree. The court found overwhelming evidence that the action
of the council was taken with careful deliberation and in good faith); Militana v.
University of Miami, 263 So. 2d 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
962 (1971) (student failed to establish that university officials had acted in a capricious,
prejudicial, or arbitrary manner in deciding that his academic performance was unsatisfactory); People ex rel. Pacella v. Bennett Medical College, 205 Ill. App. 324 (1917)
(abstract); State ex rel. Niles v. Orange Training School, 63 N.J.L. 528, 42 A. 846 (Sup.
Ct. 1899) (A nursing committee faithfully discharged its duty in determining a student nurse's right to a diploma); Edde v. Columbia Univ, 8 Misc. 2d 795, 168 N.Y.S.2d
643 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1957), aff'd, 6 App. Div. 2d 780, 175 N.Y.S. 2d 556 (App. Div.),
motion to dismiss appeal denied, 5 N.Y.2d 777, 154 NE.2d 558, 180 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1958),
appeal dismissed, 5 N.Y.2d 881, 156 N.E.2d 458, 182 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1959), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 956 (1959) (the court found ample evidence to support refusal of a doctoral
candidate's dissertation by a faculty committee, and it was not established that the rejection was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable); Tate v. North Pacific College, 70 Ore.
160, 140 P. 743 (1914) (a student failed to prove allegations of bad faith and arbitrary
action by the faculty in giving him low marks on examinations so as to bring his average
below the level required for graduation).
The student's difficulties in proving arbitrariness and bad faith are likely to be compounded by the rule that he is not entitled to notice and hearing for expulsion resulting
from failure to meet scholastic standards. Mustell v. Rose, 282 Ala. 358, 211 So. 2d 489,
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 936 (1968); Militana v. University of Miami, 236 So. 2d 162 (Fla.
Dist. Cr. App. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 962 (1971); Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19, 102 N.. 1095 (1913). However, such notice and hearing may be
required when the student is expelled for misconduct. See, e.g., Woody v. Bums, 188
So. 2d 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966). See generally Comment, ProceduralLimitations on
the Expulsion of College and University Students 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 542 (1966).
179. Connelly v. University of Vt. & State Agriculture College, 244 F.Supp. 156 (D.
Vt. 1965). In Connelly, a third year medical student was dismissed from the school and
denied permission to advance to the fourth year under a rule of the College of Medicine
because he had failed 25 percent or more of the major courses of his third year. The
court held that the plaintifFs allegation that an instructor's determination to fail a student prior to his completion of the course was equivalent to an allegation of bad faith,
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judicial review of expulsions and refusals to confer degrees when based
on academic considerations may be justified as necessary "to avoid invasion of the classroom," 1'o but it is questionable whether a mere order
to afford the student a fair and impartial hearing would provide an
adequate remedy in a situation in which one or more faculty members,
for whatever reason, have determined to frustrate all of the student's
efforts in seeking a degree.
The cases under review are indicative of the obstacles which a professional dissatisfied with the action of a certifying board concerning
the issue of his certification would encounter if he elected to emphasize
the similarity between the professional designation and the academic
degree and proceed against the board on an appropriate contract theory.
The courts would undoubtedly offer relief in cases involving manifest
arbitrariness or prejudice; nevertheless, effective judicial action might
prove extremely difficult to obtain where each of the conflicting claims
had more than merely colorable merit.181 The paucity of reported cases
premised on such a theory, however, renders an informed prediction
of the course of the law in this area impossible. 82 Nevertheless, it does
arbitrariness, and capriciousness on the part of the instructor which, if proven, would
justify granting the plaintiff appropriate relief. Id. at 161. The court then stated:
It should be emphasized that this Court will not pass on the issue of
whether- the plaintiff should have passed or failed his pediatrics-obstetrics
course, or whether he is qualified to practice medicine. This must and can
only be determined by an appropriate department or committee of the
defendant's College of Medicine.... Therefore, should the plaintiff prevail
on the issue of whether the defendant acted arbitrarily, capriciously or in
bad faith, this Court will then order the defendant University to give the
plaintiff a fair and impartial hearing on his dismissal order.
Id.
180. 'Review of University Expulsions, supra note 169, at 1393.
181. See Connelly v. University of Vt. & State Agriculture College, 244 F.Supp. 156
(D. Vt. 1965).
182. A case which might have resolved many of these unanswered questions is Fontanetta v. American Bd. of Internal Medicine, 305 F.Supp. 427 (EDN.Y. 1969), aff'd,
421 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970). The American Board of Internal Medicine, a medical
specialty board, had refused to certify Dr. Fontanetta as a specialist in internal medicine
because of his alleged failure to pass the required oral examination. Dr. Fontanetta
brought an action against the Board for equitable relief and damages. His complaint was
based on a breach of an implied contract to administer the tests fairly, or a request for
judicial review of a quasi-administative procedure. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case on jurisdictional
grounds. After a subsequent action was begun in Pennsylvania, a representative of the
American Board of Internal Medicine agreed to permit Dr. Fontanetta to take the oral
examination again. Dr. Fontanetta passed the examination and has been certified as a
Diplomate in Internal Medicine. Letter from Harry Grossman, Dr. Fontanetta's counsel
in the New York litigation, to Douglas A. Wallace, Oct. 15, 1971.
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seem safe to assume that the various certifying boards would attempt to
defeat such attacks by inserting "no-action" clauses in the candidate's
application for certification or admission to the examinations, thereby
writing the "contract of enrollment" in their own favor. 83 On the
other hand, such clauses might be held unenforceable as a violation of
84
public policy.
Notwithstanding the strong policy of judicial restraint in reviewing
the decisions of college and university faculties concerning the scholastic proficiency of students, several factors lend support to an argument
for greater judicial supervision of the quasi-educational activities of
certifying boards in judging the competence of professionals. First,
one of the major reasons for judicial restraint in cases involving colleges
and universities-the commendable desire to avoid infringements on
academic freedom-is of no real concern in the case of the certifying
board. Second, the members of certifying boards are generally professionals active in their chosen fields; their role is much more akin to
that of the members of a state board of examiners responsible for testing
applicants for admission to an occupation or profession than to the
academic faculty responsible for scholarly research and the education
of students. Third, the professional, unlike the student, faces the risk
of judgment by colleagues who may view his application for certification
with disfavor for a variety of reasons arising out of their self-interested
activities. 8 5 In other words, the professional certifying board may
control economic advancement and preferential employment in the
profesion-a form of power which a single college or university could
never attain. Since the reasons underlying the court's restraint in academic matters are absent in the area of certification, courts should
grant appropriate contractual relief to aggrieved professionals.
183. Several of the medical specialty boards have taken this precaution. The American
Board of Otolaryngology requires the applicant for certification to sign an "Applicant's
Agreement" which includes the following clause: "[Ilf the Board of Otolaryngology
refuses to grant a certificate, such a refusal may not and shall not be questioned by me
in any court of law or equity, or any other tribunal." DmRECoRY, supra note 70, at 912.
184. Cf. UNiFoRM CoMmsrncIAm CODE § 2-302.
185. See the intra-professional squabble in the background of the following cases
involving denial or revocation of certification: Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Ortho0ontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d 495, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969); Kronen v. Pacific Coast
Soc'y of Orthodontists, 237 Cal. App. 2d 289, 46 Cal. Rptr. 808 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 495 (1966); Virgin v. American College of Surgeons, 42 fI1. App.
2d 352, 192 N.E.2d 414 (1963).
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Antit-ust Law
The possibility of antitrust liability is inherent in self-regulatory or
"seal of approval" plans due to the common practices of excluding professionals from the employment market and limiting competition in
spheres of professional activity.186 Thus, the federal antitrust laws 87
may give the professional another avenue of relief against the certifying board. The availability of injunctions and treble damages makes
this route especially attractive. 18 8 However, applicability of the antitrust laws in this area is uncertain. Comprehensive programs for the
certification of the quality and characteristics of manufactured goods
as well as professional people are prevalent in the United States and
frequently operate on a nationwide basis. 8 9 Although the benefits
flowing from many forms of voluntary self-regulation in both industry
and the professions are not to be doubted, the possibility of applying
the antitrust laws to the practice of self-regulation raises many troubling
questions.
Two distinct but closely related problems of potentially controlling
significance in the application of the antitrust laws to the activities of
professionals must be examined. These problems are: (1) whether any
or all of the professions constitute "trade or commerce" within the
meaning of the Sherman Act; and (2) when, if ever, professional activities will satisfy the Sherman Act's jurisdictional requisite of interstate
commerce.
The reference in the Sherman Act to "trade or commerce" 190 constitutes a limitation of undetermined significance on the scope of the
federal antitrust laws. Because the Supreme Court has never addressed
itself to a resolution of the ambiguities inherent in the "trade or com-merce" concept, doubts have arisen whether the practice of a profes186. See, e.g., S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, FEDERAL ANnTRusT LAWS: CASES AND
CommENTs 168-70 (1968); Bodner, Antitrust Restrictions on Trade Association Membership and Participation,54 A.B.AJ. 27, 30-31 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Bodner]; Sym-

posium on Trade Associations, 37 A.BA . Ai-mmTusr L.J. 349 (1968); Comment, Use of
Economic Sanctions by Private Groups: Illegality under the Sherman Act, 30 U. Cm.
L. REv. 171, 188-89 (1962).

187. A consideration of state antitrust laws is beyond the scope of this article.
188. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
189. In 1965 there were over 120 trade associations in the United States engaged in
such quality control programs. BRADLEY, Tbm ROLE oF TRADE AssociATrONS AND PaoFESSIONAL BusINESs SocIIES IN AMERicA 95-96 (1965).

190. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (emphasis supplied).
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sion-at least one of the "learned professions"-constitutes "trade or
commerce" within the meaning of the Sherman Act.1 91 These doubts
have led to a claim.for an implied exemption of the activities of professionals from all or a portion of the antitrust laws.1 92 The claim for
this implied exemption was treated equivocally in American Medical
Association v. United States. 93 In that case the Supreme Court sustained
a conviction of the A.M.A. and other defendants for conspiring to
destroy the business of Group Health, a prepaid medical insurance plan
operating in the District of Columbia. The Court found it unnecessary
to decide whether a physician's practice of his profession constitutes
trade, holding instead that it was sufficient that the defendants had conspired to restrain the business of Group Health. 94 This disposition of
the case made it plain that any interference by professional groups with
the business of other persons would invite antitrust scrutiny, but the
Court's refusal to decide the "trade or commerce" issue suggested the
possibility that the internal affairs of a professional association would
remain immune from antitrust attack.

The case of United States v. National Association of Real Estate
Boards' 5 gives support to this analysis of the Court's position. In Real
Estate Boards the Court sustained conviction of a number of real estate
brokers for price-fixing. Finding that the -activities of real estate brokers
did in fact amount -to "trade," the Court once again avoided the issue
of whether the professions constituted "trade" by concluding that real
estate brokers were not professionals. 96 Nevertheless, the decision in
Real Estate Boards laid to rest the notion that no occupation involving
the sale of personal services would fall within the statutory meaning of-

"trade."

197

191. See Coleman, Antitrust Exemzptions: The Learned Professions, 33 A.B.A. ANnL.J. 48 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Coleman]; Comment, Personal Services and
the Antitrust Laws, 1 WAYNE L. REv. 124 (1955).
192. See Coleman, supra note 191, at 49-51.
193. 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
194. "If, as we hold, the indictment charges a single conspiracy to restrain and obstruct this business [Group Health's] it charges a conspiracy in restraint of trade or
commerce within the Statute. As the Court of Appeals properly remarked, the calling
or occupation of the individual physicians charged as defendants is immaterial if the
purpose and effect of their conspiracy was such obstruction and restraint of the business
of Group Health . . . ,"Id. at 528.
195. 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
196. Id. at 491. In dissent, Justice Jackson stated: "If real estate brokerage is to be
distinguished from the professions or from other labor that is permitted to organize,
the Court does not impart any standards for so doing." Id. at 496.
197. "Members of the Washington Board of entrepreneurs. Some are individual proTRUST

1972]

OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING

Although the Court has thus far refused to decide whether the
Sherman Act applies to all professional activities, there is little reason
to doubt that it would do so if the issue were squarely presented in a
proper case.' 9 " English cases interpreting the doctrine of restraint of
trade, the common law progenitor of the Sherman Act, assumed the
applicability of the doctrine to surgeons, physicians, and dentists.lts
The American cases decided before the passage of the Sherman Act
followed the English cases, even in the face of contentions that the
nature of a profession made the law of restraint of trade inapplicable. 0
A relatively recent English decision held that a boycott by members
of the British Medical Association of doctors engaged in "contract
practice" was a conspiracy in restraint of trade.2° ' Moreover, respectable American authority construing "trade or commerce" limitations
in antimonopoly provisions supports an expansive definition of "trade"
as encompassing professional activities. Chief Judge Groner of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded from a thorough
analysis of the authorities that the Serman Act applied not only to
commercial activity ordinarily defined as "trade," but also to the medical
profession. 02 The Supreme Court of Washington reached a similar
conclusion in construing a provision of the state constitution prohibiting monopolies and restraints of trade. 03
prietors; others are banks or-corporations. Some may have no employees; others have
large staffs. But each is in business on his own. The fact that the business involves the
sale of personal services rather than commodities does not take it out of the category
of "trade" within the meaning of §3 of the Act. The Act was aimed at combinations
organized and directed to control of the market by suppression of competition 'in the
marketing of goods and services." Id. at 490.
198. For an argument that the so-called "personal service exemption" is dead see
Comment, Personal Sersdces and the Antitrust Laws, 1 WAYNE L. Ray. 124 (1955).
199. See, e.g., Gravely v. Barnard, [1874] L.R. 18 Eq. 518; Atkyns v. Kinnier, 154 Eng.
Rep. 1429 (Ex. 1850); Davis v. Mason, 101 Eng. Rep. 69 (T.R. 1793).
200. See, e.g., Gilman v. Dwight, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 356 (1859) in which the court
noted: "There is nothing in the nature of the business or profession to which the contract relates, which takes it out of the ordinary rules applicable to contracts in partial
restraint of trade. The cases are numerous in the books, in which similar contracts entered into by attorneys, solicitors, apothecaries, dentists and surgeons have been upheld
and enforced." Id. at 359. See also Cook v. Johnson, 47 Conn. 175 (1879); Haldeman v.
Simonton, 55 Iowa 144, 7 N.W. 493 (1880); Dwight v. Hamilton, 113 Mass. 175 (1873);
Mandeville v. Harmon, 42 N.J. Eq. 185, 7 A. 37 (Ch. 1886).
201. Pratt v. British Medical Assoc., [1919] 1 K.B. 244.
.202. United States v. American Medical Assoc., 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
310 U.S. 644 (1940).
203. Group Health Co-op v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d
737 (1951) (interpreting WAsm. CoNsr. art. XII, § 22 prohibiting "monopolies and
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The 'second problem, the jurisdictional requisite of interstate commerce, 20 4 may present a more substantial barrier to the application of
the antitrust laws to professional associations. The professions may not
be subject to antitrust laws because their practice is inherently "local"
innature.20 1 Accordingly, antitrust challenges to professional activities
logically should fail when no effect on interstate commerce can
be demonstrated. 206 The leading case, United States v. Oregon Medical
Society, °7 involved a charge of a conspiracy by state medical society
sponsored health plans to restrain competition among themselves. The
district court dismissed the charge on the ground, inter alia, that no
effect on interstate commerce was shown. 208 Describing various interstate contacts proven at trial, such as payments to out-of-state doctors
and hospitals, as "few, sporadic and incidental," the Supreme Court
affirmed' the district court's finding on the issue of fact without indicating the quantum of proof necessary to satisfy the interstate commerce
requirement. 0 9 The lower federal courts have followed the Court's
cryptic lead in Oregon Medical Society and found the requisite interstate commerce lacking in a variety of antitrust litigations involving
physicians and hospitals.2 10 Judicial construction of the interstate commerce requirement with respect to professions outside the medical field
is almost non-existent. 211 The courts have not yet determined what
trusts"). Contra, Friends of Animals, Inc. v. American Veterinary Medical Ass'n, 310
F.Supp. 1016 (SD.N.Y. 1970) (unnecessary to decide whether the practice of veterinary
medicine is "trade or commerce" within the meaning of the Sherman Act); Willis v.
Santa Ana Community Hosp. Ass'n, 58 Cal. 2d 806, 376 P.2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 640
(Sup. Ct. 1962) (state antitrust law not applicable to the professions). See generally
Marcus, Civil Rights and the Anti-trust Laws, 18 U. Cm. L. REv. 171, 184-203 (1951)
[hereinafter cited as Marcus].
204. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (emphasis supplied). See generally Eiger,
The Commerce Element in Federal Antitrust Litigation, 25 FED. B.J. 282 (1965); Kallis,
Local Conduct and the Sherman Act, 1959 DuiE L.J. 236.
205. See Coleman, supra note 191, at 53-54.
206. Id. at 53.
207. 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
208. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 95 F.Supp. 103, 118 (D. Ore. 1950),
aff'd, 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
209. 343 U.S. at 338-39.
210. See Elizabeth Hosp., Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 884 (1959); Riggall v. Washington County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th
Cit. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 954 (1958); Spears Free Clinic v. Cleere, 197 F.2d 125
(10th Cir. 1952); Polhemus v. American Medical Ass'n, 145 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1944);
Robinson v. Lull, 145 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. IM.1956).
-211. But cf. United States v. Prince George's County Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 1970
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93

minimum effect upon interstate commerce will suffice to invoke federal
antitrust jurisdiction over the professions.
The present century, however, has witnessed a steady decline in the
quantum of "effect" on interstate commerce necessary to invoke Congress' regulatory powers under the commerce clause in antitrust and
other areas.212 The requirement of a measurable "effect" has gradually
become of little more than formal significance.2 13 Indeed, at least one
commentator has suggested that, in view of the acceptance in antitrust
law of per se rules making certain conduct illegal regardless of its effect
on the market, it is inconsistent simultaneously to require proof of
effects on interstate commerce in order to satisfy the statute's jurisdictional test.214 In the recent case of Burke v. Ford,215 the Supreme

Court has moved very close to-if it has not adopted-this suggestion.
Therefore, in future antitrust cases proof of a combination or conspiracy assumed to have anti-competitive effects may satisfy ipso facto
the Act's interstate commerce requirement and thus eliminate the need

for direct proof on the issue. Express judicial acceptance of this proposition would resolve much of the uncertainty as to whether professional
activities can satisfy the Sherman Act's jurisdictional test.
Regardless of the meaning of Burke v. Ford, many professional certification programs should be deemed to have a substantial impact on
Trade Cas. 73,393 (D. Md.) (fixing of real estate commissions by local real estate
boards enjoined by consent decree). The Justice Department had alleged in its complaint
that "the activities of the Board and its members are . .. within the flow of interstate
commerce and have an effect upon that commerce." N. Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1969, at 1.
212. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (Civil Rights Act of 1964);
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941) (Fair Labor Standards Act); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937) (National Labor Relations Act).
213. See, e.g., United States v. Bensinger Co., 430 F.2d 584 (8th Cir. 1970) (conspiracy
to fix price of one dishwasher within interstate commerce); NLRB v. Pierce Brothers,
206 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1953) (NLRB had jurisdiction over funeral home on the basis
that some of the corpses were destined for out-of-state shipment).
214. P. ARMDA, ANrrrusr ANAL-YsIs 60 (1967) [hereinafter cited as ABEEA].
215. 389 US. 320 (1967). In this private antitrust action a group of Oklahoma liquor
retailers sought an injunction against an alleged state-wide market division by all Oklahoma liquor wholesalers. The trial judge found that there had been a division of markets
both by territories and by brands but nevertheless entered judgment for the wholesalers
because, inter alia, the interstate commerce prerequisite of the Sherman Act was not
satisfied. Affirming, the Court of Appeals stated that "the proof was entirely insufficient
to show that the activities complained of were in or adversely affected interstate commerce." 377 F.2d 901, 903 (10th Cir. 1967).
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in a per curiam opinion,
.concluding thirough a process of a priori reasoning that "the state-wide wholesalers'
market division inevitably affected interstate commerce." 389 U.S. at 322.
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interstate commerce. Several certifying organizations publish the names,
addresses, and other particulars of certified persons and institutions in
order to facilitate referrals of business and consultations. Many of these

transactions take place across state lines. The Directory of Medical
Specialists published by the American Board of Medical Specialties,
for example, is designed for use in making referrals to specialists and
must have a substantial impact on interstate referrals. A nationwide

system for the certification of lawyers as specialists could be implemented
through the existing law list system or a special directory similar to
the Directory of Medical Specialists. In any case, the amount of interstate commerce affected by the system would be substantial. Although

the amount of interstate business forwarded annually through the law
list medium cannot be estimated accurately, it is at least in the hundreds
of millions of dollars.21 6 The impact of the certification process on
interstate commerce may be much more difficult to demonstrate in the

case of medical technologists, social workers, security analysts, engineering technicians, and life insurance salesmen. However, these certification programs are operated on a nationwide scale and have a corre-

sponding impact on the commercial life of the country. This in itself
may prove to be sufficient to invoke the antitrust laws. 17 '
Assuming the hurdles of "trade or commerce" and minimum "effects"
are cleared, the -question remains whether a discriminatory refusal to

certify constitutes an antitrust violation. The leading case involving
a "seal of approval" program, the Supreme Court's decision in Radiant
216. See Harnsberger, supra note 161. The author states:
Actually no estimate of the value of business transmitted by general law
lists, probate lists, insurance lists and the Martindale-HubbellLaw Directory
is possible, but the total must be tremendous. Some idea may be obtained
from the 1938 report of the Law List Committee which states ". . . a fair
estimate of the actual amount forwarded over all the commercial lists alone
in 1936 approximated $90,000,000. No estimate of the volume of business
forwarded to attorneys listed in non-commercial directories is possible, but
it is reasonably safe to say that in dollars and cents it is very much larger
than that which flows over the commercial law lists. Accordingly, it would
appear that these sundry publications are used in the transmittal of a very
substantial quantity of legal business, both in number of items as well as in
money value." This statement is impressive in view of the fact that national income during 1936 was about $64.9 billion; in 1960, it was over $417
billion. The gross national product in 1936 was $82.7 billion; in 1960, over
$504 billion.
Id. at 33.
217. See Austin, Real Estate Boards and Multiple Listing Systems as Restraints of
Trade, 70 COLTM. L. REv. 1325, 1335-36 (1970); Marcus, supra note 203, at 1,92.
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Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 218 has multiplied uncertainty concerning the future course of antitrust law because it raised the

crucial issue only by implication. The plaintiff was a manufacturer of a
ceramic gas burner known as the "Radiant Burner"; the defendants were
the American Gas Association (AGA), whose membership included
gas distributors as well as manufacturers of gas appliances and equipment. Demanding treble damages and injunctive relief, the plaintiff
alleged that the AGA operated testing laboratories in which it purported
to determine the safety, utility, and durability of gas burners and affixed
a "seal of approval" to gas burners which passed its tests. The plaintiff
alleged that the AGA's tests were not based on "objective standards"
and were influenced by some of the defendants who were in competition
with plaintiff. Consequently, the determination to deny a seal of approval could have beenmade "arbitrarily and capriciously." The plaintiff also alleged the failure of the AGA to approve the Radiant Burner
in spite of its being safer, more efficient, and just as durable as other
burners which had been approved. The denial of the seal of approval
resulted in the exclusion of the Radiant Burner from the market because the members of AGA engaged in the distribution of gas had
agreed not to supply gas for use in any burner not approved by the
AGA. Consumers were naturally unwilling to buy gas burners for
which they could not obtain gas. Reversing a district court judgment
which had dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted, the Supreme Court held in a per curiam
opinion that the alleged collective refusal to supply gas for the plaintiff's
burner stated a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.219

Because the illegality of concerted refusals to deal-eliminating even
a single competitor from the market-had been announced by the Supreme Court two years earlier,220 the Radiant Burners decision blazed
no new trails in antitrust law. Interest in this particular decision arose
out of speculation that, had there been no allegation of a collective
refusal to supply gas, the Supreme Court would still have held that the
complaint in Radiant Burners stated a cause of action because of the

exclusionary effects of the AGA's testing plan. The AGA's discriminatory refusal to grant the plaintiff's burner the seal of approval essential to success in the gas appliance market could, arguably, have constituted a combination in unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of
218. 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
- 219. Id. at 659-60.
220. Mior's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 22' This speculative inference has raised

many questions concerning the duties which might be imposed upon the
sponsor of a seal of approval or certification program. Such an organization may be brought under close scrutiny with regard to the substantive and procedural fairness of its testing procedures and non-discriminatory access to them by all interested persons. 22
These ramifications of the Radiant Burners decision have not gone
unnoticed by organizations operating or contemplating the operation
of certification programs for professionals. Precautionary measures taken
by the National Association of Social Workers and the various medical
specialty boards, for example, have previously been noted.2s Nevertheless, because antitrust liability depends on substance rather than form, 24
it is doubtful whether carefully worded disclaimers or the creation of
purportedly autonomous "academies" will suffice to comply with antitrust regulations. Several hypothetical examples-using the medical
specialty boards for illustrative purposes-may illuminate some of the
principles and problems in this emerging branch of antitrust law:
(1) As part of an effort to raise their standards, all hospitals in the
New York metropolitan area have agreed with the American Board
of Pathology that they will employ only board-certified pathologists
in their laboratories. R, a pathologist practicing in New York who
has been denied certification by the Board, brings a private antitrust
action against the Board and hospitals alleging that as a result of
their agreement and conspiracy he has been unable to obtain employment as a pathologist in any area hospitals because he is not boardcertified.
221. See Kirkpatrick, The Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust Enforcement,
1971 N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N ANTITRUST L. SYMposiUM at 14, 22-24; Turner, Consumer Protection by Private Joint Action, 1967 N.Y. ST. B. Ass'N AirTRusr L. SYMPOSIUM at 36,
37-39; Bodner, supra note 186, at 30-31.
222. See note 186 supra.
223. See Kidneigh, supra note 55. The specter of antitrust liability was also raised at a
meeting of the National Conference of Bar Presidents in connection with plans for the
certification of lawyers as specialists by the American Bar Association. Harold J.
Gallagher stated: "[T]he house of Delegates alone should not be the sole criteria to
determine what 200,000 lawyers should do in respect to this specialization. We have
half, or perhaps 40% of them in the American Bar Association, but the great mass of
lawyers have to be considered. . . . The antitrust problems would not permit the
American Bar Association to say that only American Bar Association Lawyers are certified to specialize." Proceeding of the National Conference of Bar Presidents, Aug. 3-5,
1
1962, at 115, quoted in GREENWOOD, supra note 67, at 152-53.
224. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); United States v. Masonite
Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
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Clearly, allegations of such a collective refusal to deal on the part of
the hospitals would state a cause of action under the principle of Radiant
Burners. Significantly, an attack on their role in defining requirements
for staff membership and employment by hospitals is the type of antitrust challenge to which the specialty boards apparently feel most
vulnerable. 5
(2) The members of the American Board of Internal Medicine have
agreed not to certify any doctor who has a reputation among the
physicians in his local community as a price-cutter. Alleging that the
Board's refusal to certify him was motivated solely by his welldeserved reputation as a price-cutter, S,an internist, brings an action
against the Board and its members seeking treble damages and injunctive relief.
Such an exclusionary use of the certification device could not be justified as necessary for the preservation of ethical standards. Extrapolation
from the Radiant Burners case leads to the conclusion that the Board of
Internal Medicine is a combination in unreasonable restraint of trade
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and S has stated a cause
of action.
(3) As part of its examination process, the American Board of Plastic
Surgery has always required all candidates for certification to perform
Procedure P. Procedure P is quite difficult to learn and perform
properly and in the past decade has almost completely been supplanted by a new substitute procedure known as Q. Thus, only older
plastic surgeons are familiar with P; it is no longer taught in medical
school or graduate training programs. The members of the Board
have continued the requirement, not out of a desire to limit the number of board-certified plastic surgeons, but because of tradition and
the feeling of some members of the Board that they should not be
too lenient with the younger doctors.
225. Illustrative is the following statement of the American Board of Orthopaedic
Surgery: "Itis neither the intent nor the purpose of the Board to define requirements
for membership in any organization or the staff of any hospital." D~croRY, supra note
70, at 807. For similar statements see DIRECTORY, supra note 70, at 532 (obstetrics and
gynecology), 1734 (surgery), 2041 (urology).
These disclaimers, which were first issued after the Supreme Court's decision in
American Medical Assn. v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943), made it clear that the
medical profession was not exempt from the Sherman Act, and partially are designed to
defeat actions under the antitrust laws. See RAYACr, supra note 34, at 222; STEvENs, supra
note 34, at 306-309.
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T, a plastic surgeon, was denied certification by the Board because
he failed to perform P successfully. Alleging that this requirement is
unreasonable, T brings a private antitrust action to enjoin the Board
from withholding his certification solely on the basis of his failure to
perform P successfully.
T's action raises the questions of whether and to what extent the antitrust laws impose a duty on a professional organization to insure that its
certification standards are current and in accord with existing technology
and practice. Because the requirements of the Board of Plastic Surgery
are not anticompetitive by design, T's action also raises corollary issues
concerning the relevance to antitrust liability of the Board's intent in
formulating and enforcing the requirement.
(4) The members of the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology have become convinced that R.D. Laing, the well-known
British psychiatrist, is a crackpot. His theories, they feel, represent a
grave threat to the future of psychiatry. Accordingly, the Board
adheres to a firm policy of refusing certification to psychiatrists attracted to Laing's views. U, a psychiatrist with impeccable credentials, feels that the Board has denied his application for certification
because he is a disciple of Laing. The Board's notice informing U of
the denial of certification stated that his candidacy might be reconsidered when he acquired "a proper appreciation of the principles of
psychiatric theory." Assailing the Board's policy, U brings an action
for treble damages and injunctive relief against the Board and its
members.
A court confronting U's case might easily picture itself about to plunge
into the "Dismal Swamp of obscure rules and doctrines" formerly
thought reserved for the intricacies of theological disputes.220 Here the
court must consider not only the largely unexplored issue of whether
the defendants' non-commercial purpose is a valid defense to an antitrust claim, but also the propriety of judicial intervention in the internal
affairs of a professional association.
The professional organization's purpose in establishing its certification
program is relevant to a determination of antitrust liability because in
formulating and enforcing their requirements and standards, certifying
organizations will frequently be furthering goals of undisputed social
226. See Chafee, supra note 40, at 993, 1024.
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importance. It thus becomes necessary to consider whether restraints
of trade cognizable under the antitrust laws may be saved from illegality
because they are designed to further socially desirable objectives.
This question has arisen most frequently in the context of concerted
refusals to deal, as, for instance, an agreement by members of a basketball association not to hire a former basketball player who had wagered
on games. Although the leading case in concerted refusals to deal,
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 227 might be viewed as an
enunciation of a rule of per se illegality for all group boycotts, 228 the
lower federal courts have not so interpreted the decision and have repeatedly upheld the legality of some group boycotts in which they have
discerned socially desirable objectives.229 Similarly, the lower federal
courts have sustained the legality of certification programs under antitrust attack by emphasizing the importance of the defendants' good
purposes and the value of voluntary self-regulation by industry and the
227. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
228. See, e.g., Handler, Recent Developments in Antitrust Law: 1958-59, 59 CoLum.
L. REv. 843, 862 (1959). Other commentators, however, have questioned the utility of
the per se rule in the group boycott area. See, e.g., Areeda, supra note .214, at 315-17;
Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts under the Sherman Act: Some Reflections on the
Klor's Case, 45 VA. L. REv. 1165 (1959); Comment, Joint Ventures and Boycotts: Some
Suggestions on Per Se, 15 S-rN. L. REv. 638 (1963). See generally Barber, Refusals to
Deal Under the FederalAntitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 847 (1955).
229. Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966) (exclusion of golfer from tournaments because he was not
an "approved tournament player" under PGA rules was reasonable); Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (refusal by association to hire
former basketball player who had bet on games was reasonable); United States v. United
States Trotting Ass'n, 1960 Trade Cas. 69, 761 (S.D. Ohio) (harness racing association
rules requiring membershipi to drive horse on member track and limiting "eligibility"
so as to exclude unsavory elements were only reasonable restraints and not a per se
commercial boycott); United States v. Insurance Bd, 188 F.Supp. 949 (N.D. Ohio 1960)
(membership rule requiring member insurance agents to represent stock insurance
companies exclusively not illegal per se, but did amount to Sherman Act violation under
"rule of reason" approach). But see Washington State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v.
Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966) (eligibility
rule limiting BPAA tournaments to bowlers who restricted their league and tournament
bowling to member establishments intends to insure that all scores used in computing
qualifying averages were made under conditions supervised by the association was held
to be an illegal group boycott); Community Blood Bank, [1965-67 Transfer Binder]
TaRAE REG. REP. 17,728 (FTC 1966) (boycott of commercial blood banks by hospitals
and pathologists was not justified by belief that commercial blood banking was morally
wrong); Mechanical Contractors Bid Depository v. Christiansen, 352 F.2d 817 (10th
Cir. 1965) (group boycott of non-members of bid depository not justified as an attempt
to eliminate construction industry evils of "bid shopping" or "bid peddling"). See
generally Note, Trade Association Exclusionary Practices: An Affirmative Rate or the
Rule of Reason, 66 CoLUM. L. Ran. 1486 (1966).
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professions. 2 0 These cases indicate that the courts will allow certification and "seal of approval" plans a relatively large measure of freedom
from antitrust scrutiny.
In Roofire Alarm Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co.,2 3 ' a private antitrust

action, the plaintiff alleged concerted action between the defendant
and Underwriters Laboratories to keep the plaintiff's fire alarm device
off the market by refusing to test it or publish the results of its tests.
Underwriters Laboratories had established certain standards which a
fire alarm device had to meet before it would be listed or approved; the
refusal to test the plaintiff's device was based on those standards.3 2
There was no dispute as to whether plaintiff's device met the standards,
and plaintiff conceded that neither the defendant nor Underwriters
Laboratories were engaged in the manufacture of fire alarm devices or
received commissions or royalties from the sale of fire alarm devices
produced by manufacturers other than the plaintiff. Referring to
Underwriters Laboratories' national reputation as a testing organization,
the court characterized its action with respect to the plaintiff's product
as "lawful and proper" and held that no violation of the Sherman Act
had been established.28 3 This summary treatment of the issue of quality

control through product standards is undoubtedly explained by the
plaintiff's failure to prove the inadequacy or unreasonableness of those
standards and the lack of any competition between the plaintiff and
either the defendant or Underwriters Laboratories.
The decision in Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Ply'wood
8 4
Association

evidenced a more discerning approach to the problem of

230. A state court adopted a similar approach in Purofied Down Prod. Corp. v.
National Ass'n of Bedding Mfrs., 201 Misc. 149, 105 N.Y.S.2d 132 (Sup. Cr. 1952)
(state and-monopoly statutes not violated by a trade association plan designed to eliminate mislabeling of pillows by manufacturers).
231. 202 F. Supp. 166 (ED. Tenn. 1962), aff'd, 313 F.2d 635 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 949 (1963).
232. One of the standards the plaintiff's product failed to meet required that "the
warning sound continue for at least three minutes at full intensity." The plaintiff's fire
alarm device consisted of two carbon dioxide filled capsules enclosed in a metal tube
with crimped ends. When heated, the capsules explode, thereby warning people in the
vicinity. This information appears in the report of an earlier phase in the litigation in
which the plaintiff had sought to compel Underwriters Laboratories to change its
standards so that the plaintiff's fire alarm might be approved. A summary judgment
for Underwriters Laboratories was affirmed on appeal. Roofire Alarm Co. v. Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1959), aff'd, 284 F.2d 360 (6th
Cir. 1960).
233. 202 F. Supp. at 169.
234. 261 F. Supp. 154 (D. Ore. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 399 F.2d 155 (9th Cit. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969).
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seal of approval plans. The case involved a treble damage 'action by a
plywood manufacturer against a trade association whose members manufactured from 82 to 89 percent of all the plywood produced in the
United States. The plaintiff manufacturer claimed that the association's
quality control program had the effect of excluding its product from
the market and eventually driving it out of business. The association
inspected and tested members' products, permitting members whose
products were approved to use its stamp and certificate. Plywood not
bearing the association's mark was more difficult to sell and brought a
lower price.
The defendant association assumed a dominant role in proposing
standards, soliciting approval of them by members of the industry, and
securing their adoption. Because the industry had experienced difficulties with the bonding of relatively thick veneers, a standard was
adopted which prohibited the use of such veneers in the construction of
V/z-inch plywood and required that such plywood be constructed of
five plies. The plaintiff believed it had solved these bonding difficulties
and in 1957 constructed a mill designed specially for the production of
V2-inch sheathing plywood composed of three plies. In 1958, the plain-

tiff sought from the defendant a modification of the industry standard
approving the three ply construction. Although the plaintiff's product
passed the defendant's performance tests for -inch plywood, the
defendant did not recommend a revision in the quality standard to
approve the three ply construction until 1963. Plaintiff had gone out
-of business in November, 1959.
The court recognized that the defendant association might have
concluded that the poor reputation three ply -inch plywood enjoyed
in the industry was unwarranted; 2s5 nevertheless, it held that the exclusion of such plywood was neither unreasonable nor done with evil
intent. 226 In support of its finding that there was no violation of the

Sherman Act, the court explained its understanding of the law as
follows:
If intent and purpose are factors in the anti-trust law, and the

court believes they are except where per se violations are involved,
then the mere failure of one who is responsible for the adoption of

a commercial standard to appreciate changes which make that
235. Id. at 159.
236. Id. at 158. The court reached this conclusion despite its finding that'some of the
members of the association had economic motives for opposing the use of three ply
2-inch plywood. Id. at 158-59.
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standard obsolete and to take immediate and effective action to
alter it, does not amount to a conspiracy to restrain trade. Any
system of standards pre-supposes that there are standard and nonstandard items. Those who produce products which are not standard are to some extent penalized and trade is to some extent restrained. This much however is congressionally sanctioned and
the court is of the opinion that in the absence of a bad purpose
mistakes made in the formulation of maintenance of standards do
237
not subject the one making the mistake to antitrust liability.
In other words, a certification plan will not violate the antitrust laws
unless the formulation and enforcement of an industry standard is done
with the intent of excluding competitors from the market.
The StructuralLamizates decision is subject to criticism on a number
of grounds. First, the court's preoccupation with the intent of the
defendant rather than the effect of its certification program as the issue
on which liability depended is not supported by case law. Antitrust
analysis does not preclude reference to intent as one factor to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a restraint of trade238 or the
existence of an antitrust violation,2 39 but it has never been supposed that
a benign intention would save from illegality an otherwise objectionable restraint of trade. 4 ° On the contrary, the. opportunities for abuse
inherent in a certification program operated by mutual competitors2 41
would suggest the imposition of an affirmative duty of fairness on a
certifying organization. Support for this suggestion is -found in the
antitrust policies favoring ease of entry into the market24 2 and innova237. Id. at 159. The court's reference to "congressional sanction" is simply to the
Department of Commerce's participation in the 'development of voluntary standards
for products, rather than express congressional approval of the standard atissue in the
case.

238. Chicago Bd. of Trade v, United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
239. Eastern R.R. Presidents' Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961) (Sherman Act not applicable to activities designed to influence legislation and
law enforcement practices even though such activities are designed to produce a trade
restraint or monopoly).
240. "The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or
the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and
to predict consequences ...

"

246 U.S. at 238-39.

, 241; This is amply demonstrated in both the StructuralLaminates and Radiant Burners
decisions.
242. See, e.g., FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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tion stimulated by competitive rivalry.2 43 Certainly antitrust law should
not condone a failure to update standards in accordance with technological advancement simply because the failure results from neglect
rather than a manifest desire to hamper the competitive ability of rivals.
In addition, the court assumed that the association was justified in
refusing to modify its standard because it had no reason to believe mills
other than the plaintiff's would have been able to produce satisfactory
V2-inch plywood using the three ply construction. 24' This was an inadequate reason for denying approval to a new market entrant which
had solved the bonding difficulties. The association did not claim that
three ply construction was inherently inferior to five ply construction;
rather, the association's disapproval centered on the bonding difficulties
formerly experienced with the thicker veneers used in the three ply
construction. Although the plaintiff's product met the performance
standards demanded of five ply construction, the association continued
to deny the plaintiff a seal of approval merely because its product did
not conform to the required construction specifications. In view of the
fact that plaintiff's plywood performed in a manner consistent with the
goals of the quality control program, the association's insistence on
compliance with construction specifications should have been deemed
unreasonable.
Another case concerning the status of certification plans under the
antitrust laws is Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools. 24 5 The Marjorie Webster
decision was prompted by the refusal of Middle States, one of the United
States' six regional educational accrediting associations, to evaluate for
possible accreditation Marjorie Webster Junior College, a proprietary
*school located in Washington, D.C. Middle States had declined Marjorie Webster's request for an evaluation in accordance with the association's established policy of refusing to evaluate schools operated on
a profit-making basis. Because of the increasing difficulty it experienced
in operating without regional accreditation, Marjorie Webster brought
suit against Middle States to compel an evaluation. The district court
found, inter alia, that the Middle States policy unreasonably restrained
trade in violation of section 3 of the Sherman Act and enjoined Middle
243. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
244. 261 F. Supp. at 158-59.
245. 302 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 965 (1970). For a discussion of Marjorie Webster Junior College and the events
leading up to the litigation see Koerner, The Case of Marjorie Webster, 20 PuB. INTasas?
40 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Koerner].
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States from refusing to evaluate Marjorie
Webster solely on the basis
246
of the school's profit-making status.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the district court on the ground that Middle States' objectives
were "educational" rather than "commercial." 247 The Court of Appeals
explained the significance of this distinction as follows:
That appellant's [Middle States] objectives, both in its formation and in the development and application of the restriction here
at issue, are not commercial is not in dispute. Of course, when a
given activity falls within the scope of the Sherman Act, a lack of
predatory intent is not conclusive on the question of its legality.
But the proscriptions of the Sherman Act were 'tailored . ..for
the business world,' not for noncommercial aspects of the liberal
arts and the learned professions. In these contexts, an incidental
restraint of trade, absent an intent or purpose to affect the comis not sufficient to warrant applimercial aspects of the profession,
248
laws.
antitrust
the
of
cation

Although the opinion is unclear on the point, the court apparently
supported the district court's characterization of Marjorie Webster's
educational activities as "trade." 249 Its holding, however, was grounded
246. The district court also held that as an accrediting agency, Middle States was
engaged in a quasi-governmental function, subjecting it to the restraints of the Constitution. Because the refusal to evaluate Marjorie Webster was arbitrary, distriminatory,
and unreasonable, fundamental fairness dictated that Middle States evaluate Marjorie
Webster and accredit it if it should otherwise qualify. 302 F. Supp. at 471, 478.
247. 432 F.2d at 654.
248. Id.
249. But see 432 F.2d at 654-55, where the court stated: "We are fortified in this
conclusion by the historic reluctance of Congress to exercise control in educational
matters. . . . [T]he process of accreditation is an activity distinct from the sphere of
commerce; it goes rather to the heart of the concept of education itself. We do not
believe that Congress intended this concept to be molded by policies underlying the
Sherman Act." For the district court's discussion of Marjorie Webster's activities as
"trade" see 302 F. Supp. at 465-66.
For a different view of the "commercial" nature of certification activities see Fontanetta v. American Bd. of Internal Medicine, 421 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970). There the
court was faced with the problem of construing a New York "long arm" statute to
determine whether the district court had jurisdiction over the defendant, a medical
specialty board. The statutory language in question referred to the "transaction of
business within the state.' The defendant board had argued that the statute applied only
to commercial activities and, therefore, jurisdiction was lacking because its activities
were non-commercial. The court gave the following answer to the Board's contention:
"[It is a considerable strain to characterize the board's activities as non-commercial.
Non-profit they may be, but the certifying of practicing physicians as specialists ob-
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chiefly in the defendant's intent; Middle States' educational purposes
constituted an affir-native defense in justification of the restraint imposed on Marjorie Webster. 250 This interpretation of the decision is
supported by the court's willingness to apply the Sherman Act to commercially motivated restrictions on eligibility for accreditation, such as
a refusal to accredit schools dealing with suppliers who did not grant
discounts to association members.251
There is little practical difference between Marjorie Webster and
StructuralLaminates: the former allowed the defense of a non-economic
purpose; the latter required proof of an anti-competitive intent. Both
decisions will allow self-regulatory certifying groups a large degree of
immunity from antitrust liability. Assuming a worthy non-economic
purpose, the application of the Sherman Act to the activities of a certifying board would be restricted to cases in which (1) direct proof
of intent to use the certifying plan to exclude competitors from the
market is available, or (2) the anti-competitive effect of the plan is so
obvious that there is no need for an inquiry into the question of intent.
Thus, by focusing exclusively on the issue of intent or purpose, both
decisions foreclose inquiry into the actual effect of a certification plan
2
and its reasonableness in terms of the goals of the Sherman Act.s
Under this view, the antitrust laws pose little threat to all but the most
self-serving certification plan.
In defense of the Marjorie Webster approach, however, it is at least
arguable that it is not inconsistent with the policy of the Sherman Act
to refrain from applying it to the internal affairs of "the liberal arts and
learned professions" by accepting non-economic purpose as justifying
viously has a direct professional and financial effect upon the doctors involved:' 421
F.2d at 357.
250. For discussions of the unsettled question whether non-economic purpose may be
recognized as a Sherman Act defense see Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Non-Comnercial Concerted Refusal to Deal, 1970 Duri L.J. 247; Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 705 (1962).
251. 432 F.2d at 654-55 & n.21.
252. Cf. 302 F. Supp. at 465-69. The district court considered in Marjorie Webster
the reasonableness of the proprietary distinction as an indicator of academic quality and
the relevance of the antitrust laws. James D. Koerner reports that the major issue at
the trial of the case was whether Middle States' basic requirement for membership,
that an institution be "nonprofit with a governing board representing the public interest," was defensible and fair. Koerner supra note 245, at 46. The noted economist
Milton Friedman testified on Marjorie Webster's behalf (without fee), the first occasion
on which he has ever agreed to serve as an expert witness. Id. at 48-49. James Tobin,
Sterling Professor of Economics at Yale, declined Middle States' invitation to testify in
its favor, as did John H. Fischer, President of Teachers College, Columbia University.
Id. at 46.
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*a restraint of trade that is otherwise consistent with public policy." s
A "considered" dictum in the Supreme Court's opinion in the Oregon
State Medical Society case recognizing a distinction between the professional-client relationship and ordinary commercial matters gives force
to this argument. 254 Moreover, the professions and the academic world
have traditionally maintained high ethical and technical standards; a certification program is one method of promoting and gaining recognition
for these standards. A desire to disrupt this pattern of voluntary self253. For an extreme expression of this view see Levin v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 233
F. Supp. 953 (D.D.C. 1964), rev'd sub nom., Levin v. Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Hospitals, 354 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
In Levin the plaintiff established that the defendant hospital had agreed to conform
to the standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals in order to
receive accreditation from the Commission. These standards required, inter alia, a sharp
limitation on the freedom of podiatrists to utilize hospital facilities. The plaintiff, a
podiatrist who had formerly utilized the hospital's facilities, alleged the hospital's
motive was to eliminate competition between podiatrists and orthopedic surgeons and
contended that the agreement was a restraint of trade violative of the Sherman Act.
Rejecting the plaintiff's contention as "farfetched," the district court stated:
Endeavors of professional groups to raise the ethical standards of their
profession and to enhance the quality of services rendered to the public
are to be encouraged and commended. They do not constitute a restraint
of trade, even if they result in the elimination of some persons who are not
regarded as sufficiently qualified, or in a limitation of activities on the part
of some professional men. This principle is particularly important where
considerations of public health and the welfare of individual patients are
involved.
354 F.2d at 518.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants; the court of appeals
reversed, holding that summary judgment was improper but expressing no view on
the district court's interpretation of the law. Id.
254. 343 U.S. at 336:
Since no concerted refusal to deal with private health associations has
been proved, we need not decide whether it would violate the antitrust
laws. We might observe in passing, however, that there are ethical considerations where the historic direct relationship between patient and physician is involved which are quite different than the usual considerations prevailing in ordinary commercial matters. This Court has recognized that
forms of competition usual in the business world may be demoralizing to
the ethical standards of a profession.
In the case of Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1934),
the Court had sustained the validity under the due process clause of an Oregon law
prohibiting advertising by dentists. The citation to Semler, therefore, is not without
significance. Advertising may very well lead to price competition among sellers and
divert customers from one seller to another. See Barron, Business and Professional
Licensing-Ca!ifornia, A Representative Example, 18 STAN. L. REv. 640, 654 (1966).
This dictum, therefore, is one indication that the internal affairs of professional association constitutes an area in which the policy of the Sherman Act must yield to other
social values. Cf. Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 71 YALE L.J. 75, 88 (1961).
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regulation perhaps should. not be imputed to Congress.2 55 An immunity
resting on these grounds naturally would be subject to forfeiture if a
cirtification program were used to injure the business of others outside
the professional group, as in the utilization by pathologists of a certification program for laboratory technicians as a means of excluding nonphysicians from the commercial medical laboratory business.
Nevertheless, the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Silver v.
New York Stock Exchange2-6 strongly suggests that action by an association exercising a large degree of self-regulatory power which adversely affects a competitor of association members may be "reconciled" with the antitrust laws only if the association provides due process
safeguards with respect to its decisions affecting non-member competitors: The Silver decision casts considerable doubt on the conclusion of
the Court of Appeals in Marjorie Webster that intent or purpose rather
than the actual effect of a certification program should be determinative
of the antitrust question. 57 Apart from the questionable approach taken
by the courts in deciding Structural Laminates and Marjorie Webster,
there is a more fundamental conflict. These decisions fail to comport
with one of the basic tenets of antitrust policy-a preference for untrammelled choices by consumers in competitive markets as the favored
method of. allocating finite. resources and determining the success or
failure of competing enterprises.08 The goal of any certification program for professionals is to influence the choices of consumers of professional services by encouraging them to rely on the fact of certification as an indication of competence and high ethical standing. The
competitive process is disrupted whenever certification is awarded or
denied unfairly because the consumer who relies on the fact of certification in choosing among the services of competing professionals has
not. made a choice on the merits. This disruption of the competitive
255. The Supreme Court, however, has shown little sympathy to claims for antitrust'

law exemptions which Congress has not made explicit. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). Moreover, Congress has made explicit exceptions to the antitrust laws for some groups, but not for professional associations. See,
e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964) (labor unions); Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12
U.S.C. § 1828 (c)(Supp. IV, 1968).
-256. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
"257. See H. BLAXE & R. PiTOFKy, CASES AND MATauAis ON ANTITRUST LAw 455, 480

(1967). The authors suggest that the requirements of procedural fairness, as set forth in
Siher, may apply to an industry-wide "seal of approval" plan operated by a trade
association.
258. See P. A-EDA, supra note 214, at 5-9; C. KAYsEN & D. TuRNm,,Axnirusr PoLicy:
A. EcoNoMic AND LEam ANALYsis 44-49 (1959). This analysis follows to some extent
that in-84 Hatv. L. REv. 1912, 1914-15 (1971).
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process occurs regardless of the intent or purpose of the certifying
board; the issue of intent or purpose in this context is largely irrelevant.
Judicial treatment of certification problems should preserve the integrity
of the consumer selection process as a method of resource allocation
by encouraging the award of certification on the basis of merit.
Finally, it should be noted that the major reason for the passage of
the Sherman Act was a fear that aggregations of economic power would
adversely affect the public.259 This was the evil the Act was designed
to alleviate. Although the economic power blocs feared most at the
time of the passage of the Act were burgeoning corporate organizations, the statutory language was designed to eradicate all evils within
its reach regardless of the form in which they appeared. 260 Since the
passage of the Act, many professional associations in the United States
have achieved a "stranglehold" over the lives of the persons they represent and have become receptacles of considerable economic power. 61
In accordance with the purpose of the Sherman Act, any device such
as the certification program through which this power can be exercised
is a prime candidate for antitrust scrutiny.
The Federal Trade Commission
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has reached its own conclusions concerning the duties which the antitrust laws impose on organizations sponsoring certification programs.262 Unlike the courts deciding
1 3 the FTC holds a certiStructuralLaminates and Marjorie Webster,26
259. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911).
260. Id. at 60-62.
261. The "stranglehold" was noted by Zechariah Chafee as early as 1930; the growing
power of professional associations has been the subject of considerable commentary ever
since. See, e.g., LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 107, at 1247;
Chafee, supra note 40 at 1021-23; Grant, The Guild Returns to America, 4 J. of POL. 303,
458 (1942); Comment, The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose and Politics
in Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L.J. 937 (1954). See generally Developments in the
Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REv. 983 (1963).
262. American National Standards Institute, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. Ra'. t 19,549
(FTC 1970); Advisory Opinion Digest No. 152, [1967-70 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg.
Rep. 18,125 (FTC 1967); Advisory Opinion Digest No. 96, [1965-67 Transfer Binder]
CCH TRADE RaE. REP. t 17,723 (FTC 1966). These advisory opinions were issued in
response to requests for information concerning the legality of proposed certification
programs for products.
263. See, e.g., BLAKE & PITOFSKY, supra note 257 (Structural Laminates); Kirkpatrick,
supra note 221, at 22-26 (StructuralLaminates and Mariorie Webster). See also Jackson
v. New York Produce Exch., 1959 Trade Cas. 69,395 (S.D.N.Y.) (produce exchange
licensing "petroleum inspectors" ordered in consent decree to adopt uniform, nondiscriminatory standards for granting licenses and to grant a license to a qualified person
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ffymg :organization responsible for insuring "that its standards reflectexisting technology and are kept current and adequately upgraded to
allow for technological innovation." 264 Moreover, construction or
specification standards may be used only in "exceptional circumstances"
and never when performance standards can be developed." 5 The FTC
also urges sponsoring organizations to avoid the use of single standard,
or "pass/fail" systems, and to employ instead graded systems which
preserve consumer and user options.

266

When a challenge to a standard

or set of standards arises, the FTC will place the burden of proof on
the issue of reasonableness upon the organization developing and enforcing them.267 The FTC will invalidate any standardization or certification program which has the effect of boycotting or excluding
competitors. 2 8 Finally, an organization sponsoring a standardization or

certification program must accord due process to all parties interested in
or affected by it, including "the conduct of timely hearings with
prompt decisions on claims respecting standards or the denial of certification." 269
If the courts had applied the FTC's guidelines to the facts of Structural Laminates and, by analogy, to the non-product accreditation plan
under attack in Marjorie Webster, they would have made the following findings: The quality standards of the defendant trade association
in Structural Laminates were out of date and its quality control plan
was based entirely on construction standards; similarly, Middle States
violated the FTC guidelines by refusing to evaluate Marjorie Webster
solely because of its profit-making character rather than judging its
performance as an educational institution on the merits. Both certification plans utilized pass/fail standards rather than graded systems. The
outcome of the cases would have been entirely different; this leads to
the supposition that, henceforth, plaintiffs complaining of the action of
regardless of whether he is a member of the exchange); United States v. Western Pine
Ass'n 1940-43 Trade Cas. 56,107 (S.D. Cal. 1941); United States v. National Lumber
Mfrs. Ass'n, 1940-43 Trade Cas. 56,123 (D.D.C. 1941); United States v. Southern Pine
Ass'n, 1940-43 Trade Cas. 56,007 (ED. La. 1940) (trade associations engaged in testing and grading of lumber required in consent decrees to make services available to all
manufacturers on a non-discriminatory basis regardless of whether manufacturers were
association members).
264. American National Standards Institute, Inc., 3 CCH TAD.E RFG. REP.
19,549
(FTC 1970).
265. Id.
266. Id,

267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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a certifying body will carry their cases before the FTC. Unfortunately
for these plaintiffs, the difference in anticipated result may be more
theoretical than real, as will be explained below.
. Notwithstanding the potential application of the agency's enlightened
guidelines, the adjudicative procedures of the FTC may not provide a
remedy to the aggrieved party in a certification dispute. As an independent administrative agency, the FTC has jurisdiction of "unfair
methods of competition" 270 as well as Sherman Act violations;2 'I but
its jurisdiction over professional activities generally and certifying
agencies in particular is subject to the same limitations created by the
uncertain scope of the terms "trade" and "interstate commerce" as discussed in connection with judicial application of the Act. 7 2 Further-

more, the FTC has never shown an interest in halting the restrictive
practices of professional associations; the Justice Department has been
responsible for bringing all significant antitrust litigation concerning
the professions before the courts. 27 3 In view of the inadequacy of the

274
FTC's staff and budgetary resources to cope with its present tasks,
one could not expect it to assume additional responsibilities in the certification area without increased funds. The accumulating evidence of
the FTC's inefficiency and preoccupation with "trivia," moreover, calls
27 5
into question the wisdom of lodging such duties with that agency.

Unjust Interference and the "Public Setvee"
Rationale of the Falcone Decision
A professional certifying board's "seal of approval" is frequently an
important source of advantageous business relationships. A denial or
revocation of certification will often seriously impair a professional's
270. FTC v. Brown Shoe, 384 U.S. 316 (1966); FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising
Service, 344 U.S. 392 (1953); FTC v. Beechnut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).

271. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
272. See pp. 89-94 supra.
273. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952); United
States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950); American Medical
Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); United States v. Prince George's County
Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 1970 Trade Cas. 73,393 (D. Md.). Cf. Community Blood Bank,
[1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. RE'. 1 17,728 (FTC 1966).
274. See L. KoHLMEIER, TaE REGULATORS: WATCHDOG AGENCtS AND THE PUBLIC INTErET
254-55 (1969) [hereinafter cited as KoHLmEimR.
275. See E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, "THE NADER REPORT" ON THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION (1969); M. GREEN et al., THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM (Ralph
Nader's Study Group Report on Antitrust Enforcement) (1972); KoHLMEIER, supra
note 274, at 251-61.
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ability to find employment and, indeed, to practice his profession at all.
The individual's stake in his profession or calling has long been the
subject of judicial protection; an unjustified interference with this
-interest is tortious and actionable under the theory of interference with
prospective advantage. 276 Therefore, action by a certifying board which
is detrimental to a professional's practice may expose the board to tort
liability.
No cases have been reported in which a professional has challenged
the action of a certifying board on the basis of the traditional interference with prospective advantage or prima facie tort theories 2 7 The
case of Owens v. Williams2 7 8 illustrates the judicial application of these
theories to an analogous situation. In this case the plaintiff claimed that
the defendant, a physician on the staff of the hospital at which the plaintiff was employed as a special nurse, wrongfully caused the hospital to
dismiss her and bar her return to the hospital. 27 9 The plaintiff alleged
that, as a direct result of this action by the hospital, she was unable to
obtain employment as a registered nurse on the staff of any other hospital in good standing and was thus deprived of her means of livelihood.
After a jury returned a verdict in the plaintiff's favor, the trial judge
entered judgment for the defendant. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts reversed the trial judge's decision and ordered
the jury verdict reinstated. The court observed that being listed on the
hospital's roster of nurses and the opportunity of nursing at the hospital
were business relationships valuable to the plaintiff because they guaranteed ready employment. Furthermore, this business relationship
would not have been interrupted except for the defendant's threat to
276. See, e.g., Regan v. Davis, 97 So. 2d 324 (Fla. App. 1957) (speech therapist).
277. Cf. Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d 495,
81 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969). In this case the plaintiff sought judicial review of the denial
of his application for admission to the defendant society, an orthodontics association.
Membership in the society was a prerequisite for certification by the American Board
of Orthodontics, the sole certifying board within the specialty. In the trial court the
plaintiff also sought damages for "infringement of advantageous relationships" but did
not appeal from the finding of the trial court that he failed to prove such damage. 1
Cal. 3d at 164 n.2, 460 P.2d at 497 n.2, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 625 n.2.
278. 322 Mass. 356, 77 N.E.2d 318 (1948). Accord, Tatkin v. Superior Court, 160 Cal.
App. 2d 745, 326 P.2d 201 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Regan v. Davis, 97 So. 2d 324 (Fla.
App. 1957); Robinson v. Lull, 145 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Il. 1956). See generally Annot.,
9 A.L.R.2d 228 (1950).
279. It is in this particular that O'eens v. Williams is distinguished from the nonexistent case of a challenge to a certifying board's action; in Owens the plaintiff's professional standing is denied by an individual. The strength of the analogy depends upon
the willingness of courts to extend the law applying to the individual in Owens to a
certifying board.
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the hospital superintendent that he would bring no more patients to
the hospital unless the plaintiff was dismissed. The court found that the
defendant had purposefully engineered the plaintiff's dismissal with full
knowledge of the consequences to her. Finally, the court dismissed the
contention that proof of a binding contract with the hospital was essential, adhering instead to the rule that "an exsting or even a probable
future business relationship from which there is a reasonable expectancy of financial benefit is enough." 280
The cause of action against a certifying board, as suggested by
Owens v. Williams, would include the below-listed elements. The
complainant would have to establish: (a) his standing as a professional;
(b) the importance of certification by the appropriate board as a source
of valuable business relationships; (c) an interference with these business relationships by virtue of an "unjustified" 21 denial or revocation
of certification; (d) the intent 2 2 of the certifying board to interfere
with the plaintiff's prospects; and (e) resulting harm to the plaintiff.
Absence of justification for the certifying board's action may be the
most difficult element to establish. The law of interference with prospective advantage recognizes privileges for group action designed to
protect the public interest 8l or the legitimate interests of the group
itself.28 4 If, for example, a defendant board proves that its withholding
of certification is for the purpose of maintaining high standards, 2 5 it

cannot be held liable for unjustified interference with prospective advantage; its conduct is not "unjustified" and, therefore, not tortious. 28
Assuming both the good faith and reasonableness of a certifying board's
280. 322 Mass. at 361-62, 77 N.E.2d at 322. See generally
comment c at 53 (1939).

RESTATEMENT

or ToRTs § 766,

281. Strictly speaking, once the plaintiff proves an intentional interference and resulting harm, the defendant bears the burden of proving that his conduct was privileged.
See W. PROssmz, Tit LAw oF TORTS 953 (4th ed. 1971).
282. As used here, "intent" refers merely to the intent to deny or revoke certification
with knowledge of the probable results, not malevolence or a desire to inflict pecuniary
injury on the plaintiff. "Ill will on the part of the actor toward the person harmed
is not an essential condition of liability under the rule stated in this Section. .. ."
RESTATEMENT

oF ToRTs § 766, comment m at 62 (1939). See also Keene Lumber Co. v.

Leventhal, 165 F.2d 815, 821-22 (1st Cir. 1948).
283. See, e.g., Julie Baking Co. v. Graymond, 152 Misc. 846, 274 N.Y.S. 250 (Sup.
Ct. 1934); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Armstrong, 30 Okla. 134, 120 P. 952 (1911).
284. See, e.g., Jones v. Cody, 132 Mich. 13, 92 N.W. 495 (1902); Kuryear Publishing
Co. v. Messmer, 162 Wis. 565, 156 N.W. 948 (1916).
285. See, e.g., Harris v. Thomas, 217 S.W. 1068, 1076-77 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920);
Thompson v. New South Wales Branch, British Medical Ass'n, [1924] A.C. 764, 768-71
(P.C.) (N.S.W.).
286. See

RESTATEMENT

OF TORTS §§ 766, 767 (1939).
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action, it is not likely that a denial or revocation of certification could
be characterized as unjustified interference. The goals of professional
certification programs usually fall within both of the privileges mentioned above. 87 On the other hand, it seems clear that these privileges.
would not justify a denial of certification solely on grounds of personal
animosity or the maintenance of standards designed to exclude one or
more otherwise qualified persons.
In the gray area between these two extremes, the application of the
law of unjustified interference is problematic. For example, the New
York courts recognize any self-interest as a sufficient justification and
therefore permit recovery only when the plaintiff can show that the
defendant acted solely out of a malicious desire to injure the plaintiff. 288
This rule would restrict the availability of the unjustified interference
remedy to instances involving personal animosity and extreme capri28 9
ciousness. Even in jurisdictions which reject the New York rule,
judicial review of the certification process is limited by the fact that
the certifying board will be able to postulate justifications for its conduct in virtually all cases except those where abuse of power is manifest.
The critical question is the extent to which the courts will inquire into
the actual necessity of the board's action for the protection of the interests at issue. Such inquiry would reveal many instances wherein
less restrictive action on the part of a board would have sufficed to
protect its interests and would have allowed a measure of satisfaction
to an otherwise aggrieved applicant. However, once a privilege is
demonstrated by the board, few courts have been willing to undertake
an examination of alternatives. 290 This narrow approach is ill-suited

to a thorough evaluation of the competing requirements involved in the
287. Professional certification programs protect the public by enabling them to identify competent persons more readily, and simultaneously aid the profession by encouraging and recognizing high professional achievement.
288. See, e.g., Reinforce, Inc. v. Birney, 308 N.Y. 164, 124 N.E.2d 104 (1954); Terry v.
Dairymen's League Co-op Ass'n, 2 App. Div. 494, 498, 157 N.Y.S.2d 71, 76 (1956).
For critical discussion of the New York rule see Brown, The Rise and Threatened
Demise of the Prima Facie Tort Principle, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 563, 566-70 (1959);
Forkosch, An Analysis of the "Prima Facie Tort" Cause of Action, 42 CORNELL L. REV.
465, 475-82 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Forkosch].
*289. See, e.g., Hawarden v. Youghiogheny & Lehigh Coal Co., 111 Wis. 545, 87 N.W.
472 (1901). A partial list of jurisdictions rejecting the New York rule is contained in
Forkosch, supra note 288, at 474-82.
290. See, e.g., Edelstein v. Gillmore, 35 F.2d 723, 727 (2d Cir. 1929), cert..denied, 280
U.S. 607 (1930); Arnold v. Burgess, 241 App. Div. 364, 368, 272 N.Y.S. 534, 538 (1934),
aff'd per curiam, 269 N.Y. 510, 199 N.E. 511 (1935).
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certification process and its proper role in the regulation of the professions.2 91
A few jurisdictions have abandoned the traditional approaches to the
doctrine of justification and have treated the issue in terms of whether
292
the defendant's conduct is justified in the light of all the circumstances.
The case of Willis v. Santa Ana Comnmnity Hospital Association293 is
a good example of this approach. Stating the issues to be considered
on remand, the Supreme Court of California said:
There is an established principle at common law that an action
will lie where the right to pursue a lawful business, calling, trade,
or occupation is intentionally interfered with either by unlawful
means or by means otherwise lawful when there is a lack of sufficient justification.... Whether there is justification is determined
not by applying precise standards but by balancing, in the light of
all the circumstances, the respective importance to society and the
parties of protecting the activities interfered with on the one hand
294
and permitting the interference on the other.
Although this approach encourages an analysis of all relevant factors,
including the availability of less restrictive alternatives, 295 it does so
291. For example, until quite recently the Academy of Certified Social Workers required applicants for certification to have two years of successful social work experience in one agency under the supervision of an academy member. Because the social
work profession has always placed a premium on the value of supervised work, this
requirement is not manifestly unreasonable as a criterion for membership in a professional society established for the recognition of advanced preparation and commitment in the social work field. But would a claim of privilege based on these grounds
survive the counter-argument that two years of supervised work experience under any
qualified agency supervisor-regardless of whether an academy member-is sufficient to
further all the legitimate goals of the academy and, theirefore, implementation of the
requirement constitutes unjustified interference? This is the kind of analysis which will
often be necessary if the certifying boards are to be challenged successfully via the
theory of unjustified interference.
292. See, e.g., Huskie v. Griffin, 75 N.H. 345, 350, 74 A. 595, 597-98 (1909).
293. 58 Cal. 2d 806, 376 P.2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1962).
294. Id. at 810, 376 P.2d at 570, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
295. See, e.g., Blank v. Palo Alto-Stanford Hosp. Center, 234 Cal. App. 2d 377, 44
Cal. Rptr. 572 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965). In the Blank case, an action for unjustified interference was brought by a radiologist attacking the exclusive contract method of
operating the diagnostic X-ray department of a hospital. The decision of the trial judge
sustaining the validity of the hospital's method of operating its X-ray department is
based on a careful consideration of existing practice and available alternatives. Relevant
portions of the trial judge's opinion are quoted in 234 Cal. App. 2d at 387-89, 44 Cal.
Rptr. at 579-80.
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without indicating the relative weight to be assigned to the various
factors.
A recent New Jersey case, however, dealing with the activities of
a professional association, not only retained the flexibility which characterized the Willis decision but also proceeded on the theory that
public policy demanded greater consideration to be given to some
factors than others. This is the so-called "public service" or "fiduciary
responsibility" theory first enunciated in Falcone v. Middlesex County
Medical Society.296 In Falcone the defendant medical society had refused to admit as an active member the plaintiff, Dr. Italo Falcone, on
the ground that he had received part of his medical training at an oste6pathic college.297 In fact, Falcone held an unrestricted license to practice medicine and surgery in New Jersey and had also received the
degree of Doctor of Medicine from the University of Milan, an AMAapproved medical college. 298 His unquestioned professional qualifications notwithstanding, Falcone was immediately dropped from the staffs
of two local hospitals which, like other hospitals in the area, required
their staff physicians to be members of the county medical societ3r.
Faced with the loss 'of his surgical and obstetrical practice, Falcone
obtained a court order directing the society to admit him to full membership. 2 9 The Supreme Court of New Jersey subsequently affirmed
the lower court decree in a unanimous opinion which stressed the
severe "economic and professional effects" of the society's action on
Falcone and its virtual monopoly over access to hospital facilities:
Through its interrelationships, the County Medical Society possesses, in fact, a virtual monopoly over the use of local hospital
facilities. As a result it has power, by excluding Dr. Falcone from
membership, to preclude him from successfully continuing in his
practice of obstetrics and surgery and to restrict patients who wish
to engage him as an obstetrician or surgeon in their freedom of
296. 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961).
297. Falcone had attended the Philadelphia College of Osteopathy, an accredited
school of osteopathy which was held to be in good standing by the New Jersey State
Board of Medical Examiners. At the Philadelphia College, Falcone received a full traditional medical course as well as osteopathic training and upon graduation was awarded
the degree of Doctor of Osteopathy (D.O.). Id. at 584-85, 170 A.2d at 792-93.
298. Falcone received the M.D. degree after seven months attendance at the University of Milan with credit for his work at the Philadelphia College. Id. at 585, 170
A.2d at 793. The basis for his exclusion from the society was an "unwritten membership
.requirement of four years of study at a medical college approved by the A.MA.:' Id.
at 586, 170 A.2d at 794.
299. 62 N.J. Super. 184, 162 A2d 324 (Super. Ct. 1960).
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choice of physicians. Public policy strongly dictates that this
power should not be unbridled but should be viewed judicially as
a fiduciary power to be exercised in reasonable and lawful manner for the advancement of the interests of the medical profession and the public generally; the evidence firmly displays that
here it was not so exercised and that Dr. Falcone was fairly and
justly entitled to the relief awarded to him in the Law Division. 00
In view of Falcone's undoubted competence, the court concluded that
the society's action was "patently arbitrary and unreasonable and beyond the pale of the law." 3oThough revolutionary in its implications for judicially compelled
admission to private associations, 0 2 the rationale of Falcone is not without foundation. The basis of the decision was a recognition that a medical society is not a voluntary membership association analogous to the
Order of the Eastern Star, but is rather a private body exercising functions of vital concern to the entire public. Thus strong policy grounds
dictate judicial review of a medical society's power to restrict its
membership. 0 3 This public service argument has direct antecedents in
a line of cases ordering labor unions to admit workers to membership
in situations in which the union exercised a monopoly of employment
in a particular trade or occupation.304 In these circumstances, the courts
declared that a union occupies a quasi-public position and does not
300. 34 NJ. at 597, 170 A.2d at 799.
301. Id. at 598, 170 A.2d at 800.
302. A good example of the prior judicial attitude (which may remain very much
alive today) is the following statement from Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y,
230 FSupp. 805, 810 (W.D.N.C. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 355 F.2d 718 (4th Cir.
1966): "An individual is free to choose his associates and a voluntary private association
of individuals is free to choose its members. A court will not and cannot compel admission of an individual into a voluntary association, membership being a privilege and
not a right. This is true no matter what may be the reason or motive for the denial
of membership." See generally Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 964 (1963); Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d
531 (1951); Comment, Medical Societies and Medical Service Plans-From the Law of
Associations to the Law of Antitrust,22 U. Cim. L. REv. 694 (1955).
303. See Griesman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 400-01, 192 A.2d 817, 824-25 (1963).
Judicial review of the society's actions seems to be the major practical consequence of
designing its responsibility to the public as "fiduciary."
304. See, e.g., Directors Guild of America, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 64 Cal. 2d 42, 409
P.2d 934, 48 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1966); Thorman v. International Alliance of Theatrical
,,Stage Employees, 49 Cal. 2d 629, 320 P.2d 494 (1958); Williams v. International Bhd.
:,of Boilermakers, 27 Cal. 2d 629, 165 P.2d 903 (1946); James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal.
2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944); Wilson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 123 NJ.Eq.
347, 197 A. 720 (Ch. 1938).
.
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possess the right to exclude arbitrarily some employees from membership.305
The Falcone rationale has more fundamental origins in the common
law doctrine of "public callings." Certain occupations and businesses
deemed to be "affected with a public interest" were under a duty to
proyide competent service for a reasonable compensation and on a nondiscriminatory basis.308 The public calling concept involved two basic
factors: (1) the indispensable nature of the service in the medieval
English economy, and (2) the virtual monopoly status of the service.8 07
Such occupations as innkeepers, common carriers, surgeons, and blacksmiths were considered public callings. As economic conditions changed,
the doctrine's flexibility allowed the courts to reassess the need to
08
regulate various enterprises.

The Falcone decision implicitly recognizes the analogy between the
public service responsibilities of innkeepers and common carriers in an
earlier age and medical societies in the present era 309 Significantly, the
basis of the Falcone opinion-the economic necessity of membership in
the society due to its monopoly position-includes the same factors
305. This position is well-stated in the following quotation from James v. Marinship
Corp, 25 Cal. 2d 721, 731, 155 P.2d 329, 335 (1944):
In our opinion, an arbitrarily closed or partially closed union is incompatible with a closed shop. Where a union has, as in this case, attained
monopoly of the supply of labor by means of closed shop agreements and
other forms of collective labor action, such a union occupies a quasi-public
position similar to that of a public service business and it has certain corresponding obligations. It may no longer claim the same freedom from legal
restraint enjoyed by golf clubs or fraternal associations. Its asserted right
to choose its own members does not merely relate to social relations; it
affects the fundamental right to work for a living.
In the Falcone opinion the court quoted the above statement from the James case and
explicitly relied on the reasoning of the labor union cases. 34 N.J. at 593-96, 170 A.2d
at 797-98.
305. See generally Arterburn, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. PA.
L.'Rv. 411 (1927); Burdick, The Origin of the PeculiarDuties of Public Service Companies, 11 COLUM. L. REv. 514, 616, 743 (1911) [hereinafter cited as Burdick]; Small,
Anti-Trust Laws and Public Callings: The Associated Press Case, 23 N.C.L. Rxv. 1 (1944);
Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem, 17 HARV.
L. REv. 156, 217 (1903) [hereinafter cited as Wyman].
307. See Small, supra note 306, at 5; Wyman, supra note 306, at 161. Cf. Burdick
supra note 306.
308. See Small, supra note 306, at 3-5.
309. In Falcone, the court cited and quoted portions of Wilson v. Newspaper & Mail
Deliverers' Union, 123 N.J.Eq. 347, 197 A. 720 (Ch. 1938), a case involving admission
to labor unions. 34 NJ. at 594-95, 170 A.2d at 798. In Wilson the court explicitly based
the union's duty on the law of public callings. 123 N.J.Eq. at 350-51,. 197 A. at 722.
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which were controlling in the old public calling cases. It is in this
doctrinal parallel that the New Jersey court's view of the proper scope
of judicial review of the actions of professional associations may be most
clearly discerned. The regulation of various enterprises in the medieval

English economy through the public calling concept exemplified the
activism of the common law courts. Falcone is a modern call for judicial activism in the regulation of the professional association.
The principle of Falcone promotes an enlargement of individual rights
with respect to the actions of certification boards. An unexpected
consequence of the decision has been the barrage of critical student
comment questioning the competence of the courts to rule in this area. 810
In an effort to "save" the Falcone decision from its critics, another
student commentator 31 ' has suggested that the courts rely on. the fact

of state licensure or certification as a standard of review in cases involving exclusions from professional associations:
When an applicant has been certified or licensed by the state there
should be a presumption that the applicant is qualified for admission to the professional association. . . . Making state licensure
prima facie evidence of qualification for membership in a professional association places upon the association the burden of proving that a particular applicant should be excluded. The society
would have to demonstrate that although the applicant had a
license his admission was not in the public interest. Absent a clear
and convincing showing, a court should accept the fact of licensure
310. See, e.g., Note, Expulsion and Exclusion From Hospital Practice and Organized
Medical Societies, 15 RuTrcERs L. REv. 327, 356 (1961); 75 HARV.. L. REv. 1186, 1193 (1962).
Cf. 14 W. REs. L. REv. 346, 359-60 (1963). The Supreme Court of Arizona, in an opinion
adopting the rationale of Falcone, suggested that on the facts of the case the New
Jersey court "may have made an appraisal of medical training beyond its competence:,
Blende v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 96 Ariz. 240, 245, 393 P.2d 926, 930 (1964).
The criteism from student commentators is remarkable because it seems to rest on a
distinction between personal rights and economic rights now largely discredited. See
McCloskey, supra note 29; Reich, supra note 10. For a different evaluation of the Falcone
case see, Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 107, at 1258-59.
The Falcone decision has been followed in at least two reported cases involving admissions to local medical societies. Blende v.Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 96 Ariz.
240, 393 P.2d 926 (1964); Kurk v. Queen's County "Medical Soc'y, 46 Misc. 2d 790,
260 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup. Jud. Ct.), rev'd, 24 App. Div. 2d 897, 264 N.Y.S.2d 859
(1965), aff'd mem., 18 N.Y.2d 928, 276 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1966). The reversal of the
lower court in Kurk was based on the ground that Falcone was not applicable to the
facts of the case rather than a rejection of the principles enunciated by the New Jersey
court.
311. 74 YALE L.J. 1313 (1965).
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as sufficient evidence of, qualification and order the applicant ad3 2
nitted to the association. 1
Such 'a presumption raised by the fact of licensing in favor of an appli-

cant could minimize the need for courts to make technical or policy
determinations concerning professional qualifications and would have
little or no adverse effect on the professional association's function of

raising ethical standards.313

A standard of review linked to state licensure, however, is inadequate'

to deal with many of the problems which arise when a certifying board,
seeks to determine professional qualifications. *On the one hand, the

boakd's inquiry may be directed to matters not explored in the state
licensing process. On the other hand, the state may not have chosen to
regulate the profession in question through the licensing device. More
to the point, even where a state licensing standard may have been
applicable to a particular certification question, courts generally have
not utilized the suggested presumption; the cases have been decided
without reference to the fact ihat the applicant had satisfied State
licensing'reqiirements 14 For example, California courts have decided
two cases 315 involvifig licensed' real estate brokers who were denied'
312. Id. at 1321-22.
313. Id. at 1322.
314. See, e.g, Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d
495, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969) (admission to society of orthodontists; state licensing'
not, relevaht but Falcone'followed); Kronen v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists,.
237 Cal. App. 2d 289, 46 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 495 (1966) (similar);
Higgins v. American Soc'y of Clincial Pathologists, 51 N.J. 191, 238 A.2d 665 (1968)
(discussed in text); Salter v. New York State. Psychological Ass'n, 14 N.Y.2d 100, 198
N-E.2d 250, 248 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1964) (admission to association of psychologists; Falcone
not applicable because of lack of proof of economic necessity and professional monopoly); Kurk v. Queen's County Medical Soc'y, 46 Misc.2d 790, 260 N.Y.S.2d 520
(Sup. Jud. Ct.), rev'd, 24 App. Div.2d 896, 264 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1965), aff'd mem., 18
N.Y.2d 928, 276 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1966) (admission to local medical society; Falcone
not applicable because of absence of monopoly over access to hospitals). For litigation
involving private certification plans not reaching the merits see Wilson v. McCune,
222 So. 2d 230 (Fla. App. 1969); Virgin v. American College of Surgeons, 42 IM. App.
2d 352,192 N.E.2d 414 (1963); American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers v. Hawk,
436 S.W. 2d 359 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
315..Martin v. Board of Realtors, No. R-12694 (Super. Ct., Contra Costa County, Cal.,
May 16, 1966); Slaughter v. Board of Realtors, No. 334-342 (Super. Ct., Alamedia
County, Cal., Mar. 29, 1965). These cases are noted in Tobriner & Grodin, supra note
107, at 1259. See Austin, Real Estate Boards and Multiple Listing Systems as Restraints
of Trade, 70 CoLum. L. Rav. 1325, 1362 (1970), including the following quotation from
the opinion in the Slaugbter case:
The activities and services of the Board vitally affect the public through
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admission to local real estate boards and access to the multiple lists
kept by those boards. 16 Despite the fact that the actions of the local
boards undercut the application of state licensing standards, the courts
explicitly relied on the "public service" rationale in ordering local real
estate boards to admit qualified brokers to their membership rolls.
Nor have courts limited their review of certification actions to those
cases in which state licensure provides evidence of professional qualifications. Although New Jersey does not regulate the practice of medical
technology, the Supreme Court of New Jersey intervened in the case
of Higgins v. American Society of Clinical Pathologists17 to protect
the interest of a medical laboratory worker in a certification proceeding. The court simply held that the society's certification rules violated the public policy of the state and could provide no valid basis for
the society's action.318
The significance of Higgins may be easily exaggerated. The Society's
rules were blatantly self-serving and entirely unrelated to the plaintiff's
professional qualifications as a medical technologist. The New Jersey
court may also have been influenced by a contemporaneous antitrust
prosecution by the Justice Department of a related group of pathologists
for activity similar to that under attack in the Higgins case. Future
cases in which the association rules bear a closer relationship to the
efforts of professionals to advance their legitimate interests and raise
standards may dampen the activist ardor of the New Jersey court. In
any event, Justice Jacobs, the author of the Falcone opinion, was careful to state that action by the county medical society designed to adits operation and control of the multiple listing service, through its regulation of the use of the designation "realtor," and through its regulation of
the real estate industry and industry practices generally. The Board had,
during all periods referred to herein, represented and held itself out to the
public and to real estate brokers as being open to admission by all ethical
and competent brokers, and performing a public service by the activities
referred to herein. Exclusion of brokers by the Board on the basis of arbitrary or discriminatory factors limits the choice of the buying or selling
public. Such exclusion is contrary to the public policy of the State of
California and the United States of America.
But cf. Grillo v. Board of Realtors, 91 N.J. Super. 202, 225, 219 A.2d 635, 648 (Super.
Ct. 1966) (holding that state system of regulation of the real estate business had preempted the field and thus a local real estate board was not free to establish its own
independent standards of ethics and competency).
316. See Austin, supra note 315, at 1350.
317. 51 NJ. 191, 238 A.2d 665 (1968). The Higgins case is discussed in detail at
pp. 72-74 supra.
318. Id. at 202-04, 238 A.2d at 671-72.
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vance medical science or elevate professional standards would be "sympathetically supported." 819

Regardless of the extent to which the above mentioned considerations
may detract from the importance of Falcone,3 20 that case offers the
best prospect under present law for some form of regulatory check on
the activities of private certifying boards. The chief merit of the
"public service" rationale is a frank recognition of the breadth of the
319. 34 N.J. at 598, 170 A.2d at 800.
320. Another ambiguity in the Falcone decision is the vagueness of the standard of
economic necessity which it establishes. Although the economic necessity of membership
in the county medical society to Dr. Falcone was obvious, it has been argued that the
open-ended nature of the concept may lead to judicial review of membership questions
involving fraternal orders, honorary societies, colleges and universities, and similar organizations. See Recent Decision, 37 NoTRE DAMS LAw. 453, 461 (1962). Assume, for example, that a life insurance salesman who was denied membership in a local Elks club
brings an action to compel the club to admit him to membership, arguing that personal
contacts attainable through fraternal orders were essential to his success in the life insurance business. Would the principles of Falcone be applicable to such a case? It seems
doubtful. Cf. Trautwein v. Harbourt, 40 NJ. Super. 247, 123 A.2d 30 (App. Div.),
cert. denied, 22 NJ. 220, 125 A.2d 233 (1956) (no liability for exclusion of plaintiffs
from Order of Eastern Star). It seems extremely unlikely that such a hypothetical life
insurance salesman could prove the two factors deemed crucial in the Falcone opinion:
the economic indispensability of membership in the association and its monopoly position. First, the possibility that membership in the local Elks Club might be economically
advantageous to a life insurance salesman is not enough-indispensability is the criterion.
In Falconethe court concluded that exclusion from the local medical society amounted
to a partial revocation of the license to practice medicine. It is difficult to imagine a
case in which exclusion from a fraternal order could have such devastating consequences.
Second, unless the Elks Club is the only source of informal, friendly personal contacts
in the local area, the criterion of monopoly is not satisfied. In the normal case the
life insurance salesman might seek membership in the Masons, Lions, church groups,
civic organizations, and similar associations.
On the other hand, the possibility of applying the Falcone doctrine to colleges and
universities-particularly professional schools-is more troublesome. The conclusion that
the courts should be asked to review questions concerning student admissions and dismissals or faculty appointments and tenure is speculative. But cf. DeFunis v. University
of Washington (Wash. Super. Ct. Sept., 1971), in N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1971 (law
school required to admit plaintiff excluded because of admissions policy favoring racial
minorities). Nevertheless, there is no question, for example, of the economic indispensability of graduation from professional school to the would-be lawyer or doctor. The
professional school generally enjoys a monopoly position vis-a-vis its students; a student
dismissed from a professional school will very often be unable to gain admission to
another. In a case involving the dismissal of a student from a professional school, the
Falcone criteria may be satisfied and judicial review would follow. But it is probably
incorrect to assume that the courts will apply a doctrine which has evolved in cases
involving professional associations to the college and university situation. The importance of preserving academic freedom presents a countervailing policy strongly
supporting judicial non-intervention. See Green v. Howard University, 271 F.Supp. 609
(D.D.C. 1967), remanded,412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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problem it addresses, namely, the virtual monopoly of the professional
association and the resulting economic and social impact on both the
individual applicant and society at large. Although there are areas of
professional association activity in which the courts will undoubtedly
continue to maintain a "hands-off" attitude, widespread acceptance of
the public service rationale will preclude arbitrary and discriminatory
action and very likely result in a wide-ranging judicial review of the
more guild-like aspects of professional associations and certifying boards.
CONCLUSION

Modem socio-political analyses of the professions have isolated the
self-regulatory authority possessed by professional associations as one
of their most fundamental characteristics. 2 ' There is no lack of evidence to support this thesis. Professional associations closely guard
the gates of entry into their respective occupations, generally armed
with state power exercised through the licensing system. Except in
extreme situations involving criminal violations, professional associations
also have the duty of disciplining their wayward members and the
concomitant responsibility for evaluating professional performance. Professional self-government is rendered more complete in the United States
by the absence of any centralized control of higher education-a factor
which has enabled the professions to assume the task of accrediting
their own training centers.
Thus, it is, in a sense, incongruous to distinguish the private certification process from the closely related procedure of state licensure. Where
state authority to govern professional activities ends, the authority of
these professions to govern themselves begins-the line of demarcation
is often a fine one. The economic and social impact of certification is
likely to be substantially similar to the effects of licensing systems. In
view of the state policies of leaving much of the regulation of professional activities to the professions themselves through the certification
process, inquiry is raised as to the advisability of placing external restraints on certification.
There are a number of reasons for imposing limits on the scope of
professional autonomy as it is manifested in the proliferation of independent certifying boards and agencies. The first reason is the compell321. See, e.g., CAPLOW, supra note 14; GILB, supra note 1; LIEBERMAN, supra note 8;
Goode, Community Within a Community: The Professions, 22 Am. SOCIOLOCIcAL REV.
194 (1957); Greenwood, supra note 19, at 44. Some of these observers have differed
over whether the public or the professionals themselves are the primary beneficiaries of
this grant of self-regulatory authority. Compare Goode, supra, with LIEBERMAN, supra.
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ing need to reform the procedures of some of the certifying boards.
Since the boards are not deemed instrumentalities of the state, they
are not constitutionally required to accord procedural due process to
the persons whose professional fortunes they may determine. 2 Consequently, some certifying organizations have disregarded fundamental
procedural safeguards against arbitrary action in passing on the applications of candidates for certification or in conducting disciplinary
proceedings82n
Simultaneously with the increase in use of the certification device,
both the Supreme Court and the state courts have been expanding the
procedural rights of applicants for state licensing.3 24 Because licensing
and certification are functionally equivalent, logic demands that the
guarantee of due process required in licensing be extended to certification. The imposition of a duty on certifying boards to grant basic due
process rights seems essential to reduce the possibility of arbitrary action
and to preserve the integrity of the process. 32
Secondly, more rigid control of the certification process will insulate the certifying board from the pressures of competing groups. Any
professional association's ability to achieve its goals in the legislature will
be limited by the lobbying power of rival groups who feel threatened
322. Despite the expansion of the concept of "state action" into many areas previously
thought to be "private," it is doubtful whether most certifying organizations are within
the doctrine. See, e.g., Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 US. 308
(1968); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 292 (1966) (private park); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (coffee shop located within state-owned parking
lot); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 US. 501 (1949) (company town); Hawkins v. North
Carolina Dental Soc'y, 355 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966) (professional association). Cf. Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools,
Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 658 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
323. See, e.g., Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d
495, 81 Cal. Rptr 623 (1969); Wilson v. McCune, 222 So. 2d 230 (Fla. App. 1969);
Virgin v. American College of Surgeons, 42 I1. App. 2d 352, 192 N.E.2d 414 (1963);
American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers v. Hawk, 436 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968).
Such abuses have been most widespread among the medical specialty boards; like
many medical societies, the medical specialty boards have claimed the right to reject
applicants without the benefit of a hearing or even a statement of reasons for the
rejection. See, e.g., Fontanetta v. American Bd. of Internal Medicine, 303 F.Supp. 427
(E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 421 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970).
324. See, e.g., Willmer v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 US. 96 (1963);
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). State court decisions are
collected in Annot, 2 A.L.R.3d 1266 (1965).
325. Although it might be objected that such a requirement necessarily will result
in increased costs, any additional expenses could be recovered easily by raising application fees.
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by the association's proposals. 20 Through this clash of interests a check
is placed on the ability of the professions to manipulate the licensing
process to their advantage or to the detriment of the public. 21 However, since no legislation is necessary to establish a certification program,
a professional association which establishes a certifying board is not
subject to any restraints upon its self-serving actions. As Higgins demonstrates, the professional association may attempt to achieve goals
through certification which would be unattainable if only licensing were
available. 28 Since the safeguards which inhere in the licensing system
are absent in certification, additional regulations should be imposed on
certifying organizations.
A third argument for expanded regulation of the certification process concerns the independence of the professions in setting their standards of training and ethics. Certifying agencies frequently make major
policy decisions with important implications for the entire society. Regardless of whether a certifying agency's particular decision has beneficial consequences, the unrestricted right to determine such policy
326. See Akers, Professional Association and Legal Regulation of Practice, 2 LAW &
Soc'y REv. 463 (1968).
327. See Gaa3, supra note 1, at 19-24; Developments in the Law-judicial Control of
Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARv. L. REv. 983, 986-90 (1963).
328. Higgins v. American Soc'y of Clinical Pathologists, 51 N.J. 191, 238 A.2d 665
(1968), is a good example of the disregard of the public interest which may result
when a certifying 'organization avoids the competing group pressures at work in the
legislature. State enactments concerning clinical laboratories uniformly authorize qualified non-physicians as well as pathologists to own and operate such laboratories. See,
e.g., CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CoPY. § 1200 et seq. (West Supp. 1962); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 483.011
et seq. (West. Supp. 1971-72); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 111-1/2, § 621-103 et seq. (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1972); N.J. REv. STAT. § 45:9-42.1 et seq. (1963); N.Y. PUB. HEaH LAw § 570-81
(McKinney Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 2151-65 (1964). The pathologists, dissatisfied with this state of affairs, conceived a plant to monopolize the commercial
medical laboratory business in the United States. One facet of this plan was a scheme
to prevent the non-physician laboratory owners from obtaining the services of qualified
laboratory personnel. The American Society of Clinical Pathologists was able to enlist
laboratory workers in the pathologists' campaign against the non-physicians through
the certification program which it conducted for medical technologists-the only recognized hallmark of qualification in the field. The Society simply declared it a breach
'of "professional ethics" for a medical technologist to work in a laboratory owned by
a non-physician. The penalty for such "unethical" conduct was revocation of certification. The effect of this exclusionary campaign was not only to limit the ability of
medical technologists to find advantageous employment, but also to deny the public
the benefit of competition between laboratories owned by physicians and non-physicians.
Clearly the pathologists would not have been able to achieve their goals in the state
legislatures without a fight from the non-physician laboratory owners; in any case, the
states already have made the decision to license non-physicians as owners and operators
of clinical laboratories.
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should not be conferred on professional groups. If such issiaes were to
arise in the context of legislative proposals, a lively debate would be
engendered in the community at large. The certification process, unlike
the licensing system, lacks the mechanism for the receipt and incorporation of ideas from outside the profession.329 Many matters should
remain within the province of the certifying board, but additional control of the certifying process is necessary to guarantee that the views
and legitimate interests of parties other than the professionals themselves are taken into account in those instances in which the ramifications of the certification action extend beyond the immediate issue.
It does not follow from this analysis, however, that certification
should be proscribed or rendered superfluous by complete state domination. Even if the administrative and financial difficulties inherent in
carrying such a proposal into action were discounted, a state takeover
would involve needless duplication of effort. Many private certification
programs are performing well in defining professional training standards and are providing the clientele with valuable information. Private
certifying agencies perform many services which could not be performed as satisfactorily by the states. It makes good sense, for example,
to certify medical specialists on a national rather than a state or local
basis. Not only do the medical specialty boards provide uniform
standards for specialist training; they also make certification possible
for physicians residing in states with small populations and a correspondingly small number of specialists whose unwillinguess or inability
to allocate the necessary resources might cripple a state licensing system.
In addition, a regulatory system which has been subjected to as much
criticism as state licensing should not undertake to grapple with the
problems of the certifying boards. State assumption of the certification
task would only add further complexities to the present chaos of the
various state licensing systems.
329. The case of Marjorie Webster illustrates this point. By virtue of its decision to
refuse to evaluate proprietary colleges for possible accreditation, the Middle States
Association had made a major policy choice concerning the role of such institutions
in American higher education. Because of the vast importance of regional accreditation
to most colleges, many proprietary schools have yielded to pressure from the accrediting
agencies and converted to nonprofit status in order to become eligible for accreditation.
Koerner, supra'note 245, at 40, 44. But certainly the question of whether the American
educational system is to consist wholly of nonprofit institutions is of sufficient importance to deserve the informed consideration of economists, sociologists, political
scientists, students and their parents, as well as professional educators. Although the
state legislatures provide a natural forum for a lively debate of this sort, the private
certification device enables the accrediting agency alone to decide the question.
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Widespread acceptance of the principles of the Falcone decision,
moreover, will remove the need for a state takeover of the certification
process. Indeed, the developing case law indicates that in regard to the
issue of procedural due process, Falcone has already succeeded; an applicant for membership in an organization has a judicially enforceable

right to have his application considered in accordance with the fundamentals of due process when membership in the organization is essential to professional achievement and recognition. 830 Clearly, the due

process requirement will be applicable in most situations involving
certification. 33' As the principles of Falcone are accepted in other states,
the certifying agencies will probably undertake a reform of their procedures on their own account,

32

thereby guaranteeing candidates for

certification the same procedural rights to which they would be entitled
in a state licensing context.

The scope of judicial review of a certifying board's substantive decisions is not settled. Although it has been suggested that application of the
principle of Falcone should be confined to cases in which state licensure
provides a standard of review,3 33 the courts of New Jersey and California have extended their inquiry beyond this standard. 3 4 The parameters of the Falcone doctrine of intervention are unclear because the
courts have been presented, for the most part, with cases concerning
procedural rather than substantive matters. 3 5
330. See, e.g., Blende v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 96 Ariz. 240, 393 P.2d 926
(1964). Since the decision of the Falcone case in 1961, the only decision to the contrary
is Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y, 230 F.Supp. 805 (W.D.N.C. 1964), revd,
355 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966). See generally Annot, 89 A.L.R. 2d 964 (1963).
331. See, e.g., Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 166, 460
P.2d 495, 499, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623, 627 (1969).
332. Counsel to professional associations, always anxious to prevent their clients from
becoming embroiled in litigation, will provide the impetus for such reforms. See, e.g.
Braemer, Disciplinary Procedures for Trade and Professional Associations, 23 Bus.
LAWYER 959 (1968).
333. 74 YALE L.J. 1313 (1965).
334. See Martin v. Board of Realtors, No. R-12694 (Super. Ct., Contra Costa County,
Cal, May 16, 1966); Slaughter v. Board of Realtors, No. 334-342 (Super. Ct. Alameda
County, Cal, Mar. 29, 1965); Higgins v. American Soc'y of Clinical Pathologists, 51
N.J. 191, 238 A.2d 665 (1968).
335. Many of the cases have turned on procedural matters. See, e.g., Blende v.
Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 96 Ariz. 240, 393 P.2d 926 (1964). In the cases which
have raised policy questions, the courts have focused on various factors which vitiated
association claims that they had acted in the responsible exercise of their self-regulatory
authority. For example, in the Falcone case, there was little reason to doubt that the
medical society's exclusion of Dr. Falcone was the product of an arbitrary prejudice
against physicians with osteopathic training. In the light of Falcone's conceded qualifications and his possession of an unrestricted license to practice medicine and surgery,
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Regardless of these uncertainties, judicial intervention in the internal
affairs of professional associations is destined to increase. The present
century is widely interpreted as being in the throes of a return to
"status" concepts rather than "contract" as the chief means of social
integration.0 6 The institutions of occupational licensing and the private
certification contribute to the resurgence of "status" because they do
not focus on contractual relationships. The professional's ability to perform and the willingness of others to contract with him for the purchase of his services are secondary to the controlling question of statusthe requirement that a professional possess a state license or a certificate
from the appropriate certifying board. 87 Although the idea of wideranging judicial review of the internal affairs of professional associations is novel, it is not an anomaly in an age which emphasizes professional status.3 8

Because existing "property" concepts provide scant

protection for the individual's professional status,839 the necessity for
innovative judicial action in the areas of occupational licensing and
private certification is certain to increase as our return to status concepts
becomes more complete. 40

the decision can be interpreted as holding that since the state legislature had refused
to grant the M.D.'s a preferred position over osteopaths in the medical field, the MD.'s
could not achieve such a result through concerted action. The merits of the feud
between M.D.'s and osteopaths, the opinion is careful to state, were not before the
court. 34 NJ. at 597-98, 170 A.2d at 799-800.
The substantive issues in the Higgins case made even smaller demands on judicial
competence. The restrictive practices of the pathologists in dispute were in direct
conflict with a state statute and were the subject of a contemporaneous antitrust prosecution by the Justice Department.
336. See, e.g., LmBERmANx, supra note 9, at 51-52; Kessler, Contracts of AdhesionSome Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLum. L. REv. 629 (1943); Reich,
supra note 10.
337. See Rich, supra note 10. For a discussion of the virtually complete disintegration
of status concepts in the professions in colonial America see Booasin, supra note 90
at 191-239.
338. It is significant that in Higgins, despite the absence of any present economic loss
resulting from the revocation of the plaintiff's certification, the New Jersey court
concluded that her "stake in her professional status" was substantial enough to warrant
judicial intervention. 51 N.J. at 202, 238 A.2d at 670.
339. See Chafee, supra note 40; Developments in the Law-JudicialControl of Actions
of Private Associations, 76 HARv. L. Rav. 983, 998-1005 (1963).
340. See McCloskey, supra note 29; Reich, supra note 10, at 783-87.

